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ABSTRACT 
 
The technological artifacts used in ship navigation have undergone substantial changes during the 
last decades, and real-time digital navigation is a reality with the introduction of the ECDIS. 
Despite the obvious merits of this new navigation mode, and the imagined improvement in safety 
that it theoretically should bring, ECDIS has in recent years been associated with several 
accidents. The term ECDIS assisted accidents has emerged in official accident investigation reports 
and is widely used among the applied technology community as well as having led to the term 
reverberating the RADAR assisted accidents that the maritime industry has used following the 
introduction of the RADAR. Despite the focus on the causal contribution from the interplay 
between the ECDIS and the navigator, the conclusions in the official accident investigation 
reports are predominantly directed towards the abilities of the ECDIS operator to use the 
equipment properly, and to a lesser extent on the features of the ECDIS. The reports do not at 
all investigate how the equipment could have helped navigators, by offering better support in 
reaching their contextual goals, i.e., to remain in control of the ship and to maintain safe 
navigation. Parallel accounts emanating from the applied community of ship navigation seem to 
suggest that functioning of the ECDIS is far from perfect, and at times is considered suboptimal 
by navigators.  
 
The ambition driving this thesis work was to explore these second stories about navigation with 
ECDIS, based on operator experiences, in order to gain leverage for new ways to inform future 
development and design of ECDIS, which to a higher degree would need to take into account 
the contextual conditions and demands that operators experience in the field of practice, and 
thereby to minimize the gap between how designers, and other remote stakeholders, imagine 
ECDIS operations, and how these actually play out.  
 
Naturalistic research was carried out by attending three ships´ bridges while the ships were 
operating. Insights were gained into what sometimes make work difficult during navigation by 
ECDIS. The findings were juxtaposed with information found in three official accident accounts 
of ECDIS assisted accidents, and finally the results were discussed based on a theoretical 
framework based on contemporary human factors and systems safety research literature, 
including Cognitive Systems Engineering. Thus, it was concluded how the methods applied in 
this thesis work, and its findings, could be useful to future ECDIS design and development. 
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ABBREVIATIONS AND MARITIME TERMS USED 
 
ECDIS (Electronic Chart Display and Information System) - Navigation equipment that 
represents the ship´s position on a computer screen, using approved charts. Further, data on 
weather, traffic, tides, voyage etc. can be processed and integrated by the system. 
 
ENC (Electronic Navigational Charts) - Official charts produced by hydrographic offices, for 
use with the ECDIS when this is to be used as the primary means of navigation. 
 
GPS (Global Positioning System) - From satellite derived information, the system 
automatically calculates the ship´s position as coordinates in a receiver device on the bridge, and 
presents the position numerically, or graphically on an electronic (chart) display. 
 
Dead Reckoning - Should the GPS receiver lose its input from satellites, it may continue to 
calculate the ship´s position based on the devices’ last known parameters. 
 
IMO (International Maritime Organization) - United Nations specialized agency with 
responsibility for the safety and security of shipping and the prevention of marine pollution by 
ships. 
 
E-navigation - Defined as “The harmonized collection, integration, exchange, presentation and 
analysis of marine information on board and ashore by electronic means to enhance berth to 
berth navigation and related services for safety and security at sea and protection of the marine 
environment.”1 
 
RADAR (Radio Detection And Ranging) – An essential piece of on board navigation 
equipment that provide bearings and distances to other ships and land targets in vicinity from 
own ship. Used for collision avoidance and navigation at sea. 
 
                                                 
 
1 Source: http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Safety/Navigation/Pages/eNavigation.aspx 
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AIS (Automatic Identification System) – A system that automatically sends and receives data 
from ship to ship and shore, for identification, position indication and voyage particulars of ships 
within radio reach. 
 
VTS (Vessel Traffic Service) - Shore based service that monitors shipping in a particular area, 
and provide services in assistance of safe navigation and traffic execution. 
 
Pilot - Advisor with special and/or local knowledge that boards the ship to assist the master and 
crew during passage of particular waters, or when entering into harbors. 
 
Paper chart - The common means of navigation prior to, or besides, electronic charts. Position 
obtained by GPS or terrestrial methods is manually plotted in the chart, and passage plans are 
manually drawn on the chart. 
 
Terrestrial navigation - Techniques for position determination that relies on land based 
reference points, in opposition to satellite navigation. Instruments used are for example RADAR, 
and compass, in opposition to GPS. 
 
Passage plan – A ship´s voyage in details, including waypoint positions, intended track and 
calculations of distances, times etc. 
 
Route checking - Verification of a passage plan to ascertain that this corresponds to vessel 
particulars and operating parameters. For example, water depths appropriate for vessel draught, 
compliance with rules and procedures etc. 
 
Safety depth - An operator defined depth that corresponds to the desired under keel water 
clearance of the ship. 
 
Safety contour - An operator defined marginal depth contour that triggers an alarm by the 
ECDIS if the ship crosses this (if nothing is chosen by the operator, the IMO performance 
standard requires a default safety contour of 30 m.). Upon route checking the system monitors if 
the ship will pass over objects shallower than the defined safety contour. 
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XTD settings (Cross Track Deviation) - An operator defined boundary on each side of the 
intended track. If the ship moves outside the track an alarm is triggered by the ECDIS. 
 
Chart scale – ENCs allow different chart scales (zoom levels) on the same chart, with different 
data to be displayed at the different chosen scale levels. The ECDIS will indicate if the chosen 
level is not found appropriate. 
 
ECDIS training - Two types of training schemes are mandatory in accordance with IMO 
regulations: Generic ECDIS training is a scheme that aims to provide the operator with basic and 
general competencies. Type specific ECDIS training is a scheme that aims to provide the 
operator with competencies specific to a particular ECDIS make and model. The latter can be 
completed both as class room (simulator) training and distance learning (for example on board). 
 
Master´s standing orders - A set of guidelines and/or preferences put out by the master of a 
ship for his/her officers to follow. 
 
Bridge console - The console where the main bridge equipment is installed, and from where the 
ship is normally conned. 
 
Autopilot - Equipment that allows the ship to automatically steer a crew ordered course or to 
keep a heading. Some autopilots can automatically follow a planned track. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The introduction of the sea chart may be viewed as the single most important milestone, and the 
beginning of ship navigation as we know it today, dramatically enhancing the ability to determine 
the central question of “where am I?” (Hutchins, 1995, p. 12). 
 
The progress in techniques to enhance precision of the ship´s position, which is an advanced 
process of data integration, can be largely ascribed to the progress in (computer) technology in 
general. Particularly the introduction and development of satellite based navigation systems has 
increased navigation performance. Work has changed from a manual process, done by the 
navigator, to the reading of readily calculated coordinates off a display. While manual skills, 
valued by older generations of navigators, are still taught at nautical colleges their practical 
application diminishes with each new generation of navigators. 
 
The development in navigation equipment however transforms navigation into an ever more 
hermeneutic discipline, where the complexity of determining the ship´s positon is hidden behind 
the equipment interface. Thus, the navigator, then, must rely on the equipment´s ability to 
communicate adequate information, effectively, at the right time. A now classic example of a 
communication breakdown between navigational equipment and bridge crew is the grounding of 
the passenger ship The Royal Majesty (NTSB, 1997). The crew did not recognize a GPS mode 
change into dead reckoning, i.e. it determined the position based on historical info instead of 
fresh satellite information.  
 
The perceived benefit of the current era of electronic chart navigation, besides capability to 
process ever larger amounts of various information, is that the navigator may follow the 
electronic representation of the ship´s position and its surroundings, and heading, practically real-
time with no manual, and supposedly little cognitive, effort. However, ECDIS assisted accidents 
have entered the scene of maritime misfortune. This suggests that the technology we introduce, 
thus, is not value neutral. It “creates new human work, new pathways to success and failure, and 
new capabilities and complexities” (Dekker, 2015, p. 207). Despite the hopes and dreams 
expressed for ECDIS navigation in the IMO performance standard2, regarding safety, reliability, 
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simplicity and easing of the workload on the navigator, several such accidents where the ECDIS 
has played a significant role have occurred in recent years.  
 
Official post-accident responses are often filled with human error labels using different words, 
attributing the problem to the human operator. A prime example is found in the following quote, 
responding to the grounding of the chemical tanker Ovit: 
 
[…] despite dedicated training ashore on the system they were to use, the operators’ 
knowledge of the ECDIS and ability to navigate their vessel safely using the system were 
wholly inadequate […] Unfortunately, the current generation of ECDIS systems, though 
certified as complying with regulatory requirements, can be operated at a very low level 
of functionality and with key safety features disabled or circumvented. Training and 
company culture may mitigate these shortcomings to some extent, but can only go so 
far […] While systems allow individuals to operate them in a sub-standard manner, 
there are those who will do so: such is human nature […] For all shipping companies 
navigation is a safety-critical function and failure to navigate effectively can and does 
result every year in pollution, loss of vessels, and loss of life. It is to be hoped, therefore, 
that the next generation of ECDIS will embody features making them less vulnerable to 
the vagaries of human performance to achieve a better level of assurance that safe 
navigation is being consistently achieved. (MAIB, 2014) 
 
According to Heede (2012), Foucault warns against society´s use of absolute categories, like 
“such is human nature” (MAIB, 2014), arguing that these rather reflect discourses created and 
conditioned by historical development, and, thus, cannot reflect any objective truth or describe a 
fundamental law of nature. A different, but parallel, portrayal of issues related to ECDIS assisted 
accidents is found in a growing number of articles from the applied community of ship 
navigation and management. This testifies to a pattern in feedback on the usability of the ECDIS 
equipment, hinting at the presence of an alternative to the canonical human error explanation. A 
recent example is found in the following quote from a column in The Nautical Institute´s journal 
Seaways, titled “We might be ready for ECDIS but is ECDIS ready for us?”: 
 
Given the primary function of ECDIS is to contribute to safe navigation, and that 
extremely sophisticated navigation technology exists, why are we so reliant on ECDIS 
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with so many flaws, weaknesses and limitations? (McDonald, A., Seaways, February 
2016) 
 
Currently, a global implementation process, running until 2018, makes the installation of ECDIS 
mandatory3 on most ships on the high seas. The issues we experience are, thus, likely to gain 
further momentum as ever more ships will have the potential for ECDIS assisted accidents. 
Furthermore, the large-scale concept of E-Navigation, currently under development, will demand 
processing of ever larger amounts of electronic shore to ship data, on the ship´s bridge. In this 
context, ECDIS is thought to play a significant role; it has been suggested that ECDIS can 
become “a suitable platform for decision making in everyday ship navigation” (Bistrovic & 
Komorcec, 2015).  
 
1.1 Thesis research question 
In the light of the ECDIS assisted accidents, and the issues that exist concerning their causal 
factors, it would be useful to look at the less studied second stories, i.e., a story that is in opposition 
to, or challenges, a commonly accepted story told previously, about ECDIS and navigator 
interaction that flourishes in the operational community. This may challenge a seemingly quick 
and easy resort to human error and nuance the debate on the challenges of future ECDIS 
development and design. 
 
The questions that will be examined in this thesis are: 
 
How do official stories about ECDIS assisted accidents match insights derived 
from normal work contexts of ECDIS use? How can these insights inform future 
design & development of ECDIS? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
3 SOLAS Chapter V – Regulation 19 – Carriage requirements for ship borne navigational systems and equipment 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A theoretical position about conditions related to ECDIS assisted accidents and future design 
and development will be outlined below: 
 
Achievement of the bridges´ collective goal of safe navigation is effectively supported by addressing local, contextual, 
operational demands at the equipment and work design phases. Goals-means dependencies (Woods & Hollnagel, 
2006) between navigator and ECDIS, crucial for process control, will manifest itself during everyday operations, 
rather than during post-accident investigations.  
 
A framework for better understanding of the goals-means dependencies is sought through a 
review of pertinent literature from the field of human factors and systems safety. 
 
2.1 Researching Maritime Contexts 
Lützhöft, Grech, and Porathe (2011), suggest that the maritime domain has been a bit slow to 
pick up developments in HFE (human factors and ergonomics), compared to other high-risk 
domains such as aviation and nuclear. The eventual spark for HFE in the maritime domain was 
the frequent use of the label human error following accidents and incidents, providing an 
incentive to address the human element.  
The authors assert that accident and incident statistics reveal a positive trend in shipping, in 
recent decades, but many future challenges remain to be solved and “while the systems become 
more integrated and complex, the handling and understanding [still] have to be adapted to the 
human element, the seafarers on board” (p. 285). The authors argue that previous problems of 
sparse information available to the navigator, to support decisions and maintain control of 
navigation, have now been replaced by information overload. Simultaneously the previous role of 
the navigator, i.e. active conning of the ship has changed into one of monitoring automated 
technology.  It is emphasized that it is important to; integrate the end user into the bridge system and to 
provide intuitive information at the right level of complexity at the right time. 
Several other researchers in the maritime domain have pointed to this, sometimes, cumbersome 
relationship between ships´ crews and the technology provided to assist them in their daily work 
on board: 
Schröder-Hinrichs, Praetorius, Graziano, Kataria, and Baldauf (2015), argue that the concept of 
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resilience might be fruitful in trying to make progress in safety, in the maritime domain. As an 
example of how history has proved it to be difficult to anticipate the effect of even small changes, 
on overall system performance, they note that with the introduction of new enhanced 
technologies; RADAR-assisted collisions occurred as an unanticipated side-effect of the new 
handling possibilities, facilitated by the technology, for operations with a smaller safety margin. 
For example, this led to closer calls between ships, and higher ship speeds in risky situations. 
They point to similarities with more recent technological advances, including ECDIS and AIS. 
In developing a safety II perspective, per the authors associated with resilience, in the maritime 
domain, the authors suggest two examples of how to move forward. Both emphasize the need to 
engage stakeholders and operators, and one of them highlights the currently ongoing CyClaDes4 
project aiming directly at the development of a framework so as to obtain user feedback for the 
design of ship board equipment. 
Another effort, aimed at exploration of resilience in the maritime domain, was undertaken by 
Praetorius, Hollnagel, and Dahlman (2015), in a study of on-shore VTS operations. Through 
engagement with the VTS operators, by interviews and observation, and subsequent analysis, i.e., 
by using FRAM (Functional Resonance Analysis Method), the researchers can provide insights 
on work as done (Hollnagel, 2012), revealing how the studied system had been adapted to the 
operational context, by inventing new functions to cope with these contextual demands. Thus, 
creating “a strong case for why management, rule-makers and regulators should consider how 
work is currently conducted before implanting changes” (p. 19).  
 
About the current fast-paced technology changes in VTS operations, including the introduction 
of E-Navigation, the authors assert that new technology is not value neutral, but new technology 
can change how work is done in the natural context. They cite Wiener (1988): “Progress imposes 
not only new possibilities for the future but new restrictions”, which fits the RADAR-assisted 
collision phenomenon mentioned by Schröder-Hinrichs et al. (2015). In relation to understanding 
why ECDIS operations sometimes prove cumbersome it may be necessary to understand the 
contextual demands and the adaptations done by the navigators, in response to the technological 
breakthroughs.  
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Lützhöft and Dekker (2002) revisited the grounding of The Royal Majesty to demonstrate how a 
second story can reveal more about the relationship between navigators and their technological 
tools, and so can challenge the conventional story about human error. The official case of “lost 
position awareness” (NTSB, 1997) following an unrecognized mode change to dead reckoning 
on the GPS was put into a systems perspective in this article, demonstrating how the technology 
may play an active role in the confusion of navigators. The authors explain why actions (and 
inactions) were sensible from the view point of the involved crew members. Several the features 
of the navigation systems were identified as problematic, leading to the miscoordination and 
miscommunications between humans and machines, evolving and deepening throughout the 
events that led to the grounding. For example, automation surprise (e.g. Woods, Dekker, Leila, 
Cook, and Sarter, 2010) was identified, i.e. when automated systems unexpectedly act on their 
own, i.e., when there is a mismatch between operators´ ideas about the functioning of the 
technology, and the actual functioning, and feedback provided by the technology, to the 
operator, about its functioning. The central message delivered by this alternative analysis, 
potentially relevant in relation to the challenges that we now see manifest themselves from the 
use of ECDIS, is:  
 
The question for successful automation is not “who has control” (and then giving 
automation more and more control as technological capability grows or economic 
imperative dictates). The question is “how do we get along together”. Indeed, what 
designers really need guidance on today is how to support the coordination between 
people and automation. (p. 12) 
 
Lützhöft and Nyce (2006) studied the art of piloting in the Baltic archipelago. Based on 
ethnographic research the researchers could construct a highly detailed account of work as done 
in piloting. Some interesting conclusions were drawn here about the integration of navigational 
methods used to determine ship position. The intertwined information environment that makes 
up the ship´s bridge is made sense of by the pilot, by forming a personal chart, which is not 
entirely a tangible artefact, but rather a personal construct.  This process transforms a simple sea 
chart into a representation useful for piloting. Thus, the actual sea chart (electronic or paper) is 
only one part of the picture needed to navigate safely and effectively, and the information 
provided by the chart is continuously evaluated against this construct:  
We have found two conditions when personal chart and plan and ship can essentially 
disconnect, one when plan and reality don’t ‘‘look’’ like each other anymore, the other 
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when plan and reality become out of synchronization with each other. (p. 13) 
The mariners studied are, thus, not just passive receptors (Norros & Salo, 2009) of the 
information provided by the chart, but rather active planners and integrators of information: 
 
Cross referencing between the world, chart and course book allows these pilots to 
build up, through experience, a model that allows them to get the job done. It helps 
them answer the question that informs almost all bridge work, ‘what do we need to do 
next´? (Lützhöft and Nyce, 2006, p. 16) 
 
2.1.1 Integration Work 
Lützhöft (2004), in a comprehensive study of mariners´ use of technology derived from four 
years doing problem-oriented ethnography, concluded that navigators all too often must do integration 
work to make the interplay between equipment and the operator work. Her observations of 
integration work are expressed as follows: 
 
Integration work is about coordination, co-operation and compromise. When human 
and technology have to work together, the human (mostly) has to co-ordinate resources, 
co-operate with devices and compromise between means and ends. (p. 57) 
 
Lützhöft concluded that the need for integration work, to be done by the mariners, is a result of 
more or less successful integration of the technological devices into the bridge as a socio-
technical system: 
 
Many ostensibly technically integrated maritime systems are neither well integrated from 
a human co-operative point of view, nor from a technical point of view […] Mariners 
have to bridge these gaps of integration by performing integration work, by adaptation, 
tailoring and shedding. (p. 88) 
 
In integration work a new sort of work load is created by having to deal with, or to anticipate, the 
shortcomings of the technology, or its limited success as an integrated entity of the collective 
human-machine ensemble that makes up the ship´s bridge. The navigators now must orchestrate 
coordination acts between themselves and their non-human ship mates. Such coordination work is 
particularly difficult because “machines cannot communicate in ways mariners see as useful”. 
(Lützhöft, 2004, p. iii).  
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About integration work and the role of Human Factors and ergonomics Lützhöft continues: “To 
be able to integrate on any level, humans must perform adaptations […] Whether this means 
humans adapting themselves or their surroundings, the job of Human Factors and ergonomics 
researchers should be to make this adapting easier.” (Lützhöft, 2004, p. 57-58). Adaptations, or 
performance variability, resulting in work-arounds, are a necessary contributor to many a 
technological and task success, but it also holds the potential for negative outcome (Woods et al., 
2010). 
 
2.1.2 Cognition in the Wild 
Hutchins (1995) argues, based on his ethnographically inspired studies on board a naval ship, that 
the discipline of navigating such ships could be seen as a number of events where cognitive 
functions, computation, a socially distributed set of events which takes place among the members 
of the navigation team, and the artefacts they use in order to reach the common goal of 
determining the ship´s position, relative to the surroundings. About the previous research of the 
cognitive sciences, which were mainly preoccupied with cognition as a phenomenon that took 
place inside the mind, Hutchins asserts: 
 
The emphasis on finding and describing “knowledge structures” that are somewhere 
“inside” the individual encourages us to overlook the fact that the human cognition is 
always situated in a complex sociocultural world and cannot be unaffected by it. 
(Hutchins, 1995, p. xiii) 
 
According to Hutchins, gaining an understanding of why, when and how navigational activities 
are carried out, is best done by studying cognition in the wild: 
 
It is notoriously difficult to generalize laboratory findings to real-world situations. The 
relationship between cognition seen as a solitary mental activity and cognition seen as an 
activity undertaken in social settings is not at all clear. (Hutchins, 1995, p. xiii) 
 
Similarly, Lützhöft (2004) concluded that the phenomena she was interested in were too complex 
to study in a simulator. Hutchins´ distributed cognition theory, thus, gives further leverage to the 
idea of studying the use of ECDIS in the operational setting. 
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In discussing navigation as a form of computation and cognition, Hutchins applies a framework 
developed by neurophysiologist David Marr in the 1980´s (Hutchins 1995). This framework 
consists of three levels of abstraction, with the highest level being the computational level: “This 
describes the goal of the computing system, why this goal is the appropriate one, and the basic 
logic of the strategy by which the computations are carried out” (Hardcastle & Hardcastle, 2015, 
p. 261). 
 
The next abstraction level is the level of representation and algorithm. This level provides an 
additional level of understanding “at which the character of the information-processing tasks 
carried out >...@ are analyzed and understood in a way that is independent of the particular 
mechanisms and structures that implement them in our heads” (Marr, 1982, p. 25, as cited by 
Hardcastle & Hardcastle, 2015, p. 261). This level, thus, also explains how the computational 
level can be modelled. 
 
The final level of abstraction is the level of implementation, where the “representations” are 
physically realized in the brain. 
 
The framework was developed to explain cognitive processes that take place inside the individual, 
but Hutchins believed that there was no reason, in principle, to confine it to such an “internal” 
conception of cognition: 
 
In order to understand navigation practice as a computational or information-processing 
activity, we need to consider what might constitute an understanding of an information-
processing system. (Hutchins, 1995, p. 49) 
 
With this, critics accused Hutchins of retaining focus on the cognition at a component level, 
rather than the quality of action and the ability of a system to stay in control (Hollnagel & 
Woods, 2005). In other words; it can be argued that Hutchins used a model of the individual to 
explain larger scale, more complex events like history, culture, society and context.  
 
2.2 JCS (Joint Cognitive Systems) and CSE (Cognitive Systems 
Engineering) 
JCS theory shares with cognition in the wild the belief that the research object should be situated 
action. It is about “listening to, eliciting, and collecting stories of practice” (Woods & Hollnagel, 
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2006, p. 44). Woods and Hollnagel argue that such methodology will provide a safeguard against 
what was termed the Psychologist’s Fallacy, articulated first in 1890: 
 
Updated to today, this fallacy occurs when well-intentioned observers think that their 
distant view of the workplace captures the actual experience of those who perform work 
in context. Distant views can miss important aspects of the actual work situation and 
thus can miss critical factors that determine human performance in that field of practice. 
(Woods & Hollnagel, 2006, p. 44) 
 
The paradigm of information processing, or computation, Hutchins picked up, is discounted by 
JCS and this model instead attempts an integrated view that avoids separating cognitive 
functioning, i.e. humans and machines, into different parts, but focuses on co-agency; “Agency is 
here used as a verb describing the state of being in action or how an end is achieved, i.e. what a 
system (an agent) does.” (Hollnagel & Woods, 2005, p. 19). 
 
Hollnagel and Woods define a cognitive system as follows: 
 
A cognitive system is a system that can modify its behavior on the basis of experience so 
as to achieve specific anti-entropic ends […] Systems that are able locally to resist the 
increase in entropy are called anti-entropic. In basic terms it means that they are able to 
maintain order in the face of disruptive influences, specifically that a cognitive – and 
therefore also a joint cognitive system – is able to control what it does. (2005, p. 22) 
 
If one chooses to define the ship´s bridge as a cognitive system, it may indeed match neatly with 
the definition provided in the above. 
 
2.2.1 Patterns in a JCS 
Studying work in context, in this case the use of ECDIS, is about capturing how behavior and 
strategies are adapted, and shaped by the artefact (the ECDIS), in order to reach the goal of safe 
navigation. The end purpose, one at least, is to plant design seeds (Woods & Hollnagel, 2006) for 
next generation of systems that will make a JCS more capable of attaining its goals. 
 
Woods and Hollnagel argue, unlike in more contextual approaches, that the search for generic 
patterns in the work context, is a central activity of CSE.  
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These patterns are empirical generalizations abstracted from and grounded on 
observations made through different studies. Patterns are a form of diagnosis that 
capture the essence of a problem (a hypothesis open to revision) and point to directions 
to be pursued to resolve the situation diagnosed (specify what could be promising 
directions to search for new solutions). (Woods & Hollnagel, 2006, p. 12) 
 
This, according to Norros and Salo (2009), they believe, draws the attention to the functioning of 
the system rather than to its structure. 
 
2.2.2 The concept of “habit” 
Norros and Salo (2005) advocate for the study of a system´s way of working. Later they argue that 
the study should not be an expression of “a generalization of externally observed behavior but, 
instead, an expression of an internal regularity in the behavior of the system” (Norros & Salo, 
2009, p. 49). They suggest using the semiotic concept of habit, in the empirical analysis of 
people´s usage of their tools and technology, to capture how the behavior of the system is “not 
just the results of repetition but what is adequate or meaningful in a particular situation, and 
hence worth repeating” (Norros & Salo, 2009, p. 49). This should allow actors to express their 
reasons for actions and assumes that users of technology, like navigators using ECDIS, are not 
merely passive receptors of information.  
   
2.3 Adaptation 
In order to understand how navigators adapt to their environment it is necessary to understand 
the demands they adapt to: 
 
By starting to build up descriptions of demands, one can begin to trace out the three 
relational properties of a JCS at work: affordance, coordination, and resilience. Each of 
these properties expresses a relationship between people (and other agents), artifacts 
(technological capabilities), and specific work settings (domains). (Woods & Hollnagel, 
2006, p. 62) 
 
Norros and Salo, (2009, p. 50) would add communication, and by that that communication systems 
make themselves affordable to the other. On this basis, they conclude that design should be aimed 
at enabling communication, reconfiguration and affordances. 
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Coordination highlights the contextual nature of cognition; “The idea that cognition is 
fundamentally social and interactive, and not private” (Woods & Hollnagel, 2006, p. 64). Work is 
done, and decisions are made, within a flux of multiple parties bringing different interests to the 
arena. Shipping is dynamic by nature, as the trading objects (ships) often physically move and are 
exposed to a continuously changing environment. Adaptive capacity is a precondition of all levels 
of ship operations to meet demands of markets, technological development and physical 
environments. Resilience represents an organizational quality that enables systems to reconfigure to 
meet such new and varying resource pressures and performance demands that is reflected in the 
law of stretched systems and the bounded rationality syllogism (Woods & Hollnagel, 2006).   
 
Perry & Wears (2012) explore how the local (often necessary) adaptations may become 
problematic at the global scale in hospital emergency departments. Adaptiveness is also necessary 
to study to inform design that can lead to cognitive artifacts which would fall prey to Grudins 
Law: “[…] when those we benefit are not those who do the work, then the technology is likely to 
fail or, at least be subverted […]” (p. 260).  
 
One adaptation strategy is system-tailoring. This means that context and devices are adapted for 
the practitioner, here the navigator, to preserve his/her own strategies for reaching goals (Woods 
& Hollnagel, 2006). This could mean physical alterations or setups of the ECDIS, different from 
those envisioned by system developers, or workaround procedures and instructions, to fit real 
world scenarios.  
 
Task-tailoring is the opposite, i.e. instances where practitioners must adapt their own strategies to 
fit the constraints imposed by the technology (Woods & Hollnagel, 2006). Activities and 
strategies here are adjusted in accordance with the characteristics of the devices that they use; for 
example, the navigator´s working preferences cannot be met by the equipment available, and 
he/she must resort to whatever support is available as offered by the device. 
 
Both examples of tailoring may be interpreted as an expression of a mismatch between the means 
and ends, leading to an operator’s integration work: 
 
There is (1) the designers´ ideas about the artefact and the functionality it shall provide 
(designers´ model of system); (2) the designers´ ideas or assumptions of who the users 
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are, what they want to do, and what they are capable of doing (designers´ model of 
users); (3) the condensed assumptions that are built into the artefact, i.e., how the 
artefact actually looks and functions, as different from what the designers intended it to 
look and function (artefact, or system´s image); and finally (4) the end users´ ideas about 
the artefact, what they intend to use it for and how they expect it to function (users´ 
model of system). (Hollnagel & Woods, 2005, p. 186) 
 
Raymer and Bergström (2013) identified several such mismatches between the machine-
embedded images and user machine images, when studying the interaction between 
anesthesiologists and the anesthesia monitor machine they operate. 
 
Tailoring, the consequence of such discrepancies, may be a way to finish the design of the 
artefact, similar to Lützhöft´s integration work, i.e. “>…@ the work that humans do to construct a 
system >…@ that helps them perform their work” (2004, p. 14). 
  
2.4 Joint Intelligent Systems 
Following the publication of one of the first coherent works on CSE; “Joint Cognitive Systems:  
Foundations of Cognitive Systems Engineering” (Hollnagel & Woods, 2005), critique was raised 
about its practical utility. The theoretical application, as treated in the book was perceived of little 
practical use to ergonomists and engineers (Bye & Naweed, 2008-1). The critics, in their review 
of the next volume “Joint Cognitive Systems: Patterns in Cognitive Systems Engineering” 
(Hollnagel & Woods, 2005), recognize “a myriad of different observational tools of an empirical 
endeavor that may generate data” (Bye & Naweed, 2008-2). Still, they assert that they find it to 
lack real prescription for research and development. The Law of Requisite Variety (e.g. Woods & 
Hollnagel, 2016, p. 19) among other things makes it clear however that a very prescriptive manual 
for design could easily end up being too narrow to handle the problems at hand. Norros & Salo 
(2009) present an argument for the need of a new design approach, which takes this critique into 
account: The approach, consisting of five steps, was developed by a multidisciplinary group, with 
diverse theoretical orientations, including both researchers and designers as well, who frequently 
discussed their work with an industrial reference group. The aim was to outline a new design 
approach based on ecological systems thinking (e.g. Amalberti, 2013). The resulting steps were 
presented as follows: 
 
1. The object of design changes from product to intelligent environments: 
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Instead of being used one stop one shop equipment-like products, technology becomes 
ubiquitous and part of a new type of intelligent environment. In this context, intelligence is 
not an attribute of technology or the human element as such but, instead, it refers to the 
appropriate functioning and adaptation of a system. The whole system, or intelligent 
environment, becomes the object of design. 
 
2. The new object brings design tensions:  
Intelligent environments bring both broader and deeper problems than those which designers 
are used to deal with. Five trends are identified, creating tension that influences the direction 
and philosophy of design. 
 
Table 1 
Tension that influences the direction and philosophy of design (Norros & Salo, 2009, p.45) 
 
 
 
3. Coping with tensions creates new design activity: 
While product design as the core practice of design will remain relevant, two complementary 
design modes will emerge. These are labelled immediate design and remote design. Immediate 
design is concerned with sensitiveness to the users´ current or expressed future needs, the 
context dependency and intensive utilization of layman designers. Remote design aims at 
structural changes, focuses on possibilities and is typically formative i.e. outlines general 
adaptive solutions. 
 
4. Characteristics of design knowledge: 
The epistemological basis for design is divided into two complementary modes, the first one, 
the more traditional one, resembles academic knowledge production, i.e. science. In the 
second mode, knowledge is created in the context of its application and crosses disciplinary 
borders. It is reflexive and dialogic rather than strictly objective or empirical in that sense. 
Both are necessary to fulfil the knowledge demands of all three design modes outlined in step 
3. 
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5. New concepts to tackle the design object: 
The methodological principle that human and environment form a functional unity is one of 
the important new ideas.  
The steps, thus, can lead to a new design model that joins more traditional approaches with new 
ones, to synthesize the remote and immediate design modes. The resulting design model 
suggested by Norros and Salo they term Joint Intelligent Systems. 
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3 Thesis Research Design 
 
3.1 Methodological considerations 
3.1.1 Ontological point of departure and epistemological consequences 
An important point made by Nyce, Talja, and Dekker (2015), will be addressed initially. They 
assert that: 
 
We need to turn the mirror back on ourselves and address not only the question of who 
holds the pen but what ontology are we committed to and what consequences this has 
for the kind of ethnography we wish to do. (p. 92) 
 
This research did not qualify as ethnography per se, but it included the use of naturalistic 
methods (Kirk & Miller, 1986). Furthermore, ethnographic methods largely influenced and 
inspired the investigator´s research efforts. Therefore, it was found appropriate to address the 
issue raised above, to promote transparency regarding both analysis and inference. This section 
aims to discuss the ontology underlying this study. 
 
A qualitative approach was suitable, because this thesis is about identification of presences and 
absences, rather than measuring the degree of a quality in the system, in a classic quantitative sense 
(Kirk & Miller, 1986). The research further aimed to use systemic and analytic categories such as 
resilience, affordability and coordination. This means picking up qualities that need interpretation 
rather than measuring to provide sensible input that may inform future design. The stories 
behind the phenomena was key. 
 
Lützhöft (2004) reminds us about the epistemology associated with qualitative methodology; that 
human observers are not just field recorders. Rather, observers are interpreters capable of going 
further than the face value of the data perceived. Raw data, however, regardless of how it is 
collected, is not self-evident or meaningful but itself requires the careful interpretation and 
analysis by the researcher. 
 
It is an ongoing debate whether human beings enjoy privileged access to their own cognition, i.e. 
the issue of whether phenomenal consciousness could be so divorced from cognitive access that 
a subject can have an experience that he does not and cannot think about (Block, 2008). This is 
an important issue in relation to the definition of the role of the observer as an interpreter, and in 
 
 
26 
answering the question of whether the informant statements about their own experience can be 
taken at face value (Nyce et al., 2015). In either case, the analysis of the collected data carried out 
by the interpreter will always carry his/her mark. Recalling Nyce et al. (2015), an indication of 
quality here was believed to be how transparent, or in contrast hermeneutic (Hollnagel & Woods, 
2005), the transformation process of raw data into a representation of meaning is. The quality 
hallmark is, thus, an analytical trace demonstrating how data becomes data as there will always be 
a transformation of meaning in the processing of raw data into representation, and that: 
 
[…] ways of getting access to empirical reality are infinitely negotiable, and their 
acceptability is a function of how well they conform to the worldview of those to whom 
the researcher makes his appeal. (Dekker, 2015, p. 203)  
 
The cognition accessibility debate leads to an important ontological and accompanying 
epistemological question about whether there exists a ground truth, one external to the human 
perception/interpretation, and in such case if it is accessible to the researcher and/or designer 
(Dekker, Nyce, van Winsen, and Henriqson, 2010). Again, this philosophical, rather than 
practical, issue was not attempted to be resolved here either. In continuation of the remarks 
about the observer´s role as interpreter, it will suffice to describe that the author assumes that any 
such objective facts, or a ground truth, about the subject under study is out of reach of any 
researcher or designer. To this end, physicist Thomas Kuhn noted in the postscript to his The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2012):  
 
There is, I think, no theory-independent way to reconstruct phrases like `really there´; 
the notion of a match between the ontology of a theory and its “real” counterparts in 
nature now seems to me illusive in principle. (p. 205) 
 
In the introductory section to this thesis, the investigator argued for a way to address the issues 
of ECDIS assisted accidents and development of ECDIS, one different from the commonplace 
official view of the causal mechanisms that underlie these challenges, which largely assumes that 
human operators are the fundamental issue (using different labels and words), and that in the 
newer technology lies the remedy, i.e. the more we automate and restrict the safer we become 
(Grote, 2012). Supporting the existence of second stories, a substantial body of contemporary 
literature points to fallacies associated with the assumptions about technology being able to serve 
this role. A well-known example being the “substitution myth” e.g. Dekker and Woods, (2002), 
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Woods and Hollnagel, (2006), Lützhöft, (2004), Amalberti, (2013). The investigator departed 
from this stance; that humans more often provide the solution to poorly designed and integrated 
technological systems, through their extraordinary cognitive and adaptive capacities (Hollnagel, 
2014). 
 
3.1.2 Methodological inspirations 
The introduction to this thesis further underlined the relevance of the issues currently 
experienced with use of ECDIS, and the phenomenon of ECDIS assisted accidents. The 
literature review served to illustrate how a theoretical framework may help identify the underlying 
mechanisms in socio-technical systems, contributing to the creation of preconditions for the 
phenomenon we wish to study here.  
 
To address these theoretical issues, the following assumptions developed by Lützhöft (2004) 
provided the principles that guided the research for this thesis:  
x “If context and meaning are not taken into account when designing new 
technology, there is a risk that a device or system does not fit the users and their 
tasks.” (p. 17) 
x “Using tools or methods designed to quantify behavior or to write laws will not 
yield the richness and complexity of the work situation, and will seldom tell 
technology designers or manufacturers what they need to know about the 
‘human element’. (p. 18) 
 
Problem-oriented ethnography 
Lützhöft (2004) studied mariners´ use of technology using ethnographically inspired methods. 
The approach, she termed, echoing Nyce, `problem-oriented ethnography´ and the idea was to 
directly focus on selected parts of a context in order to understand the ways that the studied 
operators saw, described and understood their work and their tools: 
 
The ways artefacts are used can only be observed and their significance discovered in 
actual use. It may seem, to an engineer, that there is no harm in changing the look of a 
display or changing the underlying metaphor for an instrument’s display of information. 
However, if we do not know enough about how technology is used in practice, what 
added functionality end users may have discovered or adapted the technology to afford, 
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and what work-arounds they have devised, we may lose many direct and indirect 
emergent effects. (p. 11-12) 
 
Shadowing 
In another field study of mariners at work (Ljung & Lützhöft, 2014) the researchers used what 
they refer to as shadowing, i.e. “[…] a method within participant observation […] where the 
researcher can meticulously observe real-time situations […] in order to understand how 
respondents behave in a given context.” (p. 5).  
 
The method is like that used in management research during the early 1970´s (Mintzberg, 1970). 
The method offers a compromise between using structure and excluding it. It couples the 
flexibility of open-ended observation with the discipline of seeking certain types of structured 
data. But the categorization of the findings is done based on how the observations develop, 
rather than based on the standing literature and previous research experiences.  
 
Informal interviewing  
Lützhöft (2004) used what she terms informal interviewing often as a main data source. The idea was 
that interviewing should be contextual, i.e. the informant is working while the interview is 
undertaken; this allowed here stories to be shared about the use of ECDIS. However, despite the 
best efforts to create an informal environment of trust, it cannot be escaped what Kvale (1996) 
asserts about the asymmetry of power in such interviews: “The professional is in charge of the 
questioning of a more or less voluntary and naïve subject.” (p. 20).  
 
3.2 Methods  
The research method in this thesis was to collect multiple case studies (here two cases), 
embedding multiple reports and accounts to be analyzed (three in each case). The first case was 
an ECDIS assisted accident, and the second case involved the everyday use of ECDIS. The 
navigators´ use of the ECDIS was the focal point for analysis in both cases. Yin captures the 
researcher´s motivation for choosing the case study research style, in the following quotation: 
 
>…@ you would want to do case study research because you want to understand a real-
world case and assume that such an understanding is likely to involve important 
contextual conditions pertinent to your case. (p.16) 
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The study design was structured around the two cases, to compare an official account of 
operator´s use of ECDIS following accidents, with insights collected about operators´ use of 
ECDIS during everyday operations. 
 
The data collection and subsequent analytic treatment was primarily qualitative in the sense that 
the data was subject to interpretation. Evidence collected was anchored in the theoretical basis of 
the reviewed literature and the theoretical models found there. 
 
The study protocol used, is portrayed in the figure below:  
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Figure 1: Study protocol. 
 
The following instruments and data sources were used to build the thesis’ empirical data set: 
x Analysis of official accident investigation reports, accounts of ECDIS assisted accidents. 
x Semi-structured (reflexive) observations of navigators using ECDIS for navigation under 
natural work conditions. 
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x Informal (dialogic) interviewing of navigators while using ECDIS for navigation, under 
natural work conditions. An interview guide was developed for support (included in appendix 
C, in its original, i.e., Danish language). 
x Extensive note taking on the bridge while a ship is underway. The evidence collected, using 
multiple methods, from the multiple data sources, was triangulated (see below): 
 
 
Figure 2: Triangulation of methods and data sources. 
 
3.2.1 Case # 1 - “ECDIS assisted accident” reports 
Document analysis of accident investigation reports were used here to explore pertinent features 
of the system during a control break down. As accidents are indeed rare such events was not 
expected to be observable during field work, and so insights were sought from these publicly 
available accounts. Furthermore, they offered insights into the common treatment of ECDIS 
assisted accidents, by researchers as well as officials, which often inform the widely accepted 
truth about the accidental events among the public. 
 
The main criterions for selection of the accident investigation reports was that the ECDIS was 
actively used for navigation at the time of the accident, and that the ECDIS technology is given 
attention in the report. 
 
The aim of analysis, thus, was twofold:  
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x To learn about the aspects of ECDIS use and technology which played some role in that 
accident. 
x To explore the nature of the official story, i.e. how these ECDIS was treated in these 
narratives. 
 
3.2.2 Case # 2 – Everyday use of ECDIS 
The researcher aimed for a variety of ship types and trades, to obtain an as nuanced and multi-
faceted experience of ECDIS use as possible. The focus on use of ECDIS, though admittedly 
represents one narrow slice of situated action that takes place within the broader context of 
navigation, and ship operation.  
 
The interviews were intended to be dialogue between the investigator and the informants. 
Questions asked were open ended, and so were the dialogues. In that way, the informants were 
not forced to construct answers to pre-determined questions, but the ongoing dialogue could 
develop as naturally as possible. As the investigator spent relatively long hours on the bridge, the 
conversations between informant and researcher sometimes stretched far beyond the scope of 
the study and the questions prepared. This may have, partly, remedied the power asymmetry issue 
raised by Kvale (1996). 
 
The aim of exploring natural contexts was twofold: 
x To learn about the aspects of ECDIS use that was found cumbersome, and helpful, in 
relation to the everyday work carried out on the bridge. 
x To be able to juxtapose these findings with those found in the ECDIS assisted accident 
cases analyzed. 
On-board naturalistic data collection was carried out from February to April, 2016. Evidence was 
collected from the following sources:  
x Ship #1: A cargo ship trading internationally with a fully compliant ECDIS installed. 
However, parts of its trading area were not covered by ENC charts and therefore paper 
charts was carried also and used too. 
x Ship #2: A passenger ship trading internationally on a regular route and schedule. The 
bridge navigation system offered full integration between ECDIS, RADAR, AIS and 
autopilot. 
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x Ship #3: A domestic ferry on a regular route and schedule. The bridge navigation system 
offered full integration between ECDIS, RADAR, AIS and autopilot. 
A data collection log was kept (included in appendix D) during attendance on board each ship. 
This is illustrated below. 
 
Table 2 
Data collection subject distribution 
 
Ship # Days on 
board 
(number) 
Interviewees 
(number) 
Observation 
time (hours) 
ECDIS model 
1 3 4 
(Respondents A, 
B, C & D) 
12 ½  Transas NS 4000 
2 3 4 
(Respondents E, 
F, G & H) 
15 SAM Electronics 
Multipilot 
Premium 
3 2 6 
(Respondents I, J, 
K, L , M & N) 
19 ½  SAM Electronics 
Multipilot 
Premium 
Totals: 8 14 47   
 
The successful visit to a ship´s bridge enabled the construction of a narrative accounting for the 
ways that navigators use ECDIS to pursue the goal of safe navigation. 
 
3.3 Data quality 
Neuman (1997) warns that the quality of data derived from qualitative research cannot be 
assessed by the positivist standard of reliability and validity, i.e., in terms of precise, consistent 
measures of some objective truth. Rather, high-quality field data aims to capture processes of 
sense making. Therefore, the investigator did not aim to eliminate neither the subjective nor the 
objective elements of sense making related to ECDIS use. 
 
3.3.1 Generalizability 
No statistical generalizations were pursued in this study. Furthermore, the studied cases are not 
sampling units like experiments or surveys (Yin, 2014), and numbers derived from the study 
would be too small anyways to serve as an adequate sample to represent any population. Rather, 
what was pursued here was lessons learned, and analytic generalization going beyond the cases 
studied, i.e. “>…@ to shed empirical light about some theoretical concepts or principles” (Yin, 
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2014).  Thus, it was the aim of this thesis to expand and generalize the theoretical foundation 
underlying the thesis work, not to extrapolate probabilities.  
 
One potential weakness in this study is the numerous ECDIS models and makes available on the 
market, and far from all could be included in this study. The same challenge can be raised given 
that this study only looked at several ECDIS on the bridge activities and accident reports. 
 
3.3.2 Biases 
With his master mariner background the investigator should be considered an insider (Yin, 2014) 
when studying navigators at work. However, because of working ashore for more than four years, 
at the time when the study was undertaken, some distance to the practical disciplines of 
navigation had been obtained. As accident investigator, at the time of writing, the role as insider 
was similarly assumed in the analysis of accident investigation reports.  
 
The insider role offers the advantage of knowing the environment researched, thus, being able to 
identify relevant cues. One potential pitfall is however the thinking that one understands what is 
going on, so that there is no need to record or analyze it (Lützhöft, 2004). Furthermore, personal 
experience and opinion largely biases choice of research topic, questions asked and observations 
made, and subsequently the analysis of the findings. However, the basis for treatment of data was 
consistently based on the answers provided by informants, rather than the questions developed 
by the investigator, and it was the answers that informed the meaning of observations. 
 
Then there is the issue of confirmation bias, i.e. the investigator sees what he expects to see, 
which can be an issue in qualitative research: How can one distinguish data saturation from 
confirmation biasing during later natural context data collection sessions? For example, are 
findings like those discovered at previous data collection sessions, or are they recognized as such 
only because they are now familiar to the investigator? Also, the investigator´s participation itself 
may have imposed biases, as events may be unintentionally and/or unknowingly manipulated or 
altered by the presence of the investigator, or by the ideas about his professional status as marine 
accident investigator. These conditions can be considered weaknesses in the chosen method. But 
they are a necessary trade-off that allowed the investigator to collect the data through 
participation in the natural context. With other methods, like simulation experiments, the 
sacrifice would have been that contextual inferences might have been missed regarding the 
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phenomena of interest. The participant observation method was chosen precisely because 
contextual conditions are exactly the object of interest in the study. 
 
3.3.3 Reliability and Validity 
“Reliability is the degree to which the finding is independent of accidental circumstances of the 
research, and validity is the degree to which the finding is interpreted in a correct way.” (Kirk & 
Miller, 1986, p. 20). Kirk and Miller assert that perfect validity would mean having access to the 
complete and exact truth, and as this is not possible, validity as such cannot be used to challenge 
qualitative studies, while it can be easier to obtain something close to perfect reliability in both 
qualitative and quantitative studies. Validity and reliability, thus, are by no means symmetrical. 
However, the case study research design chosen for this thesis work aimed to address validity and 
reliability in terms instead, of four quality measures; construct validity, internal validity, external 
reliability and repeatability (Yin, 2014). These measures were applied as follows: 
x Triangulation of evidence from multiple data sources, and multiple evidence collection 
methods (figure 2) 
x Application of theoretical propositions and a coherent theoretical framework 
x Exploration of rival explanations (theory vs. natural context derived insights vs. official 
truths) 
x Definition of data points in terms of specific concepts (abstract level) and operational 
measures (interview guide) 
x Key informants offered the opportunity to review and comment on draft report. 
x Identification of patterns, matching and categorizing 
x Maintaining a clear chain of evidence 
x Providing detailed descriptions of the methods, inspirations and the ontological position, 
and the provision of visible argument and evidence paths for the reader to follow. 
 
3.4 Research ethics 
The researcher was concerned mainly with two ethical issues in connection to this study: 
x The fact that the researcher was employed as a marine accident investigator with an 
official accident investigation board. 
x The fact that the main objects of study in the one case were human subjects that were not 
supposed to be at risk of incrimination of any kind if they participated in this research. 
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This was dealt with by emphasizing to potential informants and their organizations that the 
researcher´s professional status is irrelevant in relation to his academic studies, and that strict 
confidentiality would be maintained always. Later, during the data collection and subsequent 
analysis and processing, these principles was to be enforced. 
 
Ship owning organizations found to be appropriate research subjects was addressed at both 
management level and operator level regarding participation. It was emphasized that both levels 
needed to express sincere interest, and no further plans were made before this two-level consent 
had been obtained. After these consents were obtained, subjects were familiarized with study 
objectives, ethics and rules (the letter of request for participation, in Danish, is included in 
appendix A). Included here was the right to refuse participation, both prior to any on-board visits 
and while data collection was ongoing, and the right to refuse to discuss any subject matter. This 
was further emphasized when informed consent was obtained from every informant involved 
(informed consent form is included in appendix B). 
 
One rule was emphasized throughout this research, because the natural context studies were 
carried out during live operational conditions: A clear agreement and understanding between 
researcher and informant that all interviewing and observation activities were to be done at the 
discretion of the ships´ crews to not interfere during operations requiring full attention on 
navigational activities. 
 
The accident investigation reports analyzed was freely available and in the public domain. 
Therefore, no ethical concerns were considered necessary to address regarding these reports. 
 
3.5 Analysis 
Analysis was started already before the research was undertaken, when the perceived issues of 
ECDIS assisted accidents as a potential function of mismatches between design and operational 
features, was defined as the problem to be treated in this thesis work. 
 
The following analytical stage was initiated once on board carrying out the naturalistic research. 
Inputs in the form of statements from respondents and observed actions were, from start to end, 
subject to the researcher’s interpretation, based on the actual context in which they occurred.  
Both the statements, observations and ideas were noted separately, immediately as they occurred 
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during the field work. These on-site analytic inferences also helped shaping the actual on board 
experiences as they inspired the further courses.  
 
Immediately following the on-board sessions, the experiences and impressions were synthesized 
and patterns related to how use of the ECDIS proved cumbersome, and how it supported daily 
navigation practices, were identified and extracted for further analysis. This was done manually 
through a review of field notes and partly through audio recordings of the sessions. At one stage, 
the researcher found that many of the stories told by the respondents were connected to the 
status of the information derived through the bridge windows versus the information derived 
from the ECDIS. It was interpreted, by the researcher, as an underlying condition to the 
perceived problem to be treated in the study, and therefore it was decided to make this condition 
a subject for an elaborate analysis on its own. 
 
The identified patterns were compared to concepts and information derived from the theoretical 
framework used in this thesis work, as found pertinent from the researcher’s interpretation of 
events and statements. Based on how the theoretical insights connected to the practical problems 
encountered on board, and how these are thought to inform possible mitigation strategies, issue 
categories at an abstract, or higher order, level was formulated along with the researcher´s 
suggestions on how to address, or at least think about, the issues when these are viewed through 
the lens of a human factors and systems safety lens. 
 
The analysis results were framed so that they could be compared with insights derived from 
official accident investigation reports, and form the basis for a further discussion about future 
design and development of ECDIS. 
 
3.6 Research Procedures 
Analysis of ECDIS assisted accident reports were carried out as follows: 
x Official government funded accident investigation unit websites were searched to obtain 
published reports on ECDIS assisted accidents. 
x Three sample reports that matched the selection criterions were chosen as a basis for 
analysis. Accounts were available from multiple investigation units, demonstrating similar 
structures and conclusions. However, reports published by one, world leading, unit were 
ultimately selected, to discuss here. 
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x The sample reports were reviewed, with a focus on the causal explanations related to use 
of ECDIS. 
x The analysed data was synthesised and abstracted. 
 
The natural context research was carried out as follows: 
x Danish ship operators were approached and presented with a brief description of the 
research topic. A request for participation was also forwarded. 
x Interest in participation was expressed by all approached ship operators. A letter 
describing the aim of the study, the proposed methods and approach was then sent to 
each contact point with the ship operators. They were asked to forward the letter to 
potential ship crews, requesting participation and seeking preliminary consent. 
x When consent had been obtained from subject ships, arrangements were made for visits. 
x Upon arrival on board the ships, objectives and rules were explained and consent forms 
were signed by all parties.    
x The investigator was present during navigation duties on the bridge, observing activities 
involving ECDIS. Informal interviewing about the research topic was kept going, 
supported by the interview guide. As much observation time, as possible (practical), was 
logged, and in all cases, every navigation officer on board at the time of attendance was 
observed and interviewed. The observations were in most cases sound recorded (subject 
to informant permission), and field notes were made (done during breaks in the 
conversation, mostly away from the informant, in order not to disturb focus). 
x The stories collected from the respondents and the observations made by the researcher 
during the on-board sessions was synthesized and a narrative was constructed on this 
basis, which accounts for the experience on board. Field notes were given the highest 
priority in informing this storytelling process (Neuman, p. 368). The accounts were 
constructed immediately following the on-board sessions, to ensure accuracy. 
x The accounts functioned as a basis for the analysis, which resulted in the extraction of 
issue categories at two abstract levels. This means that the respondents´ perceived issues 
with ECDIS navigation, and those issues perceived by the researcher were sorted under 
common denominators, characterizing the core of the issues encountered. 
x The abstracted issues were tabulated for comparison purposes. 
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4 FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
 
4.1 Accident report analyses 
Evidence was collected from the sources referenced below. The accidental events are briefly 
summarized here, and the accident investigation reports, in their full lengths, are included as 
appendices E, F & G. 
 
ECDIS assisted grounding #1 - Commodore Clipper (MAIB, 2015) 
In the morning on 14 July 2014, the Bahamas flagged Ro-ro passenger ferry, Commodore 
Clipper, departed Portsmouth, UK, bound for St. Peter Port, Guernsey, on the continental side 
of the English Channel. The ship used its ECDIS as the primary means of navigation, backed up 
by paper charts. On approach to St. Peter Port, the ship was navigating slightly off the planned 
track. As it passed close to the Roustel Beacon light house a noisy shuddering vibration was felt 
reverberating through the ship. The bridge team observed nothing unusual and convinced 
themselves that they had just caught something with the propellers. The master was sure that the 
under-keel clearance had been sufficient, and that it would have been safe to pass even closer to 
the light house. Therefore, the vibration felt in the ship was not thought to be the result of 
contact with ground. However, during a routine inspection of the hull, after arrival in port, it was 
established that the ship had touched bottom, and suffered significant damage and hull 
penetration.  
 
ECDIS assisted grounding #2 - Ovit (MAIB, 2014) 
In the morning on 18 September 2013, the Maltese chemical tanker, Ovit, was underway from 
Rotterdam, Netherlands, to Brindisi, Italy, when it ran aground on the Varne Bank, in the 
English Channel. The ship was being navigated by the chief officer at the time of the grounding, 
by using the approved ECDIS solely for position monitoring. The passage planning had been 
carried out, using the ECDIS, prior to departure of the ship by the ship´s third officer. No 
significant damage occurred and there were no injuries because of the accident. 
 
ECDIS assisted grounding #3 - CSL Thames (MAIB, 2012) 
In the morning on 9 August 2011, the Maltese bulk carrier departed from Glensanda, UK, bound 
for Wilhelmshaven, Germany. A pilot was on board to assist on departure. After the pilot had 
disembarked the ship, it continued on track, out through a relatively narrow sound. The master 
had handed over the watch to the ship´s third officer. Navigation was undertaken by means of 
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the instruments including two radars, but the ECDIS was considered the primary means of 
navigation. To steer clear of a recreational craft that was navigating in the sound, at an 
approximately opposite course, the third officer altered the ship´s course so that it deviated from 
the planned track. As his initial maneuvers proved ineffective, because the third officer became 
aware of the presence of a third vessel, he continued to alter the ship´s course to starboard. 
Eventually the ship grounded and only narrowly avoided a collision with one of the other vessels. 
Substantial damage occurred to the ship. 
 
4.1.1 Patterns derived from the report findings 
From the report analysis, several issues could be identified, which are here interpreted as 
indicators of how the phenomena of ECDIS assisted accidents are treated in these investigations. 
Below, the researcher has abstracted these issues so that they reflect the recommended preventive 
actions, expressed in the reports: 
 
1. Reliance on the visual representation provided by the ECDIS – mitigate complacency, 
discipline operators. 
 
Ovit´s position was monitored solely against the intended track shown on the ECDIS. 
Consequently, situational awareness was found to be poor, as this track did not provide a safe 
passage, and not all means of navigation was (could be) considered. 
 
2. Use of ECDIS functionality – enhance training and procedures. 
 
On board Commodore Clipper, specific passage planning actions were routinely not taken; 
route checking, ECDIS safety depth, safety contour and XTD settings were not adjusted to 
reflect the safe water, based on height of tide, available for the passage. The ECDIS safety 
frame is a feature that offers forewarning of danger, primarily intended to prevent grounding, 
but this feature was switched off. 
 
The operator-defined settings applied to the ECDIS fitted on board Ovit were unsuitable, 
and the route, planned by the third officer, was unsafe and had never been properly checked. 
 
The safety alarm parameters (safety contour) of the ECDIS fitted on board CSL Thames 
were not corresponding to the vessel configuration (draught). 
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3. Chart scale / zoom function - enhance training and discipline operators. 
 
On board Ovit, the scale of the chart shown on the ECDIS was inappropriate. 
 
4. Audible alarm not used or inoperative – discipline operators. 
 
On board Commodore Clipper the audible alarms had been disabled because of frequent 
alarms, and consequently the crew did not respond to the alarm warning about risk of 
grounding. 
 
On board Ovit the ECDIS audible alarm did not work. 
 
On board CSL Thames the audible alarm of the ECDIS was inoperative. 
 
5. Training as ineffective mitigation – improve training regime. 
 
Although training in the use of the ECDIS fitted on board Ovit had been provided, the 
master and deck officers were unable to use the system effectively. 
 
Despite the mandatory training, the crewmembers on board CSL Thames were found to have 
difficulties operating the ECDIS. 
 
6. Automatic functions not operating as expected – improve ECDIS functionality/reliability. 
 
The safety contour alarm should have activated shortly before Ovit crossed the 30m contour. 
 
7. Formal integration of ECDIS – enhance procedures. 
 
No guidance on the use of ECDIS was included in the master´s standing orders on board 
Commodore Clipper. 
 
The company operating CSL Thames had not provided any instructions or guidance on the 
use of the ECDIS fitted to the ship. 
 
8. Basic ergonomics – improve design. 
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On board Commodore Clipper, the ECDIS display screen was located on the starboard side 
of the central bridge console adjacent to the starboard side (master´s) chair. It was not 
accessible from the port chair. 
Several of the features of the ECDIS fitted on board Ovit were either difficult to use or 
appeared not to comply with international standards. 
 
On board CSL Thames the ECDIS was installed so that the operator needed to stand facing 
sideward relative to the forward direction of the ship to use it. As the third officer was 
preoccupied with anti-collision activities at the time of the accident, facing forward, it was 
difficult to operate the ECDIS effectively at the same time. 
 
9. Information presented by the ECDIS not acknowledged – enhance training. 
 
The XTD alarm on the ECDIS on board Commodore Clipper was active for 10 minutes 
prior to the grounding without being recognized by the bridge crew. 
 
After the course alterations were made by the third officer of CSL Thames, he did not 
monitor the position and projected track of the ship on the ECDIS. Neither did he recognize 
the grounding warning alarms on the ECDIS. This had activated approximately 7 minutes 
prior to the grounding. 
 
The abstractions are ascribed to three higher order categories of training/discipline, procedures and 
design as shown below. 
 
Table 3 
Accident report analyses patterns 
 
Patterns 
Training/discipline Procedures Design 
1 Reliance on the visual representation provided by the ECDIS – mitigate complacency, 
discipline operators. 
2 Use of ECDIS functionality – enhance training and procedures. 
2 
 
 
43 
3 Chart scale / zoom function - enhance training and discipline operators. 
4 Audio alarm inoperative – discipline operators. 
5 Training as ineffective mitigation – improve training regime. 
6 Automatic functions not operating as expected – improve ECDIS functionality 
/reliability. 
7 Formal integration of ECDIS – enhance procedures. 
8 Basic ergonomics – improve design. 
9 Information presented by the ECDIS not acknowledged – enhance training. 
 
4.2 Natural Context Studies 
4.2.1 The bridge windows or the ECDIS? 
A theme that reverberates throughout the natural context accounts derived from the studies is 
connected to the bridge windows and how these relate to ECDIS navigation, i.e. data input origin 
and processing. This theme is here found to be a manifestation of the hermeneutics associated 
with ECDIS navigation, and, thus, also the complexities that arise from it, hidden behind the 
seemingly ease of use offered by the visual real-time navigation mode that the system provides. 
This condition is exemplified, for example, in the following: 
 
The crew members did however have a hard time figuring out why navigation 
information such as particular navigation marks and depth contours were not 
represented at certain chart zoom-levels at certain positions. (Respondents E & F) 
 
With the introduction of ECDIS navigation there has been a shift that moves data input towards 
a conflation of sea chart and the bridge windows. Thus, the windows may seize to be thought of 
as a representation of the real world which the charts are checked against, while the charts may be 
thought of as an automated representation of fact rather than a reference that verifies the 
observations made, manually/visually, by the navigator. Statements made by respondents, point 
towards this condition, exemplified in the following: 
 
You tend to look less through the windows, the more information that is put on the 
screen in front of you. What is gained from looking out the windows basically seems 
less pertinent. (Respondent H) 
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Such a shift fundamentally changes work on the bridge and the role of the navigator in navigating 
the ship. From being a manually controlled task (naturally within the limits of the navigators´ 
individual capacity and capability) of determining the ship´s position this is now done 
automatically with seemingly limited needs for insights about functioning. The role of the 
navigator, in navigating the ship, has effectively been reduced to a supervisor of the technology 
while this is performing the navigation. This relationship reveals how determining the ship´s 
position changes towards a social collaborative relationship between human and the technology. 
 
With this changing of the role of the navigator there will, inevitably, occur an erosion of the 
manual skills that was necessary to the navigator during eras of navigation prior to ECDIS, 
confirmed by opinions expressed among informants to this study. However, it also suggests that 
while the future may look sinister with regards to preservation of more traditional disciplines of 
navigation, we may currently find ourselves in an implementation phase, not just with regards to 
the fitting of ECDIS on board most ships, but, perhaps to an even larger degree, regarding how 
the ECDIS is used on board.  
 
Scepticism towards the system was found with many of the informants, and the ECDIS´ 
competition with the windows for the navigator´s attention is not unproblematic. In the 
following statement, it is particularly clear how a mismatch between data from the bridge 
windows and the ECDIS (in this case operating without the availability of ENC) can have a 
shattering effect on the navigator´s mental model of ship positioning, in the current 
implementation phase where many navigators find themselves in a borderland between what 
came before the ECDIS, i.e. input from the windows among other, and the new functionalities: 
 
On approach to port, following a turn, the representation on the ECDIS screen 
suddenly did not match the visual representation obtained from looking out of the 
window. An island was on the “wrong side” of the bow. This was highly confusing. 
(Respondent D) 
    
With the technology, unable to make decisions beyond the integrated algorithms it must be 
assumed that the human navigator is still in control of navigation, ultimately. In the situation 
described in the statement above there was a need to quickly reconstruct sense making that could 
be used to rapidly make decisions that would allow the bridge crew to regain control over 
manoeuvrings, which required the integration of information from sources external to the 
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electronic chart system. Hermeneutic functioning of the ECDIS, in combination with eroded 
manual operator skills, may hamper the ability to reconstruct sense-making when the JCS is 
challenged. An example of how the hermeneutics associated with ECDIS operation may confuse 
operators is found in the following: 
 
Unaware of the fact that representations of chart details at different zoom levels was 
determined by the system itself as a feature in the default setup, the crew members did 
however have a hard time figuring out why navigation information such as particular 
navigation marks and depth contours were not represented at certain chart zoom-levels 
at certain positions. (Respondents E & F) 
 
Despite the impact from the technology, towards an erosion of the way that instrument derived 
data used to be cross checked with visual observation, the scepticism expressed by respondents in 
the study was often closely connected to how the world was perceived through the windows. In 
continuation of the previously quoted statement made by respondent D, such scepticism is 
exemplified in the following:  
 
It [the ECDIS] often functioned only as a secondary reference, subordinate to other 
more basic methods [terrestrial/visual]. During critical manoeuvring, for example 
navigation close to shore, the use of ECDIS was directly abandoned. (Ship # 1) 
 
On one ship scepticism was low if the waters were known, i.e. felt familiar to the navigators 
because they had recognized the limitations of the ECDIS, e.g. by knowing from visual 
observation that sea marks were in place despite that they were not represented on the ECDIS, in 
the applied system configuration. In contrast, scepticism was high when the ship was navigating 
in unfamiliar waters, and even traditional sea charts were consulted (ship # 2). On board another 
ship it was similarly what was observed through the windows that enabled the bridge crew to 
manually correct their ECDIS chart representation so that it could be used for docking: “the 
crew finished the chart design by manually drawing a virtual line that matched the ship´s contour and 
indicated when the ferry had docked” (ship # 3). 
 
Perhaps paradoxically, it can be said that while bridge cognition, in relation to position 
referencing, has become ever more distributed, in the sense that the human navigator used to be 
central to making sense of data on the bridge, originating from a variety of sources, but has now 
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turned over this position to e.g. the ECDIS, the data source representations has become more 
and more integrated. Common strategies, observed during the study, was to collect navigation 
information from devices on a central representational unit, with the ECDIS as the background: 
 
A common strategy was to integrate all the systems´ information (RADAR, ECDIS and 
AIS) on the screen in front of the chair where the navigator was sitting. This was where 
the primary attention was directed, and the other screens, were glanced at only 
occasionally. (Ship # 2) 
 
This is potentially the future technological window, should the scepticism towards the technology 
decline with the next generations of navigators, and the borders between what can be seen 
through the windows and what can be obtained from the technology dissolve. The question that 
must be asked, however, is how it affects safety of navigation and/or the resilience of the 
navigation system, i.e. its ability to reconfigure to remain in control of safe navigation in the face 
of disruption? Not to argue against the technological development, but rather to gain a better 
understanding of the implications of the technology, here considered useful when tomorrow´s 
systems are designed and developed. 
 
4.2.2 Patterns derived from the findings 
From the empirical evidence, common elements could be extracted across the units of analysis. 
The findings are assigned to abstracted categories below along with proposed action points. 
Several findings would overlap categories, but have been placed in the one found more pertinent, 
by the researcher. 
 
1. Mistrusted, technology – enhance ability to determine system reliability. 
The crew on board ship # 1 experienced that there was a mismatch between satellite derived 
positions, i.e. their representation on both ECDIS and paper charts, and the correct spatial 
position of the ship, which could be verified from terrestrial observation methods. This was 
the reason for a sound skepticism towards the ECDIS as it was expressed by several crew 
members (Respondents A, C & D). From the crew members´ point of view, the conditions 
made it necessary to use terrestrial techniques on many occasions to obtain a trustworthy 
representation of the ship´s position, and plot this in a traditional sea chart. One account of a 
near-miss was given by a crew member:  
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On approach to port, following a turn, the representation on the ECDIS screen 
suddenly did not match the visual representation obtained from looking out of the 
window. An island was on the wrong side of the bow. This was highly confusing. 
(Respondent D) 
 
The mental model of the situation was instantly shattered and required a rapid reconstruction. 
This incident was an overarching barrier hindering the ECDIS in becoming a fully integrated, 
or trusted, element in the bridge´s system of position referencing, therefore it often 
functioned only as a secondary reference, subordinate to other more basic methods. During 
critical maneuvering, for example navigation close to shore, the use of ECDIS was directly 
abandoned.  
 
Although ship #2 was fully ECDIS compliant, additional paper charts were kept, although 
they were not updated regularly, so they served as an additional, unofficial, reference in case 
the ship needed to make voyages beyond its regular trading routes. Two elements were 
emphasized as the reason for this; the first being a matter of trust (the level of trust in the 
ECDIS was high if the route sailed was well known from previous experience and cross 
referencing between terrestrial data and ECDIS data, but declined as the waters navigated 
became less familiar), and the second being that the crew members found it easier to obtain 
an overview on a traditional paper chart, also during route planning. Furthermore, regular IT 
issues were experienced (infrequently though). The latter included loss of system sensor input 
and system freezes. Normally the issues could be resolved by restarting devices, or the 
system, but until the reboot was completed; “we have practically no navigation aids” as a 
crew member expressed it (Respondent F). 
 
The perceived benefit however of the bridge systems integration on board ship #2 was that 
different representations could be cross-referenced instantaneously; “does RADAR and AIS 
tracks correspond, and land features or navigational marks shown on the ECDIS can match 
the RADAR echoes?” (Respondent E). Thus, terrestrial and satellite information was used to 
verify each other at a glance. 
 
On board ship #3, uncertainty about the trustworthiness of the data quality presented by the 
system was expressed. Sources of uncertainty comprised discrepancies observed from 
comparison between instruments, at certain instances: During berthing the ship contour did 
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not match the berth represented on the chart. Thus, the crew finished the chart design by 
manually drawing a virtual line that matched the ship´s contour and indicated when the ferry 
had docked. The ECDIS did not communicate to the crew, it was imprecise in its 
representations and, thus, it was left to the crew to assess the reliability of the representation 
provided, by integrating other information, and personal/collective experience. One crew 
member expressed: “I can only use it for approximation, when I ought to be able to use it for 
navigation” (Respondent I). Another crew member expressed that the ECDIS was not found 
to provide the same level of overview as the traditional paper charts offered (Respondent J). 
 
2. Hermeneutic mode of operation – enhance system communication and transparency. 
 
The crewmembers on board ship #1 found the ECDIS very useful (Respondents A,B,C & 
D), but knowledge gained from experience was necessary, to determine when the data on the 
screen could be trusted as the system did not communicate to the user when the position 
representation displayed was unreliable, and thus it was found ignorant of its own incapacity 
to show true location. The usefulness of the system in terms of real-time position 
representation and ease of route creation, and deviation from a route, which was often 
necessary, made the crew pick from among the ECDIS functionalities the ones they found 
feasible and integrate the perceived benefits with those of other strategies deployed for 
navigation.  
 
Due to the trade pattern of ship #2, the crew members seldom had the need to plan new 
routes as these were re-used. Further, an effect of the trade pattern was that the crew 
members were very familiar with the routes sailed, including any navigational obstructions 
and dangers, and new crew members were quickly familiarized with the trade. This meant 
that any perceived shortcomings of the ECDIS were compensated for by integrating the 
information provided by the system with the individual experience, and the collective 
knowledge present on the bridge (experience sharing), and thereby the crew members could 
fill in the blank spots. An example of this was the missing representation of known 
navigation marks on the ECDIS chart. Unaware of the fact that representations of chart 
details at different zoom levels was determined by the system itself as a feature in the default 
setup, the crew members did however have a hard time figuring out why navigation 
information such as particular navigation marks and depth contours were not represented at 
certain chart zoom-levels at certain positions (Respondents E & F). Thus, a slight mistrust in 
the processes behind the electronic chart construction had developed on board. 
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3. Automation vs. Operator control – understanding of limitations in various contexts. 
 
The auto scale function on the ECDIS on ship #1, choosing the most appropriate chart 
scale, as programmed into the system, was deselected because it was annoying and attention 
demanding when scale shifts occurred that was not found pertinent. One crewmember 
expressed that; “I don´t need the machine to decide what I need to see” (Respondent H). 
Furthermore, the rationale behind the system´s choice of chart scale was not communicated 
effectively to the users, leaving them in the dark regarding the logic of the machine. 
 
One crewmember on board ship #2, recalled an experience on board another of the 
company´s ships:  
 
We were crossing into an offshore wind farm under construction, which had not 
been represented on the ECDIS at the selected chart zoom level. Some of the 
turbine foundations were already installed. When we zoomed in on the ECDIS, the 
wind farm suddenly appeared, and we were inside of it”. (Respondent G) 
 
The representation selection on the ECDIS, which made sense to the crew at the time, did 
not hold the relevant information, at the time, needed for safe navigation and created a near 
miss situation. 
 
Different settings for sensor input to the system could be selected on board ship #3. One 
setting that automatically switched between the two GPS receivers fitted on board was 
deselected by crew members. This was because during switching between receivers the 
representation of the ship contour, on the chart, jumped because of a proximal difference in 
position; “It is difficult to work out the exact parameters that determines the switching 
between GPS receivers”, as it was expressed by a crew member (Respondents J & K). This was 
found cumbersome while maneuvering narrow waters.  
 
4. Alarm functions disturbing, not helpful - address operator goals and sense making. 
 
The navigational alarms offered by the ECDIS on board ship #1 was deliberately deselected 
by the crew members as part of a common strategy among all navigators on board. One 
crewmember expressed that; “the amount of alarms is often unmanageable, and too much 
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time is needed to sort out, acknowledge and cancel them” (Respondent A). Thus, the alarms 
were perceived as a nuisance, borderline hazard, rather than as supportive. Despite automatic 
selection of all alarms by the system, upon start-up, they were systematically deselected by the 
crew. A crew member told that: 
 
At one time, following a chart update where the alarms were reactivated, 
deselection was forgotten afterwards and immediately after switching back to 
navigation mode, “navigational warnings” and “safety contour” alarms activated 
visually and acoustically. However, it was not clear exactly what on the chart had 
activated the alarms and therefore highly confusing. (Respondent D)  
 
This information was not communicated effectively by the system. A crew member expressed 
that; “the alarms are difficult to derive meaning from. It is not clear why the alarms appear 
and elaboration on them (information on this) is not offered by the system” (Respondent A). 
 
On board ship #2 all ECDIS alarms that could possibly be disabled had been so. 
Furthermore, the speaker creating the audible signal had been blocked by a piece of adhesive 
tape. The reason for this was that the alarms were perceived as annoying, with little or no 
perceived value offered to the crew (Respondents E,F,G & H). Alarms that offered specific 
information about the state of the system, such as a GPS information failure alarm, was, 
however, considered useful and so were alarms that clearly communicated an important state, 
e.g. a lost target alarm (on the RADAR). Most of the alarms produced by the system was 
perceived to offer little or no information that supported navigation. This was so, partly 
because of poor communication, i.e. the source of the alarm was not specific enough and 
they were too frequent to deal with. 
 
As part of a process to screen out what was perceived as irrelevant information provided by 
the system, all possible alarm functions had been disabled on the ECDIS fitted on board ship 
#3. The audio speaker had also been blocked to silence, as much as possible, the alarms that 
could not be disabled. A crewmember noted that:  
 
It is difficult to determine the origin of several alarms, and it is distracting to have 
to attend to these, (and) trying to work out what they mean, when attention is 
demanded on maneuvering and such. (Respondent I) 
 
 
51 
 
Maneuvering constituted a substantial part of the daily operations on board. 
 
5. Clumsy information representation and potential clutter - take holistic approach to 
needs for information. 
 
On ship #1 it was noted that many pieces of information, represented on the ECDIS screen, 
was overrepresented in the sense that this information was also represented on other 
instruments on the bridge console, in some instances on several other displays: “I don´t need 
that information several places” one crew member noted (Respondent C). 
 
On ship #3 the same point was made; too many information-doublets (Respondent M). 
 
6. Complex user interface - address specific ship operations and individual operator 
needs to customize ECDIS functionality. 
 
A crewmember on ship #1 expressed that “it is not expedient to need to have the manual 
ready for reference during navigation” (Respondent A). Neither should one have to navigate 
sub-menus in the ECDIS system while navigation is ongoing; “an extra man is required, 
then” was further expressed (Respondent A). This, led to little interest in setting up the 
system to individual preferences, following shift handovers. One crewmember expressed that; 
“you count on the settings to be appropriate when you take over the watch” (Respondent D). 
 
The ECDIS on ship #1 was integrated with an early E-navigation trial platform, which, 
among other, allowed the ship to communicate its routes with other parties, including other 
ships trading in the area, and authorities ashore and at sea. This basic concept was much 
appreciated by the crew members who were often trading in remote locations, but due to 
technical difficulties in the system (failure to connect to the internet properly and poor 
integration with other systems, e.g. AIS) they only used the system infrequent. The actual 
words from a crew member was; “it is great when it works” (Respondent A). Similar, chart 
updating was perceived as annoying because of only unstable connection to the internet. 
 
The crew members on board ship #2 had different preferences with regards to the level and 
layers of information they wanted represented on the screen. One strategy was to select as 
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much information as possible, in order not to miss anything (Respondent A). Another 
strategy was to select only what was perceived as strictly necessary (Respondent H). The latter 
strategy was connected to how the equipment was integrated and represented. The integrated 
navigation system consisted, on the console where navigation was done, of four monitors, 
which were interchangeable in terms of what was shown on each screen. This could be 
selected by the navigator on watch. A common strategy was to integrate all the systems´ 
information (RADAR, ECDIS and AIS) on the screen in front of the chair where the 
navigator was sitting. This was where the primary attention was directed, and the other 
screens, were glanced at only occasionally. With the RADAR echoes represented on the same 
screen as the chart, the danger of not noticing small echoes that did not simultaneously show 
AIS information, was perceived by one crew member to be quite possible, based on his 
experience: “once I missed one echo belonging to a small craft” (Respondent G). The screen 
was considered too cluttered with all the representations of data. Another crew member, who 
also pursued this latter strategy of information sorting, said that “the feature that allows 
customizing of the information representation are useful” (Respondent H). This was 
preferred over the predefined layer selections offered by the system, but a need for even 
further options of individual information selection and setup was expressed, to truly match 
individual preferences and strategies. 
 
One disadvantage, as expressed by several crew members on board ship #2 (Respondents E, 
F & G), was that basic chart information, including navigation light characters and bottom 
characters were difficult to obtain as several sub-menus needed to be scanned, and then the 
information found was ambiguous. A crew member stated that “sometimes you give up 
before you end up at the desired piece of information” (Respondent F). The menu system 
was in general perceived as complex, i.e. too many layers and not very intuitive. 
 
Due to the short crossing trade of ship #3 only one fixed route was used during daily 
operations. New route planning was only relevant in relation to dry-dockings. The 
functionality needed from the ECDIS to undertake the daily operations was basically the 
ability to follow the course line plotted, and to have AIS targets represented visually for anti-
collision purposes. “Many of the functions offered by the system are irrelevant”, was the 
opinion expressed by one crew member (Respondent J). However, the few functions used, 
for example full AIS target information was found cumbersome to retrieve, because several 
sub-menus had to be navigated. As expressed by another crew member: “further options for 
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customization to the individual users´ preferences and needs would improve on these 
conditions” (Respondent M). 
 
7. Prosthetic use of systems – maintenance of basic skills. 
 
It was a common opinion among the crew members on board ship #2 that the ease of use 
offered by the ECDIS, and the integrated system gradually disconnected the crew members 
from basic navigation skills. The youngest of the crew members expressed that: 
 
You tend to look less through the windows, the more information that is put on 
the screen in front of you. What is gained from looking out the windows basically 
seems less pertinent” (Respondent H) 
 
8. System as means to predict and plan future actions – develop further predictive 
functionality. 
 
A major benefit provided by the ECDIS fitted on ship #2 during manoeuvrings in narrow 
waters with sharp turns, was the ability to look ahead by using the system´s curved heading line 
and predict functions, said one crew member: “This gives a good indication of the ship´s 
current capacity to make a planned turn and to see where the ship will end up after turning” 
(Respondent A). 
 
9. Skills difficult to transfer across systems – enhance functional transparency. 
 
One crewmember who had recently joined ship #2, came from another ship within the 
company, expressed the difficulties in changing from one ECDIS system to another:  
 
There is a low level of standardization and it is only very general knowledge that is 
transferrable. It feels a bit like starting from scratch again with a new system. 
(Respondent H) 
 
10. Operator/system preference mismatch – align work as imagined with work as done. 
 
The availability of ENC charts on the ECDIS on board ship #1 did not lead crewmembers to 
trust the positional representation(s) on the screen, and at times the unofficial charts were 
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chosen over the available ENC charts. The ECDIS could automatically prioritize ENC 
charts, and automatically load these when available, but this function had been deactivated, 
deliberately. The crew members gave two main reasons for this; “the unofficial charts visually 
resemble the traditional paper charts more” (Respondents A & C), which were used in 
navigation strategies that was trusted more, and “when using ENC charts there sometimes 
comes jail bars all over the screen (vertical lines all over the chart)” (Respondent A & B), 
which was perceived as disturbing, and partly incomprehensible to the crew members (they 
believed it to somehow relate to temporary chart corrections loaded in the system). Thus, the 
officially, and vendor, perceived advantages of ENC charts did not match those as perceived 
by the navigators.  
 
The strategies used for positional representation on ship #1 were to a large degree dependent 
on both the collective and individual experiences available on the bridge. Functions and 
features delivered by the ECDIS was continuously cherry picked, to make the functionality of 
the system fit multiple strategies in the joint navigation system. This also gave the crew 
members a sense of ease of use despite the limitations and incompleteness of the ECDIS, in 
meeting the operational demands. In this way, they themselves finished the system design. 
 
On board ship #3, the chart scale was frequently adjusted to suit the navigators´ strategies at 
different parts of the routes. On several occasions the ECDIS warned that the chart was 
overscaled. This indicated that the chart representation preferred by the system was inconsistent 
with that preferred by the navigator. The preferences of the latter were based on context, i.e. 
traffic situation, current operation (maneuvering or crossing), environmental factors etc. The 
ECDIS did not account for any of these factors, illustrating the context independent nature 
of the automated system. The crew members preferred to determine the level of automation 
themselves, as expressed by one crew member; “I´d rather decide for myself” (Respondent 
L). However, crew members were not aware of the fact that representations of chart details at 
different zoom levels was determined by the system itself as a feature in the default setup 
(Respondents I, J, K, L, M & N). The representation automatically chosen by the system 
often made little sense to the crew members. 
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The abstractions from crew interview are ascribed to three higher order categories of adaptation, 
mismatch and communication/coordination as shown below. 
 
Table 4 
Natural context studies patterns 
 
4.3 Comparing the two cases 
From a comparison of the post-accident accounts and normal work context accounts it is found 
that the issues with ECDIS in each case are interrelated. The abstracted patterns stand, however, 
in opposition to each other but can be said to represent two sides of the same coin, as shown 
below. 
 
Patterns 
Adaptation Mismatch Communication/coordination 
1 Mistrusted technology – enhance operators’ ability to determine system reliability. 
2 Hermeneutic mode of operation – enhance system communication and transparency. 
3 Automation vs. Operator control – understanding of limitations in various contexts. 
3 
4 Alarm functions disturbing, not helpful - address operator goals and sense making. 
4 
5 Clumsy information representation and potential clutter - take holistic approach to needs 
for information. 5 
6 Complex user interface - address specific ship operations and individual operator needs 
to customize ECDIS functionality. 6 
6 
7 Prosthetic use of systems – maintenance of basic skills. 
7 
8 System as means to predict and plan future actions – develop further predictive 
functions. 
9 Skills difficult to transfer across systems – enhance functional transparency. 
10 Operator/system preference mismatch – align work as imagined with work as carried out. 
10 
10 
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Table 5 
Interrelation between accident report analyses and natural context studies patterns. 
 
Pattern interrelation 
Adaptation & 
Communication/Coordination 
VS. Training/Discipline & Procedures 
Mismatch VS. Training/Discipline, Procedures & Design 
 
The explanatory frame used in the two sets of cases vary substantially, spanning from mainly 
being an issue of poor operator training and discipline, or poor instructions, to a variety of 
insights that points towards issues with co-agency and communication. These issues affect how 
interaction between the navigator and the ECDIS plays out, including work-arounds and tailoring 
to make the system fit the operator in ways that does not seem to be accounted for at a design 
stage. An example of this is found in the following two representations of the same basic 
element, i.e. the selection of chart scale: 
 
On board Ovit, the scale of the chart shown on the ECDIS was inappropriate vs. On 
board ship #3, the chart scale was frequently adjusted to suit the navigators´ needs at 
different parts of the routes. At several occasions the ECDIS warned that the chart was 
`overscaled´. This indicated that the chart representation preferred by the system was 
inconsistent with that preferred by the navigator. The preferences of the latter were 
based on context, i.e. traffic situation, current operation (maneuvering or cruising), 
environmental factors etc. The ECDIS could not account for any of these factors, 
illustrating the context independent nature of the automated system.  
 
The two representations of the issue consequently prompt different mitigation strategies. One is, 
better training, procedures and operator discipline, alternatively (the other) is a better 
understanding of contextual demands which could minimize potential mismatches between the 
designer, operator and machine images, embedded in the ECDIS. 
 
The post-accident accounts primarily reflect WAI (work as imagined), i.e. the idealized way that a 
system is thought to work through governing in legislation, standards, procedures, design etc., 
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and the accident reports seem to aim at restoring a disrupted system by identifying how the 
situation did not match the imagined scenario and gives suggestions to how to obtain a future 
match. WAD (work as done) is reflected in what crews can tell about their everyday work, i.e. how 
the idealized conception of functioning is distorted by contextual demands and inferences, in the 
field of operation and, therefore, how workarounds are deployed. 
 
In all the reviewed reports on ECDIS assisted groundings there has been an emphasis on a need 
to improve (amostly) operator capacity or moral, so they use the functionalities of the ECDIS 
properly, or the focus has been (to a lesser extent) on tweaking functions of the ECDIS in order 
to minimize a perceived risk of operator error. None of the reports focus on the actual 
coordination of the means-goals, i.e. making integration of human and machine more successful 
by exploring what would have helped the crews to make optimal use of the data available from 
the system, to avoid the accidents. 
 
The study illuminates some of the gaps that exist between the outsider interviewing in hindsight 
and the operator performing actual work in an everyday context, and demonstrates how this gap 
can be explored and minimized. Future system developments can be influenced by system 
functionality feedback, from the regulatory level that creates performance standards, legislation 
etc., to the manufacturer level where standards are implemented along with other vendor and 
industry ideas about functionality and features. Accounts from the applied community are often 
seen as not as relevant or important when compared to the official truth established by formal 
accident investigations. However, this study demonstrates that findings that help us to 
understand the use of artefacts, and thereby also safety, can be derived from the natural working 
context. Further, this information is most valuable if we are to successfully design safety into the 
technological artefact. 
 
About training issues, in most of the reviewed accident cases formal training in the use of ECDIS 
had been completed by the involved crew members. But the accident investigation reports show 
that this was not sufficient mitigation against operators getting lost in their systems. Therefore, it 
can be argued, training is not necessarily a complete solution to dubious designs, and that current 
ECDIS training regimes themselves could be another pertinent research area.  
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5 Discussion 
 
5.1 Why Human Error? 
The researcher´s intention, here, is not to portray formal accident investigations as conspiracies 
against alternative ways to understand operating environments. These may, however, often seem 
so but the author believes that they merely reflect an established tradition rooted in the history of 
modern society. Growing bureaucratization in society in general, and bureaucratization of safety 
(Dekker, 2014-1) have led to a perceived need for parenting institutions such as accident 
investigation entities that serve entangled societal needs, arising following accidental events. 
Dekker (2014-2) identified these needs as a four-component constellation: 
x Establishing what happened (epistemological component) 
x Identification of pathways for avoidance (preventive component) 
x Tracing of transgressions committed, and reinforcement of moral and regulatory 
boundaries (moral component) 
x Finding explanations for the suffering that occurred (existential component) 
 
The researcher does not intend to evaluate if the official explanations are right or wrong, but 
rather to raise the question of how to pursue new pathways, in terms of creating tomorrow´s 
artifacts that will help joint human-machines systems to obtain their goals, both in terms of safety 
and production, which is often two sides of the same coin (Hollnagel, 2014).  
 
5.2 What can be learnt from the natural context findings? 
The insights gained from the natural context research sheds light on the flip side of the 
epistemological component (as outlined above), and therefore can contribute to the 
understanding of the system described here, and indirectly to the understanding of ECDIS 
assisted accidents. Second stories about properties of ECDIS use was indeed possible to extract 
from the research for this thesis. How the findings connect to the theoretical framework used 
here will be discussed in the following, to examine what clues they may hold for future design 
and development of ECDIS. 
 
This research attempted to understand what makes work difficult (e.g. Woods et al., 2010) for any 
agent or sets of agents during navigation by use of ECDIS. The identification of joint cognitive 
system demands, helped reveal “how agents have or will adapt and how artifacts have 
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affordance” (Woods & Hollnagel, 2006, p. 20). This focus is believed by the researcher to 
promote a shift in analysis, and design, away from the fallacy of function allocation (Dekker & 
Woods, 2002) by addressing how integration and co-agency work out during ECDIS navigation. 
Function allocation, or Man is Better At – Machine is Better At, risks falling prey to a false 
opposition between people and technology.  
 
The researcher found was that there was a common skepticism towards the ECDIS. The ECDIS 
represents only part of the input integrated by most mariners to construct their mental model, 
based on which navigational decisions are made. The mariners were found to be very sensitive to 
cues derived from the whole operating environment (the experienced mariners). However, at the 
same time the modern hermeneutic mode of navigation, i.e. “the operator has moved from an 
experience of the world through the artefact to an experience of the artefact embedding the 
world.” (Hollnagel & Woods, 2005, p. 33), seems to bear the risk of decreasing this sensitivity. 
The risk is that silently, imperceptibly, ever more control will be given to the automated system, 
which relies on the embedded images and algorithms developed at a distance. So much more the 
reason to try to understand the environment that developers aim to model and engineer into the 
artifacts, to avoid what has been termed clumsy automation (Wiener, 1989 as cited by Woods & 
Hollnagel, 2006). This means that “the benefits of the new technology accrue during workload 
troughs, and the costs or burdens imposed by the technology occur during periods of peak 
workload, high-criticality, or high-tempo operations” (p. 127). In short, navigation becomes an 
even more hermeneutic discipline with integrated systems, providing ever more information, 
which may not seem problematic during normal conditions, but any negative side effects of the 
disconnection from more basic navigation skills reveal themselves only when operations slide out 
of their normal operating domains. This could be the case in some ECDIS assisted accidents. 
 
It is of course possible to frame these issues as training and discipline challenges. Training, as a 
relevant issue, is not disregarded by the author of this thesis. Naturally, advanced technology such 
as an ECDIS requires a set of taught skills, to operate it. However, there exists a risk that training 
becomes a universal tool to tweak operator performance. The aspect of co-agency and affordance 
issues, and an understanding of local rationality and sense making, risk being neglected in this 
case. Furthermore, training can be dissolved into two dimensions, where the first is, legitimately, 
concerned with obtaining knowledge and skills in how to operate a device or system. The other 
dimension represents the enforcement of morale or discipline, i.e. how power and institution 
wants the device or system to be used (complying with work as imagined). Training as a concept 
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seems to be confused in formal accident investigations because while the first dimension is 
necessary (naturally), to obtain skills, which in some cases is not done well for various reasons, 
such as financial costs etc., the investigation reports seem to address the second dimension; the 
undisciplined navigators that should have acted in accordance with how the system was intended 
to be used (disregarding the context). 
 
The adaptations found on the ships´ bridges, for example silenced acoustic alarms, leave a risk 
that the clumsy automation is not necessarily noticed until an unexpected event or system 
anomaly occurs, ultimately as an accident. This was termed the Law of Fluency by Woods & 
Hollnagel (2006). They assert that: 
 
[…] adaptations often become routinized as a standard part of a task or a role, so that, 
on the surface, it is difficult to see how these routines are adaptive and to what they 
have adapted. (p. 37)  
 
Even the informants, the navigators, at times had difficulties to see through their own routinized 
adaptations and habits. Perry & Wears (2012) also found that the Law of Fluency was relevant in 
their hospital emergency department study of adaptation (addressed in section 6.3). They noted 
that: 
 
Because ad hoc adaptations are for the most part tacitly introduced, systems use can 
easily be misinterpreted by vendors, designers and purchasers as evidence of successful 
design and implementation unless hidden workarounds are actively sought and 
studied. (p. 259) 
 
There was a consensus among the informants; that the ECDIS could be improved if 
customizability is enhanced. This is interpreted here as a manifestation of the point made by for 
example Hollnagel & Woods (2005) and Norros & Salo (2009), as addressed in section 2.1, that a 
cognitive system, the human parts of the joint cognitive system, actively seek and interpret rather 
than passively receive information. Therefore, they may also seek and accept wrong information, 
and end up going in an incorrect direction if the representation does not correspond to the 
recipient’s understanding. It is not likely that every navigator´s mental model will be shaped 
appropriately, if expectations rely on a standard design model aiming to capture a remote reality. 
For the information offered by the ECDIS to make sense, it is therefore necessary to be able 
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customize information representations so that it can be tailored locally to fit the particularities in 
each situation, and operator preferences. In other words: One size does NOT fit all, in ECDIS 
use nor should it in ECDIS design.  
 
Furthermore, the above also has implications to the strategies that navigators apply to determine 
actions. These strategies can be said to consist of a combination of feedback and forward control 
(Hollnagel & Woods, 2005), which are, thus, highly dependent on the representation of the 
process to be controlled (navigation), and of how it will behave or develop, to select an 
appropriate action. ECDIS is clearly a preferred source of feedback information, and a very 
effective tool in support of forward control, because the information represented is practically 
real-time information about the environment to be controlled. A great incentive, thus, exists to 
seek out information from the ECDIS as it effectively enhances the navigator´s ability to 
anticipate the future conditions that the ship will encounter. However, the mismatches between 
navigator preferences and machine embedded images, as identified in this study, can increase the 
likelihood of going in the wrong direction. The issue becomes most apparent in ECDIS assisted 
accident cases where navigators was misinformed, or not at all informed, by the representation 
on the ECDIS, due to a mismatch between the operator preferences and corresponding settings, 
and the machine embedded idea about how the equipment was to be used in the particular 
context (a prime example is the varying representation of information at different zoom levels).  
 
Basing action on wrong, or incomplete, information has been termed selective use of feedback and it 
was represented in this model by Hollnagel & Woods: 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Cyclical Control Model (Hollnagel & Woods, 2005, p. 138). 
 
 
62 
 
To mitigate this potential for misconstruction of mental models, based on information 
originating from the ECDIS, it is necessary to understand the gap between work as imagined and 
work as done, and pursue design solutions that align the two dimensions. 
 
5.3 Progressing design and development 
Recalling the critique of CSE, addressed in section 2.4, the researcher here believes that this 
theoretical position does not compete with other design approaches, but rather it complements 
them in a quest to create better solutions, as the design needs change together with technology. 
The critics´ perceived lack of direction and proscription in the theory and methods is not thought 
of here as a deficiency, but rather shows that the theoretical concepts are complementary tools to 
think with, by designers and the developers. CSE can generate insights about systems´ ways of 
working, and thereby added value to a design process, when integrated with existing, and perhaps 
more, perhaps, pragmatic tools, and design philosophies. Thus, the insights gained in this thesis 
can serve as an example of a practical realization of the dimensions above the horizontal axis in 
the graphical representation of the Joint Intelligent Systems approach developed by Norros and 
Salo, as addressed in section 2.4, which is shown in the figure below.  
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Figure 4: Joint Intelligent Systems design model (Norros & Salo, 2009, p. 53).  
 
Four development points can be derived from the action points suggested in the findings section, 
especially in relation to development of operator control abilities. They may serve as an abstract 
for of inspiration for future design and development of ECDIS: 
x ECDIS´ should be highly customizable, with the ability for the user to, to a large degree, 
select and set up data representation on the ECDIS screen. 
x ECDIS´ should incorporate a platform for elaborate self-monitoring and clear 
continuous communication regarding the current system’s reliability status, in a manner 
that reflects on the current navigation situation that the navigator faces. 
x ECDIS´ should incorporate a platform for clear communication of the automation 
status, allowing the navigator at a glance to familiarize himself with this. Easy 
adjustments of automation levels should also be possible. 
x ECDIS alarms should clearly communicate, specific origin and the status change that it 
reflects, and how this impacts on the current navigation situation that the navigator faces 
now. Different levels of (elaborate) information regarding the particular alarm should be 
easily accessible on operator request. 
 
 
 
 
64 
5.4 Further reflections on chosen methods 
Valuable insights can be derived from the natural context research. However, challenges were 
also encountered in the study. Establishing the right environment for a fruitful dialogue and 
reflection was challenging, i.e. establishing a means, where the desired information was flowing, 
required a very thorough introduction to the study objectives. Furthermore, attendance on the 
bridge for long hours was found to be personally exhausting (the researcher also expected this 
based on his professional work with accident investigations where the challenges are similar). 
 
The researcher experienced that operators (navigators) often have difficulties in diagnosing their 
own operational environment, except for the obvious annoyances and direct problems faced.  
Therefore, to obtain high quality data, i.e. information does not just reflect answers to questions 
asked, but also the integration of non-verbal cues and observations of the technology, and the 
subsequent transformation from data input to higher order understandings of socio-technical 
systems, deep immersion into the operating environment was found to be necessary, which is 
multi-resource demanding. Thus, it is difficult for more or less automated, generic, operator-
feedback schemes and simpler approaches, relying on for example simulations and surveys, to 
tease out issues found at the higher level of abstraction while they may be successful in bringing 
to the surface the more obvious issues that operators face. A potential negative side effect from 
involving users, particularly at the level that generic operator-feedback schemes operate, may be 
that just because operators are involved in research and design there is a risk that they may be 
made partly, or indirectly, responsible for future system designs. Lützhöft expresses the same 
conflict in the following:  
[…] users, in this case mariners, are not designers. They should not be given or left with 
the responsibility to come up with design solutions. Their expertise lies elsewhere, and it 
is this which we must tap into in appropriate ways. (2004, p. 42) 
Furthermore, the researcher agrees with Norros and Salo when they note that:  
 
By “user designers” we denote users that contribute to the design process by 
understanding the usage and future needs from inside the practice. Design requires, 
however, also scientific and special knowledge, design skills, and mastery of whole 
design processes. Therefore “researcher designers” are needed. Jointly mastered 
vocabulary, models, and transparency of the course of design process are required for 
balancing between these demands. (2009, p. 45) 
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Ensuring such a system that empowers design through user participation is found to be crucial. 
At the same time, it needs to be the responsibility of system designers and developers to ensure 
that user-feedback is properly obtained and used, just as the responsibility for the shape of the 
end-product can never be put on the end-user. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this thesis, the investigator explored reflexive and dialogic methods focused on natural 
contexts, to gain empirical insights into a field of interest. The results from the study are 
significant, both in themselves and when compared with findings from analyses of accident 
investigations reports related to ECDIS assisted accidents. 
 
The study shows that there exist different levels of explanations regarding what sometimes make 
the relationship between ECDIS and the navigator cumbersome, and it allowed the articulation 
of second stories about ECDIS. While official accounts of ECDIS assisted accidents tend to 
emphasize the human operator as the most broken link in the socio-technical chain, various 
facets of ECDIS use offer only limited support of navigators´ goals, as they manifested 
themselves during every day navigation work. Thus, mismatches between causal factors derived 
from accident reports, and insights on how normal work is carried out, using ECDIS, was 
discovered. The former seems to mainly reflect society´s, complex, reaction to accidental events, 
while the latter is believed to provide important clues to further development and design, and 
thereby also safety creation.  
 
Many challenges seem yet to be resolved, while at the same time ECDIS become an ever more 
central navigation tool. One possible consequence of ECDIS navigation may be deteriorated 
resilient capacity of the navigation system due to deteriorating manual navigation skills, which it 
can fall back on, as part of a reconfiguration-response to system disruption, to maintain control. 
 
Further, it was found that addressing features, in this study related to adaptation, mismatch and 
communication/coordination, would enhance usability of the ECDIS, and consequently also 
safety by helping navigators to retain control of the navigation processes. A clear communication 
of system reliability would promote trust, and a platform to communicate the system automation 
status, outlining control distribution between ECDIS and navigator would significantly enhance 
the operator´s ability to make good decisions regarding control levels. Also, the ability to tailor 
the information and representation on the screen to suit individual preferences is an area that 
needs to be developed. Further, any mismatch between embedded images and operator image, 
resulting in a machine vs. operator preference conflict, needs to be recalibrated to avoid negative 
side effects, which could ultimately lead to the ECDIS assisted accidents. Also, there seem to be a 
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need to re-invent the alarm functions, to provide relevant and useful input for the navigators, i.e. 
alarms that you would not want to disable.  
 
The insights gained may inform design and development processes, but at a relatively high level 
of abstraction. Thus, further more detailed research will be needed to arrive at any conclusions 
regarding the specific design, of future ECDIS units. Such research could include a detailed study 
of the social functions and processes, linked to ECDIS. Consequently, a cross-disciplinary, multi-
level stakeholder effort is encouraged for the future ECDIS design and development processes. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A1: letter of request for participation (Danish, sent to ship managers). 
 
Kære XX, 
I forbindelse med mit kommende master-speciale på Lunds Universitet i Sverige, vil jeg som 
nævnt i telefonen, høre om i kunne være interesseret i at deltage i mine studier, som skal danne 
det empiriske grundlag heri.  
 
Emnet som jeg har sat mig for at undersøge, er interaktionen mellem navigatør og ECDIS og de 
praktiske problemstillinger som navigatøren oplever ved brug af denne. Kort sagt: understøtter 
ECDIS funktionerne opfyldelsen af navigatørens behov? Dette skal gerne være med til at 
udfordre de konventionelle fortællinger om ”ECDIS assisterede ulykker” hvor konklusionen ofte 
knytter sig til fejlbetjening. Jeg vil gerne bidrage til diskussionen med en ny vinkel, hvor det er 
”samarbejdet” mellem navigatøren og udstyret der bliver fokuseret på og således skibsbroens 
funktion som helhed (som moderne sikkerhedsteori understøtter). 
 
Måden jeg påtænker at gribe opgaven an, er ved at observere en række navigatører på deres vagt, 
for at få et så virkeligt som muligt indblik i de strategier der anvendes ved brug af udstyret (jeg vil 
uundgåeligt være farvet af min egen baggrund som navigatør of ECDIS bruger). Dette skal 
suppleres med uformel historiefortælling om en række relaterede emner, før eller efter vagten. 
Der er ikke tale om en evaluering af nogens adfærd, men derimod om at skabe forståelse. Alt vil 
blive gengivet i anonymiseret form. 
 
Afhængig af hvad der er muligt kunne jeg tænke mig at følge 3-4 vagter, i løbet af en periode på 
1-2 dage om bord. Igen afhængig af hvad der er muligt, påtænker jeg at udføre disse ”feltstudier” 
i løbet af marts og april 2016.  
 
Emnet er højaktuelt i forhold til den obligatoriske implementering af ECDIS, som foregår i disse 
år i størstedelen af verdens handelsflåde, samt eksisterende fremtidsperspektiver der involverer 
ECDIS, så som E-Navigation. Håbet med projektet er at kunne bidrage med ny viden og 
forbedrede processer for design af udstyr som ECDIS, der i stadig stigende grad vil indgå i 
samspillet mellem mennesker og maskiner, således at søfolk oplever at dette i stigende grad som 
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problemfrit til gavn for både produktion og sikkerhed. Herigennem håbes på en mere nuanceret 
anskuelse af problemstillingerne, end den vi er vidne til i dag. 
 
Jeg håber i vil finde det interessant og brugbart, og på denne baggrund har lyst til at hjælpe. 
 
Med Venlig Hilsen, 
Mads Ragnvald Nielsen 
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Appendix A2: letter of request for participation (Danish, sent to shipboards). 
 
Kære kollegaer om bord, 
Jeg hedder Mads og jeg er ansat ved Den Maritime Havarikommission som ulykkesundersøger, 
hvor jeg beskæftiger mig med at klarlægge omstændighederne for ulykkerne og fremme initiativer, 
der øger sikkerheden til søs. Jeg har desuden en fortid som søfarende. Ved siden af mit arbejde 
studerer jeg på andet år, på et Master program (MSc) i menneskelige faktorer og system 
sikkerhed, ved Lunds Universitet i Sverige. Jeg har valgt emnet ”ECDIS integration” til mit 
speciale som jeg netop har påbegyndt. 
 
Jeg vil anvende en systemisk tilgang (Cognitive Systems Engineering) til at undersøge samspillet 
mellem ECDIS og navigatører, med hovedfokus på hvordan ECDIS som instrument opfylder de 
behov som navigatøren har i sit daglige arbejde på broen, og hvordan ECDIS design til tider ikke 
understøtter navigatørens behov, i forhold til målet; at navigere sikkert. Det sidste er desværre en 
observeret faktor i flere ”ECDIS assisterede ulykker”. Formålet med projektet er overordnet at 
fremme design-metodologi som tilgodeser brugeren i en højere grad end det vi ser i dag. 
En meget vigtig del af forskningsprojektet involverer observationer af praktisk anvendelse af 
ECDIS om bord, samt interviews med brugerne/navigatørerne.  Derfor henvender jeg mig nu. 
 
x Projektet søges udført bredest muligt, med deltagelse fra skibe i flere segmenter indenfor dansk 
søfart. 
x Der er ingen kendt risiko ved at deltage i projektet. Deltagelse er frivillig og kan fra deltagerens 
side afbrydes når som helst. Deltagere skal være villige til at tale om deres oplevelser med ECDIS 
i forhold til navigatorisk arbejde.  
x Ingen individer eller organisationer vil blive lagt til last for nogen forhold som jeg måtte blive 
bekendt med under projektet, og alt vil blive anonymiseret ved gengivelse i min opgave. Rå 
optagelser og optegnelser vil ikke blive delt med andre.  
x Observationer og interviews foretages om bord under drift, med fuld forståelse for 
arbejdsopgaverne der foregår på broen samtidig, og bestræbelse på minimal forstyrrelse i forhold 
til disse. 
x Jeg vil under tilstedeværelsen bede om lov til at foretage lydoptagelser. Dette er for nemheds 
skyld ved efterfølgende behandling af data, men er dog ikke obligatorisk, og deltagere har retten 
til at afslå. 
x Alt efter mulighederne, søges at følge deltagende skibe i ca. 2-4 dage, enten med ophold om bord 
eller i land afhængig af drift form osv. 
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x Projektets observationer og interviews søges afviklet ved tilstedeværelse om bord i perioden 
februar-maj 2016. 
x ECDIS skal indgå som en aktiv del af arbejdet med navigation på skibe som deltager i projektet. 
x Der er ingen krav i forhold til ECDIS uddannelse af de navigatører som deltager da dette emne er 
udeladt fra studiet, som udelukkende fokuserer på den praktiske, faktiske, anvendelse af udstyret.  
x Deltagere vil blive bedt om at udfylde en samtykke erklæring ved observationernes begyndelse. 
x Min arbejdsgiver vil holde alle udgifter i forbindelse med projektet. Skib og reder vil således ikke 
opleve økonomisk last i forbindelse hermed. 
Projektet vil ganske givet udfordre den gængse opfattelse af ”fejlbejening” og ”menneskelig fejl” 
som ofte bliver en stor del af fortællingen når noget går galt til søs. Fokus vil i dette projekt blive 
rettet mod de redskaber/instrumenter som producenterne stiller til rådighed og deres kvalitet 
som ”hjælpemidler” for brugerne. Der vil her blive givet en unik mulighed for at komme til orde, 
med hvilken som helst form for observationer man som operatør må have gjort, eller 
frustrationer som man måtte have i forhold til brug af ECDIS. Med disse ”historier” kan 
fremtidens udstyr blive endnu bedre og mere brugerorienteret. 
 
På denne baggrund håber jeg i vil have lyst til at deltage i mit forskningsprojekt. Jeg ser frem til at 
høre fra jer. 
 
Med venlig hilsen 
Mads Ragnvald Nielsen 
tlf. 25117384 / e-mail madsragnvaldnielsen@gmail.com 
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Appendix B: Informed Consent Form. 
 
 
 
HOW THE SHIP´S BRIDGE KNOWS ITS POSITION – ECDIS assisted accidents 
from a human factors perspective 
 
 
Student Investigator:  
 
Mads Ragnvald Nielsen, Lunds University. 
 
Project Purpose and Procedure:  
A systems approach (Cognitive Systems Engineering) will be applied to investigate the interplay 
between the ECDIS and the navigator. The main focus will be on how the ECDIS, as a 
navigational instrument, meets the goals and needs that the navigator has in his/her daily work 
on the bridge. The overarching purpose is the demonstration of how a better understanding of 
”work as done” can inform design processes, and improve design methodology that takes into 
account ”user information”. 
 
Work in context (ECDIS use) will be observed and users will be interviewed in order to form the 
empirical foundation for the thesis project. This will be done during navigation of the ship. 
 
The results of this study will be published as a thesis and it may also be published as articles in 
scientific journal(s). 
 
Confidentiality: 
Identities of all participants will remain anonymous and will be kept confidential from all other 
parties other than the interviewer. Notes will be taken and recordings made (optional) during the 
observation/interview for the purpose of recall by the researcher for future analysis. Anonymity 
will be further protected in any future portions of the thesis paper and any presentations that may 
result from this work. Participant names will be kept in a locked secure filing cabinet separate 
from the information collected by the researcher.  
 
Compensation: 
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There will be no compensation for participation in the research. 
 
Contact Information about this Thesis Work:   
Mads Ragnvald Nielsen 
Tel: +45 25117384 / E-mail: madsragnvaldnielsen@gmail.com 
 
Lund University / Johan Bergstöm, Associated Professor 
Tel: +46 705563369 / E-mail: johan.bergstrom@risk.lth.se 
 
Risks/Benefits: 
There are no known risks or benefits to participating in this research.  
 
Consent: 
Your participation in this research project is entirely voluntary. You may refuse to participate or 
withdraw from the research at any time.   
 
Your signature indicates that you have received a copy of this consent form for your own records 
and that you consent to participate in this research.  
 
 
 
I,________________________________________________________________agree to 
participate as outline above. My participation is voluntary and I understand I can withdraw at 
anytime.  
 
Participant’s Signature      
   Date 
 
 
Student Investigator Signature     
   Date 
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Appendix C: Interview guide (Danish). 
 
Generelt 
1. Hvornår / hvordan oplever du begrænsninger ved ECDIS´ens funktionalitet? 
2. Hvordan oplever du at ECDIS´en ikke passer til dine behov/skibets operation? 
3. Oplever du brugerfladen som værende nem eller problematisk at benytte 
a. Har ECDIS´en for mange eller for få funktioner? 
b. I hvilke situationer kommer dette til udtryk? 
c. Hvad er det bedste ved måden systemet er på (hvad hjælper dig mest)? 
d. Hvad savner du allermest ved systemet (hvad er det ringeste ved systemet)? 
4. Hvilke strategier benytter du for at imødegå problematikkerne med brugerfladen? 
5. Hvad er dit bedste råd til ECDIS designere, hvis de skal lave systemet bedre næste gang? 
6. Er der andre problemstillinger som du oplever ved brug af ECDIS´en? 
7. ”Kommunikerer” ECDIS´en klart, i forhold til hvad den gerne vil præsentere af 
information 
a. Fortæller den for meget eller for lidt i forhold til dine behov? 
b. Er de visuelle og akustiske signaler hjælpsomme eller generende? 
8. Har du været udsat for brug af ECDIS´en har forårsaget utrygge situationer (mistet 
kontrol/overblik) eller ligefrem near misses? 
a. Har du oplevet at ECDIS´en (automatiske funktioner) har opført sig anderledes 
end forventet? 
 
Specifikt 
1. Hvordan oplever du brug af systemets indstillinger for kort, valg af dataniveau/lag, 
alarmfunktioner, ruteplanlægning og kontrol, osv.? 
2. Hvordan personliggøres systemet ved overlevering (hvilke parametre kontrolleres/ændres 
på, hvis det er tilfældet)? 
3. Hvordan opsættes systemet til den enkelte rejse (hvilke parametre justeres/kontrolleres)? 
4. Findes der tilstrækkelig vejledning/instruktion til brug af ECDIS´en (hvor findes denne)? 
Er ECDIS´en placeret hensigtsmæssigt (ergonomisk) i forhold til navigationen, og øvrige opgaver 
på broen? 
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Appendix D: Data collection log. 
 
Ship: Dates on board: 
Number of navigators: Watch shift: 
ECDIS equipment make: Manual collected: 
  
Observation times: 
Date & time: Hours: Navigator: Date & time: Hours: Navigator: 
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
Total observation time: 
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Appendix E:  
Marine Accident Investigation Branch. (2015). Grounding and flooding of ro-ro ferry Commodore Clipper. 
Accident Investigation Report 18/2015. Retrieved from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/451374/MAI
BInvReport-18_2015.pdf 
 
Appendix F: 
Marine Accident Investigation Branch. (2014). Grounding of oil/chemical tanker Ovit. Accident 
Investigation Report 24/2014. Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/maib-
reports/grounding-of-oil-chemical-tanker-ovit-on-the-varne-bank-in-the-dover-strait-off-
the-south-east-coast-of-england 
 
Appendix G: 
Marine Accident Investigation Branch. (2014). Grounding of bulk carrier CSL Thames. Accident 
Investigation Report 2/2012. Retrieved from https://assets.digital.cabinet-
office.gov.uk/media/547c6f8240f0b60244000021/CSLThames.pdf 
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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
AIS  Automatic identification system
BEAMer  French Bureau of Marine Accident Investigation
BMA  Bahamas Maritime Authority
BTM  Bridge team management
CATZOC  Category of zone of confidence
cm  Centimetre
CoC  Certificate of Competency
DNV  Det Norske Veritas
DNV-GL  Det Norske Veritas-Germanischer Lloyd
DSC  Digital selective calling
ECDIS  Electronic chart display and information system
ENC  Electronic navigational chart
GPS  Global positioning system
IHO  International Hydrographic Organization
IMO  International Maritime Organization
ISM Code  International Safety Management Code
kts  Knots (1 knot = 1 nautical mile per hour)
LDL  Limiting danger line
m  metre
MCA  Maritime and Coastguard Agency
MGN  Marine Guidance Note
MRCC  Maritime Rescue and Co-ordination Centre
nm  Nautical miles
OOW   Officer of the watch
PMSC  Port Marine Safety Code
PSC  Port state control
PSD  Public Services Department 
Ro-ro  Roll-on roll-off
SMS  Safety management system
SOLAS  International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974, as 
amended
STCW  International Convention on the Standards of Training, Certification 
and Watchkeepers 1978, as amended (STCW Convention)
UKC  Under keel clearance
UKHO  United Kingdom Hydrographic Office
UTC  Universal co-ordinated time
VDR  Voyage data recorder
VHF  Very High Frequency (radio)
VTS  Vessel traffic services
XTD  Cross track distance
TIMES: all times used in this report are UTC+1 
1SYNOPSIS 
At 1515 on 14 July 2014, the Bahamas registered ro-ro passenger ferry Commodore 
Clipper grounded on a charted, rocky shoal in the approaches to St Peter Port, Guernsey.  
No-one was injured, there was no pollution and the vessel continued its passage into the 
harbour.  However, there was significant raking damage including breaches of the hull 
resulting in flooding of double-bottom void spaces.  
The grounding caused a noisy, shuddering vibration that reverberated throughout the 
ship, but the crew did not check for damage, no external report was made and no safety 
announcements were made to the passengers.  Once alongside in St Peter Port, cargo 
discharge, reloading and a lifeboat drill went ahead as planned.  However, a pre-planned 
divers’ inspection of the hull soon discovered damage and the vessel was withdrawn from 
service.  
The investigation found that there had been insufficient passage planning for the voyage; in 
particular, for the transit through the Little Russel, the extremely low tide and effect of squat 
were not properly considered.  This resulted in the bridge team being unaware of the limits 
of safe water available and thus, despite their good positional awareness, they headed 
into danger without appreciation of the risk.  Several course alterations intended to regain 
track were ineffective due to the tidal stream setting the vessel off course.  Additionally, 
the absence of any alarm, steering and propulsion responding normally, and the master’s 
conviction that there had been sufficient depth of water, led to a collective denial of the 
possibility that the vessel might have grounded.  
The company’s approved route for use through the Little Russel was not followed and the 
vessel’s electronic chart display and information system was not utilised effectively because 
key safety features were either disabled or ignored.  It was also established that Guernsey 
Harbours did not have an effective safety management system for the conduct of pilotage 
within its statutory area.
Safety recommendations have been made to Condor Marine Services Limited and the 
Government of Guernsey designed to ensure appropriate levels of proficiency in the 
conduct of safe navigation.
2SECTION 1 – FACTUAL INFORMATION 
1.1 PARTICULARS OF COMMODORE CLIPPER AND ACCIDENT
SHIP PARTICULARS
Vessel’s name Commodore Clipper
Flag Commonwealth of the Bahamas
Classification society Det Norske Veritas-Germanischer Lloyd
IMO number 9201750
Type Ro-ro passenger ferry 
Registered owner Condor Limited
Manager(s) Condor Marine Services Limited
Construction Steel
Year of build 1999
Length overall 129.5m
Registered length 118.7m
Gross tonnage 14,000
Minimum safe manning 29 
VOYAGE PARTICULARS
Port of departure Portsmouth, UK
Port of arrival St Peter Port, Guernsey
Type of voyage Short international voyage
Cargo information Road freight trailers, cars and passengers
Manning 39 
MARINE CASUALTY INFORMATION
Date and time 14 July 2014, 1515 UTC + 1
Type of marine casualty Serious marine casualty
Location of incident Little Russel, Guernsey
49°29.36’N, 002°28.73’W
Place on board Hull
Injuries/fatalities None
Damage/environmental impact Hull damage, void space flooding 
Ship operation On passage
Voyage segment Mid water
External & internal environment Wind: south-westerly, force 5
Sea state: slight
Visibility: good
Persons on board 39 crew and 31 passengers
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41.2 NARRATIVE
At 0900 on 14 July 2014, Commodore Clipper sailed from Portsmouth, UK, heading 
for St Peter Port, Guernsey with 39 crew, 31 passengers and 23 vehicles on board.  
The master had selected the company approved ‘Route 06’ (Figure 1) for the 
passage.  At 0948, once clear of the pilotage channel, the master handed the con 
over to the officer of the watch1 (OOW).  During the handover, the master directed 
that the vessel’s arrival time in St Peter Port should be advanced by approximately 
30 minutes to allow more time in the port for a dive team to conduct a programmed 
underwater hull inspection and for the crew to carry out a lifeboat drill.
At 1030, the second officer (navigation) took over as OOW, and at 1452 the chief 
officer came to the bridge in preparation for the arrival into St Peter Port.  Having 
apprised himself of the situation, the chief officer sat down in the port bridge chair 
(Figure 2).  When the master arrived on the bridge just before 1500, Commodore 
Clipper was on a heading of 220°, its engines were set at full sea speed and it was 
making 18 knots (kts) over the ground.  The vessel was in the Little Russel and 
was approximately 1 cable to starboard of the 220° transit line2.  The OOW briefed 
the master on the situation, including shipping traffic, weather and the time of low 
water.  The master took the con and sat in the starboard bridge chair next to the 
chief officer.  The OOW remained on the bridge to complete the pre-arrival checklist 
and the helmsman closed up at the main steering console and switched to hand 
steering. 
At 1510, the master ordered an alteration to port to 215° in order to manoeuvre 
the vessel onto the 220º transit line (Figure 3).  At 1512:103 Commodore Clipper 
crossed the transit, and at 1512:44 the master ordered the helmsman to return 
to a heading of 220°.  The vessel did not steady on this heading as, at 1513:24, a 
further alteration to starboard to 222° was ordered.  Two further heading alterations 
were made to starboard; the first at 1513:47 to 224° and the second at 1514:25 to 
226° (Figure 3).  As the master ordered the successive 2° alterations to starboard, 
the chief officer went to the centreline of the bridge to visually assess the vessel’s 
position and the OOW went to the port bridge wing to monitor the bearing movement 
of Roustel beacon as it passed to port.  
At 1515:36, on a heading of 226° and a speed of 18.2kts over the ground, a noisy 
and shuddering vibration lasting 9 seconds was heard and felt throughout the 
vessel.  Immediately after the shudder, the master instructed the chief officer and the 
OOW to look astern.  He then reduced propulsion power to 70% and altered course 
to port to 215º (Figure 3).  The chief officer and the OOW saw nothing unusual 
behind the vessel and, as there were no alarms, and steering and propulsion 
were responding normally, the master reselected full sea speed and continued the 
approach to the harbour.
The master then phoned the chief engineer, who was in the engine control room, 
to discuss what had happened.  The chief engineer explained that the shudder felt 
below decks had been exceptional, surpassing anything he had ever experienced.  
However, the master reassured him that there had been sufficient depth of water 
where the vessel had just passed and explained that the vibration could only have 
1  The OOW was the second officer (safety)
2  For vessels inbound to St Peter Port intending to pass west of Roustel, there are leading marks on a bearing of 
220º when in transit
3  Key timings prior to the grounding include seconds
5Figure 1: Company approved Route 06
Reproduced from Admiralty Chart BA 0002-0 by permission of the Controller of HMSO and the UK Hydrographic Office. 
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7Figure 3: Commodore Clipper’s track in the approach to the grounding
Tidal stream:
South-south-east
2-3 knots
Reproduced from Admiralty Chart BA 0808-0 by permission of the Controller of HMSO and the UK Hydrographic Office. 
8been caused by something that the propellers had picked up, such as a string of 
fishing pots.  The master then told the chief engineer to instruct the dive team to 
inspect the propellers during the planned underwater survey.   
After his phone conversation with the chief engineer, the master discussed the 
event with the chief officer.  The master restated his conviction that there had been 
sufficient water where the vessel had been and went on to explain his assessment 
that it would have been safe to have passed even closer to Roustel beacon.   
Having passed the Grune au Rouge rock and Boue de la Rade shoal (Figure 
4), Commodore Clipper entered St Peter Port harbour at 1527 and proceeded 
alongside as planned.  Once berthed, the stern door was opened and the discharge 
of vehicles and passengers commenced.  At about 1620, the dive team arrived 
and the chief engineer went ashore to brief them.  He explained about the earlier 
shudder and instructed them to inspect the propellers and to search for damage.  
Once the cargo discharge was complete, the chief officer and bosun made their way 
to the bridge to supervise the lifeboat drill.  At 1645, with the drill complete, they both 
returned to the vehicle deck and commenced loading the vessel in preparation for 
the next voyage.  
At about 1700, the leader of the dive team advised the chief engineer that significant 
underwater damage to the hull had been observed.  The chief engineer informed the 
master and asked him to proceed to the dockside to view the divers’ video footage.  
Having done so, the master directed the chief officer to discharge all vehicles and 
passengers that had embarked.  The master then returned on board and phoned 
the Condor Marine Services duty operations team to inform them of the situation.  
In the meantime, the chief engineer and chief officer instigated a thorough internal 
inspection of the vessel looking for damage; tank soundings of the double-bottom 
void spaces soon identified water ingress.  
At 1730, a company representative phoned the St Peter Port harbourmaster and 
informed him that Commodore Clipper had touched the bottom and was being 
withdrawn from service.  The harbourmaster immediately proceeded on board the 
vessel, where he met the master and was briefed that there were no casualties, 
the vessel was in a stable condition and the risk of pollution was minimal.  The 
harbourmaster then informed the harbour director, the Chief Inspector of Marine 
Accidents (Guernsey) and other members of the Guernsey Pilotage Board.  An 
immediate decision was taken by the Guernsey authorities to suspend the special 
pilotage licence held by Commodore Clipper’s master.
At 1805 the following day (15 July 2014), with all the necessary approvals in place, 
no cargo or passengers on board and a relief master in command, Commodore 
Clipper sailed from St Peter Port for docking and repairs in Falmouth, UK. 
1.3 DAMAGE AND STABILITY 
A post-accident dive survey of the seabed in the location of the grounding identified 
that Commodore Clipper had struck two granite pinnacles on a rocky shoal that 
was charted at a depth of 5.2m.  During the grounding the tops of the two pinnacles 
broke away (Figure 5). 
9Figure 4: Commodore Clipper’s track from grounding to St Peter Port
Reproduced from Admiralty Chart BA 0808-0 by permission of the Controller of HMSO and the UK Hydrographic Office. 
10
The grounding caused significant damage (Figure 6) including:  
• The shell plating of the hull on the port side was subject to a deep gouging 
distortion along approximately two thirds of its length (Figure 7).
• Water ballast tank 4 was holed in two places (Figures 8 and 9).
• Void space 8, void space 9 and water ballast tank 1 (port) were all breached 
by small holes and fracture damage to the hull (Figure 10).
• Although the propellers and rudders were not struck, the skeg was damaged 
along its entire underside length (Figure 11).
Images courtesy of Captain Andy Lowe
Figure 5: Granite pinnacles struck by Commodore Clipper
11
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Figure 7: Hull gouging looking aft
Figure 8: First hole in water ballast tank 4
13
Figure 9: Second hole in water ballast tank 4
Figure 10: Detail of hull fracture damage
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• Internal fixtures in affected areas were damaged resulting from the upward 
force of the grounding; an example was the distortion to a fixed ladder within 
a void space (Figure 12).
After the extent of the damage had been fully established by internal and external 
examination of the vessel in St Peter Port, stability calculations were undertaken 
for a series of scenarios including the post-grounding ‘actual’ and ‘worst case’ 
conditions.  This analysis showed that in each condition the minimum metacentric 
height4 necessary for satisfactory stability of the vessel was maintained.
1.4 ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS
1.4.1 Weather
Wind:     south-westerly, force 55
Sea state:    slight
Visibility:    good, in daylight
1.4.2 St Peter Port tidal data for 14 July 2014
High water:    2105, 9.9m
Low water:    1509, 0.8m
Time and height at grounding: 1515, 0.9m
Tidal range:    9.1m (115% of mean spring value of 7.9m)
Tidal stream:    south-south-east, 2 – 3 kts
1.4.3 Guernsey tidal conditions
The waters around Guernsey are subject to unique and often extreme tidal 
conditions.  Unusually, slack water does not coincide with high and low water 
times.  This was the case during the grounding, where a significant tidal stream was 
flowing at low water.  In the approaches to St Peter Port, such streams can also be 
difficult to predict.  Additionally, the tidal ranges are large and therefore significant to 
navigation.  
1.5 VESSEL 
Commodore Clipper was a roll-on roll-off passenger ferry that was purpose built in 
1999 for the Portsmouth to Channel Islands routes.  The vessel was registered with 
the Commonwealth of the Bahamas, owned by Condor Limited and managed by 
Condor Marine Services Limited (the company).  The vessel’s Safety Management 
4  The calculation of the static stability of a floating object measured as the distance between the centre of gravity 
and the metacentre
5  Beaufort wind scale Force 5 defined as ‘fresh breeze’; wind speed of 17 - 21 knots
15
Figure 12: Example of internal ladder damage 
in a void space
Figure 11: Detail of damage to keel skeg
16
Certificate, confirming that its safety management system (SMS) complied with the 
ISM Code6, was issued by Det Norske Veritas-Germanischer Lloyd (DNV-GL) on 3 
June 2014 and was valid until 8 June 2019.  
Commodore Clipper was of a double-bottomed construction (Figure 6) with 12 
double-bottom void spaces and 6 double-bottom water ballast tanks.  The void 
spaces were not fitted with bilge alarms.  At the time of the grounding, all the water 
ballast tanks were pressed full of water except tank No.2 (starboard), which was 
used by the crew for stability adjustments.
The bridge navigational equipment included:
• A single Transas Navi-sailor 4000 electronic chart display and information 
system (ECDIS).  The system was loaded with a UK Hydrographic Office 
(UKHO) electronic navigational chart (ENC) outfit that was up to date with 
corrections.  Paper charts were carried as a back-up to the ECDIS and this 
arrangement complied with the Flag State’s carriage requirement.
• Two Kelvin Hughes Manta radar systems; the port display was configured 
to the S-band (10cm) radar and the starboard display was configured to the 
X-band (3cm) radar.
• A Sperry Marine ES5100 echo sounder, which was running at the time of the 
accident although the safety alarm depth was set to 0m. 
• Two Litton Marine LMX 420 global positioning systems (GPS).
• A ‘Dive Time’ draught measuring system; the recorded even keel draught of 
the vessel on departure from Portsmouth was 5.0m.
At the time of the grounding the company approved ‘Route 06’ was selected for 
navigation in the ECDIS and both radar systems.  The ECDIS display screen was 
located on the starboard side of the central bridge console adjacent to the master’s 
chair (Figure 2). The display was not accessible from the port chair.
1.6 CREW
Commodore Clipper’s crew of 39 consisted of 20 operational and 19 cabin staff 
that fully met the Flag State’s safe manning requirement.  The master, chief officer, 
chief engineer and deck officers were British nationals and the second and third 
engineers were Ukrainian.  The remainder of the crew were British or Ukrainian 
except for one Polish cabin crew member.    
The master was 60 years old and had been regularly in command of Commodore 
Clipper since it had entered service in 1999.  He was also designated as the 
vessel’s senior master, which meant that he held responsibility for vessel standards, 
crew changes and general manning issues.  He held an STCW7 II/2 master’s 
(unlimited) certificate of competency8 (CoC) and had been a special pilotage licence 
holder for St Peter Port since 1991.  He had a detailed working knowledge and 
extensive experience of navigation in the waters around Guernsey.     
6  International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention
7  International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978, as 
amended 
8  All the crew certificates had been endorsed by the Flag State
17
The chief engineer was 57 years old and, like the master, had been assigned to 
the vessel since it entered service in 1999, thus he had a long-standing working 
relationship with the master.  He held an STCW III/2 chief engineer (unlimited) CoC.
The chief officer was 35 years old and had been at sea for 12 years, primarily in the 
cruise industry, before joining Condor Marine Services in April 2012.  He held an 
STCW II/2 master’s (unlimited) CoC and a special pilotage licence for St Peter Port.  
He had been the chief officer of Commodore Clipper since November 2013.
1.7 CONDOR MARINE SERVICES LIMITED
The company was originally founded in 1964 and had ties with the Commodore 
Shipping Group. In 2003 the two companies merged and operated solely under 
the Condor name.  The company operated a fleet of high speed and conventional9 
roll-on and roll-off passenger and freight ferry services on regular routes between 
UK, Guernsey, Jersey and France.  
1.8 SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
Condor Marine Services' Document of Compliance, confirming that the company’s 
SMS met the requirements of the ISM Code, was issued by DNV on behalf of the 
Flag State on 28 May 2013 and was valid until 6 May 2018.
The company provided a generic SMS for use by all its vessels. The SMS was 
divided into three volumes:
• Group management manual 
• Group route operational manual
• Group shipboard manual
There was also a dedicated operational procedures manual for Commodore Clipper.
The group management manual set out the company’s policy for safety, quality 
management and environmental protection. It also contained detailed guidance on 
pilotage including the conduct of passage planning and navigation.  
The group route operational manual included operational limitations and detailed 
guidance on company approved routes.  Each of the company’s routes had been 
certified as safe for navigation by its vessels in all states of tide.  However, the 
routes did not contain authorised cross track distances (XTD).  The operational 
limitations for conventional ferries included the requirement for a minimum under 
keel clearance (UKC) of 1m.  This manual also contained guidance for the use of 
ECDIS.
The group shipboard manual focused on crew management, training and onboard 
services, including terms of reference for all staff. 
Commodore Clipper's operational procedures manual provided guidance on the 
company’s operational and engineering processes.  It included the pre-arrival and 
departure checklists (Annex A) that listed a requirement for arrival and departure 
9  Commodore Clipper and Commodore Goodwill were the company’s ‘conventional’ ferries. 
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briefs.  It was a requirement of the grounding-raking checklist (Annex B) to 
immediately inform the coastguard, the company and passengers following such 
incidents.   
1.8.1 Master’s standing orders
The SMS was required to be supplemented by a set of master’s standing orders, 
which had been issued dated 22 January 2007; key extracts included:
• ‘The vessel’s position is to be continuously monitored and plotted on the 
chart.
• Radar parallel indexing is a simple and highly effective method of monitoring 
the vessel’s track close to land.  It should always be used approaching the Big 
or Little Russel. 
• The tides in the area are very strong.  It is not uncommon to have to allow 20 
degrees set.
• The whole point of increasing the bridge team in pilotage waters is so that 
each member monitors the others actions.’
Given that these orders were issued prior to the ECDIS installation, no guidance on 
the use of this equipment was included.
1.8.2 Crew training and drills
The SMS list of emergency drills required to be conducted is at Annex C.  This list 
did not specifically include a requirement for grounding or flooding training, but a 
damage control exercise was required every 3 months and its checklist10 (Annex D) 
included damaged stability management, void space access and use of submersible 
pumps.
Commodore Clipper’s log of crew training and drills undertaken between 21 April 
2014 and the accident (Annex E) shows that, on 9 June 2014, a fire exercise was 
‘combined with instructions for damage control’.  Other than this, the crew training 
conducted in this period prior to the accident was dominated by simulated fires and 
abandon ship drills.   
1.9 NAVIGATION THROUGH THE LITTLE RUSSEL
The Little Russel is a northern approach channel to St Peter Port between the 
islands of Guernsey and Herm. The primary method of navigating through the 
Little Russel was visual; the key reference for the passage west of Roustel was the 
leading marks bearing 220° when in transit (Figure 13).  The Roustel is a rocky 
shoal that dries at low water and is marked by a beacon (Figure 14).  There are also 
numerous navigational marks and transits that provide further visual references to 
monitor the passage through.  For vessels approaching St Peter Port from the north, 
use of the Little Russel is 4 nautical miles (nm) shorter than using the deeper and 
wider approach via the Big Russel passing east of Herm (Figure 15).    
10  Although titled for Commodore Goodwill, this list was assumed to apply to both Condor’s conventional ferries.
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For vessels planning a passage through the Little Russel, Admiralty Sailing 
Directions (Channel Pilot) (NP27) contains detailed guidance on safe navigation, 
including the 220° leading marks.  It also contains specific cautions on the rocky 
shoals with depths less than 10m that present a very significant hazard to navigation 
in this channel.
The syllabus for St Peter Port special pilotage licence training contained a route 
recommended by local pilots (Figure 16) that advised use of the 220° transit when 
passing west of both Roustel and Grune au Rouge, before turning south to pass 
west of Boue de la Rade.
The company approved route through the Little Russel (Figure 16) mirrored the 
Admiralty and Guernsey pilots’ advice, passing west of Roustel and Grune au Rouge 
on the 220º transit.  Thereafter, the company route turned to a southerly heading but 
passed east of Boue de la Rade.  
Image courtesy of Captain Andy Lowe
Figure 14: Roustel beacon pictured at low water
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Figure 16: Pilots' recommended route and company approved route through the Little Russel
Reproduced from Admiralty Chart BA 0808-0 by permission of the Controller of HMSO and the UK Hydrographic Office. 
23
In the course of this investigation, the MAIB obtained 12 months of available11 
automatic identification system (AIS) data for Commodore Clipper’s southbound 
transits of the Little Russel prior to the grounding.  This data (Figure 17) showed 
that the vessel routinely deviated from the company route by passing east of Grune 
au Rouge.
1.10 PASSAGE PLANNING
1.10.1 International requirement 
The International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) Resolution A.893(21) Guidelines 
for Voyage Planning requires masters to plan every voyage, identifying a route that 
takes into account all navigational hazards and ensures sufficient sea room for the 
safe passage of the vessel.  The IMO guidelines explains that:
‘The development of a plan for voyage or passage, as well as the close and 
continuous monitoring of the vessel’s progress and position during the execution 
of such a plan, are of essential importance for safety of life at sea, safety and 
efficiency of navigation and protection of the marine environment.’
The guidance sub-divides passage planning into four key stages: appraisal, 
planning, execution and monitoring.  The initial voyage planning appraisal stage 
involves the gathering of all information relevant to the intended voyage. The next 
stage requires the detailed planning of the whole voyage from berth-to-berth.  The 
third and fourth stages are the effective execution of the plan and monitoring the 
progress of the vessel during the implementation of the plan.
1.10.2 Company guidance
Condor Marine Services' group management manual stated:
‘3.2.16.7. The passage plan must take into account all the pertinent information 
relating to the voyage, in particular:
• The draught of the vessel
• Depth of water and range of tide
• Tidal flow and rate, currents and swell
All tracks laid down shall be well clear of hazards to navigation giving adequate 
under keel clearance at all times.
Masters have full discretionary powers to delay entry or leaving port if by reason 
of adverse weather or other conditions they consider it unsafe.
In general, when either entering or leaving port where the charted depth is a 
critical factor it is best to wait until near the time of High Water, to provide a 
reasonable margin of water under keel.’ 
11 This data set is not a complete history of all the vessel’s tracks but is sufficiently well populated to provide an 
overview of routes used.
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For conventional ferries inbound to St Peter Port, the group route operations manual 
stated:
‘11.8.4.2. The usual approach to Saint Peter Port is via the Little Russell. 
Guernsey pilots have made a recommendation that the Big Russell and a 
Southerly approach to St. Peter Port should be used in reduced visibility. It 
should be stressed however that use of the Little Russell in poor visibility is not 
prohibited, all hazards should be taken into account, including speed of transit, 
before using this approach channel’ [sic].
‘14.7.3. The Little Russel Passage is not used in fog due to problems with the 
identification of small craft; passage is via the Big Russell’ [sic].
1.10.3 Onboard preparations   
Prior to each voyage, the master chose the route to be followed, which was then 
selected from pre-loaded route data in the ECDIS and radar systems.  The OOW 
was also required to update tidal data on a state-board by the chart table.  No other 
specific passage planning actions were taken; ECDIS safety depth, safety contour 
and XTD settings were not adjusted to reflect the safe water, based on height of tide, 
available for the passage.
1.10.4 Passage execution in pilotage waters
In pilotage waters, the master, chief officer and a helmsman were required on the 
bridge.  In addition, for inbound passages, after handing the con to the master, the 
OOW would routinely remain on the bridge until required to close up at a mooring 
station thus providing additional manpower in the approach to harbour.  Having 
taken the con, the master would pass verbal instructions to the helmsman for 
required courses to steer, but operated the propulsion power levers himself.  The 
master did not routinely vocalise his intentions or plans to the rest of the bridge 
team.  
1.11 INTERACTION
1.11.1 Effects
Interaction between a moving vessel and the seabed takes a number of forms 
including squat and shallow water effect.  Squat is the decrease in under keel 
clearance that results from the increased velocity of water flowing under a vessel’s 
hull and, therefore, the consequent reduction in pressure underneath.  Shallow water 
effect can cause loss of speed, vibration and sluggish handling when a vessel is in 
waters shallower than the onset depth12.  Shallow water effects increase as depth 
reduces and becomes significant at 25-30% of the onset depth.  In this case, for 
Commodore Clipper with a displacement of 7975 tonnes and a speed of 18kts, 
the onset depth would be 61m and the effects significant in approximately 18m or 
less sea depth.  Interactions vary with the square of the vessel’s speed through 
the water, therefore reducing speed is the most effective method of limiting shallow 
water effect.   
12  Onset depth = speed x 0.17 x cube root of displacement in tonnes
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1.11.2 Topography
The seabed in the approaches to Portsmouth and St Peter Port have different 
topographical features.  The eastern approach to the Solent consists of gently 
shelving mud and sandbanks; whereas the Little Russel is mainly granite with steep 
rocky shoals.  Thus, the onset of shallow water effect in the Solent approach is 
gradual and easily detected by the bridge team.  Conversely, the onset of interaction 
effects in the Little Russel will not be gradual and, therefore, much more difficult to 
recognise or respond to. 
1.11.3 Company guidance
The group management manual discussed hydrodynamic interaction and excessive 
speed, and stated:
‘3.2.14.1. The Master and Chief Officer are reminded of the hydrodynamic 
interaction forces between vessels and banks of channels, and ‘squat’ over the 
ground.  These forces can almost be eliminated by proceeding at slow speed.  
No consideration of prior knowledge or experience of the pilotage waters, 
schedule, practice or prior instruction can justify a speed likely to cause a 
casualty.’  
The ECDIS section of the group route operations manual offered guidance on the 
calculation of safe depth taking squat into account, and the wheelhouse poster 
(Figure 18) contained estimated squat data for planning.  The information on 
the poster showed that in approximately 10m of water and at a speed of 12kts, a 
‘draught increase’13 of 1.18m should be applied. 
After the grounding, the company commissioned an independent consultant to 
assess the effects of squat in the Little Russel; this calculation showed an estimated 
value for squat at the time of grounding of 1.46m.  
1.12 ECDIS
1.12.1 Equipment, training and performance standards
Commodore Clipper’s Transas Navi-sailor 4000 ECDIS had been approved by the 
Flag State for use as the primary means of navigation on board since 14 August 
2013.  All of the deck officers had completed the necessary generic training and 
type-specific familiarisation.  This training had been provided by ECDIS Limited in 
Fareham, UK and fulfilled the requirements of the IMO Model Course 1.27 syllabus, 
thus meeting the requirements of the STCW Code.  
The performance standards for ECDIS are detailed in IMO Resolution MSC 232(82): 
Adoption of the Revised Performance Standard for Electronic Chart Display and 
Information Systems, dated 5 December 2006. Appendix 5 to this Resolution 
mandates an alarm whenever a vessel crosses the safety contour or deviates 
from the selected route. An alarm is defined as 'an alarm or alarm system which 
announces by audible means, or audible and visual means, a condition requiring 
attention.'
13  Squat does not result in an increase in the vessel’s draught; however, it is most easily considered in this way 
for the purpose of calculating under keel clearances.  
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Figure 18: Wheelhouse poster showing estimated squat data for planning
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1.12.2 Safety depth and safety contour
Warning of the risk of grounding is achieved using the safety depth and safety 
contour functions. The group route operations manual gave the following calculation 
for safety depth:
‘Safety depth = draught + squat + minimum UKC – height of tide’
At the time of the accident, the safety depth was set at 7m.  
The safety contour is intended to show the operator a clear distinction between 
safe and unsafe water.  If there is not an ENC contour corresponding to the chosen 
safety contour value, ECDIS will automatically default to the next deeper contour.  
However, should the operator wish to use a safety contour that does not correlate 
with an available ENC contour, ECDIS has the capability for a limiting danger line 
(LDL) to be drawn manually at whatever safety contour value is required.  At the time 
of the accident, the safety contour was set to 5m.
1.12.3 Deviation from planned route
Warning of deviation from the planned route is achieved by use of the XTD setting, 
which is an operator defined safety corridor either side of the planned route.  If the 
vessel crosses outside the XTD, the system will alarm until the vessel is back inside 
the safety corridor.  Particularly in pilotage waters, the XTD should be calculated 
for each leg of a passage and take into account the expected width of safe water 
available.  For the leg of the passage plan at the time of grounding, the XTD settings 
were:
• XTD (port):  0.025nm (50 yards14)
• XTD (starboard): 0.06nm (120 yards)
The XTD alarm on board Commodore Clipper was active from 1504 when the 
vessel crossed outside the safety corridor until the time of the grounding. 
1.12.4 Safety frame
The safety frame feature is a look-ahead zone providing navigational safety by 
forewarning of a risk of grounding ahead.  An anti-grounding alarm is generated 
when the safety frame crosses the safety contour or passes over the safety depth.  
The size of the safety frame ahead of the vessel’s position is measured in time15 and 
the width either side is defined as a distance.  The available settings were:
• Ahead:   0 – 15 minutes
• Port/starboard:  0.1nm - 4nm
The group route operational manual stated: 
14  1 yard = 0.9144m
15  By measuring ahead in time, the distance at which a warning occurs is a function of the vessel’s speed
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‘16.5.8.1. Turning the Safety Frame off means that the system will only alarm 
when the ship symbol encounters them [safety depth or safety contour], which in 
most cases will be too late.’
On Commodore Clipper the safety frame feature was switched off at the time of the 
accident.
1.12.5 Alarm management
After ECDIS was approved for use as the primary means of navigation, its alarms 
activated frequently during Commodore Clipper’s passages.  Along with the 
bridge teams from other vessels in the company’s fleet, the crew on the bridge 
of Commodore Clipper found the constant ECDIS audible alarms a significant 
distraction.  As a result of concerns raised by the masters of its vessels, the 
company allowed the audible alarms to be disabled across its fleet.  Nevertheless, 
the visual alarms remained active and could still be observed on the ECDIS display.  
The company did not notify the Flag State of its decision to allow the ECDIS audible 
alarm to be disabled.
1.13 INSPECTIONS AND AUDITS
Between March 2013 and the accident, Commodore Clipper was inspected 
seven times in accordance with the ISM Code and the Paris Memorandum of 
Understanding, and no navigational non-conformities were raised. The inspections 
consisted of two internal ISM audits by the company, a renewal ISM audit by 
DNV, an annual inspection by the Flag State and three Port State Control (PSC) 
inspections.
The most recent external inspection prior to the accident was the renewal ISM audit 
conducted by a DNV surveyor on 3 June 2014. The inspection report stated that the 
vessel’s ‘bridge processes, including navigation, watchkeeping, voyage planning, 
equipment maintenance, and testing, communications, library and publications, etc’ 
had been reviewed and found to be satisfactory.  The inspection did not identify that 
the ECDIS audible alarm had been disabled.  
1.13.1 Internal audits
The report of the company’s internal audit conducted on 5 - 6 May 2014 noted a 
‘very high level of knowledge of vessel procedures was found as was a commitment 
to safe operations’ and ‘an inspection of operational areas of the vessel was carried 
out as was an informal Bridge Team Management Assessment and the standard 
achieved was observed to be high.’
Condor Marine Services also had a system of conducting regular navigation and 
bridge team management (BTM) assessments.  The assessment programme 
was delivered by the company’s marine manager and included an annual check 
voyage with each vessel to assess standards and provide a training opportunity for 
bridge teams.  The output from these assessments was a BTM evaluation checklist 
with comments where necessary.  The marine manager also conducted random 
navigational data downloads from ECDIS and voyage data recorders (VDR), which 
were then analysed ashore and feedback provided to the bridge team concerned.  
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1.14 HYDROGRAPHY
1.14.1 International obligations
The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), Chapter V, 
Regulation 9 requires IMO member states to provide nautical and hydrographic 
services that are suitable for safe navigation.  Provision of such services is an 
obligation for the UK, its overseas territories and crown dependencies. The States of 
Guernsey is a self-governing crown dependency of the UK.  
Responsibility for prioritising and managing civil hydrographic surveying in UK 
waters is held by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) and for the Channel 
Islands is delegated to its local governments.  Responsibility for analysis of survey 
data and the preparation of charts and corrections is held by the UKHO.
1.14.2 Survey data quality
Admiralty paper charts contain a source data diagram that is a scaled replica of the 
area covered showing the quality of the survey source.  This information should be 
taken into consideration during the passage planning process.  For ENCs, a similar 
system is used to categorise the accuracy of the hydrographic data.  Referred to 
as the category of zone of confidence (CATZOC), it gives an accuracy for both 
positional and depth data on the ENC.  The CATZOC table from the Mariners’ 
Handbook is at Annex F.
The survey data for the Little Russel was based on 1960s single-beam echo 
soundings.  Data from the ENC in use at the time showed that the position of the 
grounding was in an area defined as CATZOC ‘B’, which means that, for depths 
down to 10m, an error of plus or minus (+/-) 1.2m should be applied16.
Guernsey Harbours recognised its obligation to maintain accurate hydrographic data 
in its territorial waters, and in March 2014 it commissioned a commercial multi-beam 
echo sounder survey of St Peter Port’s harbour approaches.  The results of this 
survey were completed and passed to Guernsey Harbours by the survey company 
at the end of June 2014; the data was then forwarded to the UKHO for analysis.  
After the accident, scrutiny of this new data showed the rocky shoal in the grounding 
position had a surveyed depth of 4.6m below chart datum (Figure 19).
1.15 THE STATES OF GUERNSEY HARBOUR AUTHORITY  
1.15.1 Guernsey Harbours
The States of Guernsey’s Public Services Department (PSD) was responsible for 
the maritime environment.  As a sub-department of the PSD, Guernsey Harbours 
undertook specific mandated functions as the island’s harbour authority. These 
functions included: operation and management of the island’s harbours, moorings, 
vessel registry, provision of pilotage, coastguard functions, aids to navigation and 
facilities maintenance.  
16 A positional error of ±50m would also apply and the absence of full seafloor coverage by the survey meant 
that, although not expected, uncharted features may exist.
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Figure 19: Extract of data from multi-beam survey conducted in March 2014 showing 4.6m 
sounding in grounding position (orientated north up)
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Guernsey Harbours was led by a harbour director who was responsible directly 
to the PSD Board, and a harbourmaster who delivered the operational outputs.  
Although the harbourmaster had a team of assistant harbourmasters, harbour 
managers and operators, there was no individual member of staff assigned direct 
responsibility for safety management.
In 2013, Guernsey Harbours managed over 3,600 commercial shipping movements 
entering or departing either St Peter Port or Saint Sampson; the majority of these 
were ferries.  Each year, St Peter Port also hosts approximately 85 cruise ship visits, 
landing over 100,000 visitors to the island by small boats.  Cruise ships anchor 
outside the harbour with pilotage assistance.  The island’s fishing fleet consists of 
165 vessels (2013 data) and Guernsey Harbours also manages significant levels of 
leisure vessel activity, especially in the summer months. 
1.15.2 The Port Marine Safety Code and Guernsey safety management
The UK Port Marine Safety Code (PMSC) established the principle of a national 
standard for every aspect of marine operations in ports and pilotage areas across 
the UK. Although it is a voluntary code, it has been adopted by most harbour 
authorities that have statutory powers and duties.  It applies the processes of risk 
assessment and safety management systems in order to ensure operations are 
conducted safely by trained and competent staff.  
The PMSC offered guidance on the establishment of accountability for safety 
through the appointment of a duty holder17 and a designated person.  The duty 
holder is directly accountable for the safety of marine operations in its waters and 
approaches.  The designated person provides independent assurance about the 
operation of the harbour authority’s safety management system and has direct 
access to the harbour board.
In order to comply with the PMSC, the duty holder, on behalf of the harbour 
authority, must: 
‘1. Review and be aware of their existing powers based on local and national 
legislation; 
2. Comply with the duties and powers under existing legislation, as appropriate; 
3. Ensure all risks are formally assessed and as low as reasonably 
practicable in accordance with good practice;
4. Operate an effective marine safety management system which has been 
developed after consultation and uses formal risk assessment;
5. Use competent people (i.e. trained, qualified and experienced) in positions 
of responsibility for safety of navigation;
6. Monitor, review and audit the marine SMS on a regular basis – an 
independent designated person has a key role in providing assurance for the 
duty holder;
17 Duty holder – for most harbour authorities this means members of the harbour board, both 
individually and collectively.
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7. Publish a safety plan showing how the standard in the Code will be met and 
a report assessing the performance against the plan;
8. Comply with directions from the General Lighthouse Authorities and supply 
information & returns as required.’
In 2001, Guernsey Harbours commissioned an external review of its operations.  
The output of this work was a Marine Operations Plan for the ports of Guernsey, 
dated 17 April 2001.  Although Guernsey Harbours were not required to apply the 
UK PMSC, its Marine Operations Plan was compliant with the 2001 edition of the 
Code.  Subsequently, this plan was not updated or amended and was not in use as 
a safety management system for operations at the time of the grounding.
The PMSC also provided guidance for the development of a port passage plan, 
regarded as essential for the safe conduct of navigation and environmental 
protection.  Guernsey Harbours did not have a port passage plan for St Peter Port.
Guernsey Harbours maintained a risk register that was managed by a risk working 
group; however, this process primarily considered strategic and commercial 
risks.  Annex G is an extract of the risk register regarding the safe navigation at 
sea.  There was no evidence of risk assessments for the conduct of navigation or 
pilotage, including supporting capabilities such as underway boat transfers.
1.15.3 Harbour control
Under the direction of the harbourmaster, Guernsey Harbours maintained a 
continuous watchkeeping organisation that fulfilled two functions: harbour control 
and the Guernsey Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre (MRCC).  Watchkeepers 
kept watch in a harbour control operations room at the end of the St Peter Port 
breakwater; situational awareness was provided by a commercial radar, AIS data 
and very high frequency (VHF) radio including digital selective calling (DSC).  
The watchkeepers were trained locally and were responsible for maintaining a log of 
events, keeping a radar lookout and approving shipping movements in the harbour.  
In the event of a search and rescue, the Guernsey MRCC would co-ordinate 
operations with the UK, Jersey and French MRCCs in Falmouth, St Helier and 
Jobourg respectively. 
1.15.4 Vessel traffic services
SOLAS Regulation 12 Chapter V (Safety of Navigation) required contracting 
governments to arrange for the establishment of vessel traffic services (VTS) where 
the volume of traffic or the degree of risk justified such a service.  The regulation 
also required contracting governments planning and implementing such services 
to follow IMO guidance18.  The MCA’s Marine Guidance Note (MGN) 401 (M + F)19 
provided the UK interpretation of VTS and offered guidance to assist statutory 
harbour authorities in the implementation or review of a VTS service.  
18  IMO Resolution A.857(20) Guidelines for Vessel Traffic Services
19  MGN 401 (M+F) – Navigation: Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) and Local Port Services (LPS) in the 
United Kingdom
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The purpose of a VTS is to enhance safety of navigation and protection of the 
marine environment.  A VTS should comprise at least an Information Service, and 
may also include others such as a Navigational Assistance Service or a Traffic 
Organisation Service, or both.  An Information Service does not involve the direction 
of shipping movements but provides essential and timely information which may 
include other vessel movements, weather forecasts, notices to mariners and status 
of aids to navigation.  The prerequisites of a VTS include: the provision of equipment 
appropriate for the type of service provided, and suitably qualified staff trained to 
IALA20 V-103 standard.  The St Peter Port harbour control watchkeepers were not 
V103 qualified and Guernsey Harbours was not providing a VTS. 
1.15.5 Pilotage
The primary legislation for pilotage in and around St Peter Port was the States 
of Guernsey Pilotage Ordnance Act, 1967, as amended.  It defined the Statutory 
Pilotage Area (Figure 20), established the powers of the Pilotage Board and also 
set out the requirement for the granting and renewal of general and special pilotage 
licences.  Holders of special pilotage licences were empowered to conduct pilotage 
of their vessels within the statutory area without a Guernsey pilot embarked.  
Gaining a special pilotage licence required candidates to complete a dedicated 
period of self-study and practical training.  The syllabus included details of the 
navigational hazards in the pilotage area as well as a minimum of 10 supervised 
entries and exits from the ports defined in the licence.  Candidates were also 
required to be fully familiar with Guernsey pilotage and harbour laws.  On completion 
of the training, the candidate was required to pass a practical examination.  
Special pilotage licence holders were then required to complete a minimum of 20 
entries and exits from designated ports every 12 months in order for their licence 
to be revalidated.  There was no continuous professional development programme 
or further requirement for the periodic re-assessment of special pilotage licence 
holders.
1.16 SIMILAR AND PREVIOUS ACCIDENTS
1.16.1 Condor Marine Services
This is the third casualty since 2010 involving vessels managed by Condor Marine 
Services that has resulted in a published report.  
On 16 June 2010, Commodore Clipper suffered a major fire on its main deck while 
on passage from Jersey to Portsmouth.  Although the crew contained the fire, they 
were unable to extinguish it; damage was extensive and the fire-fighting effort also 
affected the vessel’s stability.  The accident was investigated by the MAIB and the 
report21 was published in November 2011.
On 28 March 2011, the high speed craft Condor Vitesse collided with the French 
fishing vessel Les Marquises.  Les Marquises was cut in two by the collision and 
one of the three crew was lost.  The accident was investigated by both the Bahamas 
20  IALA – The International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities
21  MAIB Report No 24/2011 – https://www.gov.uk/maib-reports/fire-started-by-unaccompanied-refrigerated-
trailer-unit-on-main-vehicle-deck-of-ro-ro-passenger-ferry-commodore-clipper-in-the-english-channel-on-
-route-to-portsmouth-england 
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Maritime Authority (BMA)22 and the French Bureau of Marine Accident Investigation 
(BEAMer) 23.  Poor visibility and a lack of attention on the bridge of Condor Vitesse 
as well as Les Marquises’ lack of a continuous radar lookout were identified as 
causal factors of the accident.  BEAMer made a recommendation to Condor 
Vitesse's owners to ensure ISM Code and company procedures were implemented 
on board.  The BMA report concluded that the speed of Condor Vitesse was 
probably too fast for the conditions, and the bridge team’s level of alertness 
appeared to have lapsed once the vessel had left the restrictions of the St Malo 
channel.
22  The Commonwealth of the Bahamas report into the collision between the high speed ferry Condor Vitesse 
and the fishing vessel Les Marquises on 28 March 2011. http://www.bahamasmaritime.com/downloads/
Casualty%20Reports%202001%20onwards/CONDOR%20VITESSE%20-%20March%202011.pdf
23  The report of the safety investigation into the collision between the high speed craft Condor Vitesse and the 
potter Les Marquises on 28 March 2011 http://www.bea-mer.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/RET_
CONDOR_VITESSE_-_LES_MARQUISES_04-2011_Site.pdf.
Figure 20: Guernsey Ordnance Act statutory pilotage area
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1.16.2 Queen Elizabeth 2
On 7 August 1992, Queen Elizabeth 2 grounded whilst on passage to New York; the 
weather was fine and the vessel was under pilotage.  The MAIB report24 concluded 
that the immediate causes of the grounding were that the depth of water was less 
than shown on the chart, the height of tide had been over-estimated and the effect 
of squat was substantially greater than had been allowed for.  Contributing factors 
included high speed and a failure to heed guidance on the planning and conduct of 
passages. 
1.16.3 Octopus and Harald – MAIB Report 18/2007
On 8 September 2006, the jack-up barge Octopus, which was under tow by the tug 
Harald, grounded to the west of Green Holm Island in the Orkneys. The grounding 
occurred on an uncharted 7.1m patch in an area where the closest sounding 
indicated a depth of 26m.  The area had last been surveyed in the 1840s.  The 
MAIB report included a recommendation for relevant industry bodies to emphasise 
to shipmasters and navigating officers the need to carefully consider the chart 
source data and, in the case of electronic charts, the CATZOC when passage 
planning.
1.16.4 Ovit – MAIB Report 24/2014
On 18 September 2013, the Malta registered chemical tanker Ovit ran aground 
on the Varne Bank in the Dover Strait.  The MAIB investigation report established 
that the passage plan was unsafe as it passed directly over the sandbank.  In 
addition, the vessel’s ECDIS, which was the primary means of navigation, gave 
no warning of the grounding.  This was because the ECDIS was not being used 
effectively; safety settings were inappropriate and the audible alarm was switched 
off.  Recommendations were made to the MCA, the Flag State, the International 
Chamber of Shipping and the Oil Companies International Marine Forum aimed at 
improving the standard of navigational inspections of vessels using ECDIS.
24  MAIB report of the investigation into the grounding of passenger vessel Queen Elizabeth 2 on 7 
August 1992. https://www.gov.uk/maib-reports/grounding-of-passenger-cruise-ship-queen-elizabeth-
2-on-uncharted-rocks-south-of-cuttyhunk-island-usa
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SECTION 2 - ANALYSIS
2.1 AIM
The purpose of the analysis is to determine the contributory causes and 
circumstances of the accident as a basis for making recommendations to prevent 
similar accidents occurring in the future.
2.2 THE GROUNDING
Commodore Clipper suffered significant raking damage after grounding on a 
charted, rocky shoal in the Little Russel.  The bridge team had good positional 
awareness but were not concerned as they were unaware of the limits of safe water 
available.  Their lack of risk appreciation occurred because insufficient passage 
planning had taken place prior to the voyage; in particular, the extremely low tide 
and effect of squat were not properly assessed.  The company approved route was 
not followed and, recognising that the vessel was to port of the leading transit line, 
the master made a succession of course alterations to regain track; however, this 
action was ineffective due to the strength of the prevailing tidal stream that was 
setting the vessel off course.
2.3 PASSAGE PLANNING
Prior to sailing, the master selected the company ‘Route 06’ for the voyage between 
Portsmouth and St Peter Port but no detailed planning was undertaken.  Passage 
planning factors not properly taken into account by the bridge team of Commodore 
Clipper were the height of tide, squat and accuracy of survey data.
For mariners planning passages through unfamiliar waters, consideration of the 
height of tide, interaction and the calculation of UKC and LDLs are no more than the 
application of basic navigation principles.  However, where the passage is through 
familiar waters navigated daily all year round for many years by special pilotage 
licence holders, such planning action may not appear necessary.  As the vessel 
approached the Roustel, both the master and the chief officer recognised that it 
was off track to port; indeed the chief officer stepped out of his chair to check the 
position visually from the bridge centreline just before the grounding.  However, 
without knowledge of the available width of safe water, neither of them appreciated 
that the vessel was beyond the limit of navigational safety.
Irrespective of a vessel’s size, its operational function or, in some cases, the 
repetitive nature of its journeys, it is imperative that every voyage is properly 
planned taking into account all relevant factors necessary to ensure that hazards 
are avoided.  Complacency can be defined as ‘repeated exposure to risk without 
consequence’, and the evidence in this case clearly indicates that the repetitive 
nature of the task was a causal factor.
2.4 HEIGHT OF TIDE
The mean spring range of 7.9m in St Peter Port is significant and requires 
awareness of its applicability to each passage; specifically, how the height of tide 
affects the width of safe water available.  The grounding occurred 6 minutes after 
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low water on a 115% spring tide, causing an unusually low value of just 0.9m height 
of tide.  Although the bridge team were aware of the time and height of low water, no 
action was taken to assess its significance.
Figure 21 is a comparison of the ECDIS display showing safety contours set at 2m 
and 10m; a difference of 8m, which is effectively the mean spring range.  These 
two images offer a visual comparison of the difference and significance that 8m 
height of tide makes to the width of navigable water in the Little Russel channel.  For 
Commodore Clipper, the importance of this planning consideration is reinforced by 
the fact that several of the shoals in the Little Russel are hazardous at low water 
but perfectly safe to pass over at high water.  Any of the OOW, chief officer or 
the master could have made an assessment of the effect on navigational safety 
resulting from such a low tide.
2.5 INTERACTION
Although the bridge team were aware of the effects of interaction and had routinely 
experienced it during their approaches to Portsmouth, squat was not considered by 
the crew when approaching St Peter Port.  A post-grounding assessment indicated 
that the vessel was squatting by 1.46m, and data available on the bridge prior to the 
accident suggested that at least 1.18m of squat should be applied.
Interaction between a moving vessel and the seabed is a dynamic feature and 
effects of topography can be difficult to assess.  Nevertheless, it is ever-present in 
shallow water and the speed of the vessel is the most significant factor in managing 
the effects.    
When approaching Portsmouth, vibration experienced from shallow water effect 
acted as a cue to slow down; however, the rocky shoals in the approaches to St 
Peter Port meant the onset of squat was faster and not apparent to the crew in 
the same way as when approaching Portsmouth.  This induced a situation where 
masters and watchkeepers of Commodore Clipper took account of, and responded 
to, shallow water effect when approaching Portsmouth, but did not consider it when 
approaching St Peter Port.
2.6 ACCURACY OF HYDROGRAPHIC SURVEY DATA
The vessel grounded on a rocky shoal charted at 5.2m.  This depth was based 
on 1960’s data, and the information on the ENC defined it as CATZOC B, which 
meant an error of +/- 1.2m should have been applied. While the March 2014 
survey established a depth of 4.6m in the area of the grounding, this was within the 
tolerance denoted by the CATZOC.  
Modern, colour UKHO paper charts or ENCs can give a misleading impression of 
accuracy.  In ENCs, the CATZOC information can either be displayed in a symbolic 
form or found in the system’s menu pages.  The key point is that masters and 
navigating officers must take this information into account when passage planning.
Had the bridge team produced a berth to berth voyage plan, taking the chart 
accuracy into consideration, a worst case depth of 4.0m (5.2m – 1.2m) for the rocky 
shoals adjacent to Roustel and Boue de la Rade would have been applied.  Had this 
been the case, the area where the vessel grounded and the Boue de la Rade would 
have been identified as unsafe, and avoided.
39
Figure 21: Comparison of ECDIS 2m and 10m safety contour lines in the Little Russel
Safety Contour 
2m
Safety Contour 
10m
40
2.7 CALCULATING THE SAFETY DEPTH
The master was aware of the charted 5.2m shoal patch and the company’s 
requirement for a minimum UKC of 1.0m.  He was also aware of the height of tide 
of approximately 1.0m.  Thus his planning appreciation of the navigational situation 
was:
• Draught + minimum UKC = 6.0m
• Charted depth + height of tide = 6.2m
Having made this mental appraisal, the master assessed that the vessel could pass 
safely over the 5.2m shoal and thus no danger was associated with it, both before 
and after the grounding.  However, had squat been taken into account, calculation of 
a safety depth would have been:
• Draught + minimum UKC + allowance for squat – height of tide
• 5.0m + 1.0m + 1.2m25 – 0.9m = 6.3m
Thus, the vessel should not have passed over any charted depth of 6.3m or less.  
Furthermore, if the +/- 1.2m source data accuracy of the chart is added to this 
equation then, for assurance of maintaining the minimum UKC, the vessel should 
not have passed over any charted depth of less than 7.5m in the Little Russel.  
Figure 22 is an illustration of the assessed values for the moment of grounding.  
25  Value used is taken from data available on board at the time, rounded to nearest 10cm.
COMMODORE
CLIPPER
Draught = 5.0m
Reduction in UKC (Squat) = 1.2m
Effective draught = 6.2m
Depth below chart datum = 4.6m
Height of tide = 0.9m
Depth of water = 5.5m
Figure 22: Assessment of actual values of draught and depth during grounding
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Had an accurate assessment of the safety depth been made prior to the voyage, 
alternative plans, such as approaching St Peter Port through the Big Russel or 
adjusting the time of arrival to coincide with a greater height of tide, would have been 
considered.  Even a simple calculation, taking squat into account, might have led to 
such a decision.  
2.8 PASSAGE EXECUTION AND MONITORING
2.8.1 Route
Admiralty sailing directions, Guernsey pilots’ and the company’s approved route 
through the Little Russel all converge on a track which passes west of Roustel 
and Grune au Rouge on the 220º transit.  Thereafter, the recommended tracks 
diverge with the company approved route passing east of Boue de la Rade, but the 
Guernsey pilots’ route passing west of it.  Having selected the company’s generic 
route for the Portsmouth to St Peter Port crossing, which had been authorised 
by the company for all states of tide, the master did not follow it through the Little 
Russel.
Figure 23 shows the company approved route and the actual route taken by the 
vessel.  In the approach to the grounding, Commodore Clipper was always to the 
east of the approved track.  The vessel then passed under 100 yards to the east 
of Grune au Rouge (Figure 24) and over the eastern side of the Boue de la Rade 
shoal (Figure 25).    
The absence of leading transit marks when passing Grune au Rouge and Boue de 
la Rade meant that it would not be possible visually to assess the vessel’s position 
(or the drift) to the accuracy required given the very close proximity of danger.  
Therefore, the Guernsey pilots’ recommended route passing west of Grune au 
Rouge and Boue de la Rade utilising the 220° transit would be safer.  
In addition, given that the Boue de la Rade is charted at the same depth as the 
grounding position (5.2m), and subject to the same survey accuracy of +/- 1.2m, 
then passing over this shoal created a similar navigational hazard to the grounding.  
This event reinforces the analysis that the crew were unaware of the limits of safe 
water in the Little Russel. 
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Figure 24: Detail of passage past Grune au Rouge and Boue de la Rade
Reproduced from Admiralty Chart BA 0808-0 by permission of the Controller of HMSO and the UK Hydrographic Office. 
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2.8.2 Countering the tidal stream
As Commodore Clipper made its approach to the grounding position, the south-
south-easterly tidal stream was setting the vessel off course to port.  In the 2 
minutes prior to the grounding, and appreciating the set, the master made a series 
of heading alterations intended to offset the effects of the stream and regain track.  
However, comparison of Commodore Clipper’s heading and the course over the 
ground (Table 1) shows that after the alterations to 222º and 224º, the vessel was 
still opening away from the leading transit.  It was not until 226º was being steered 
that the course over the ground was 222º and thus the vessel was finally regaining 
the transit.  However, this heading was insufficient to avoid danger; a larger and 
earlier alteration of course would have been necessary to get Commodore Clipper 
back into safe water.
Time Helmsman 
reported steady 
on heading
True heading Course over the 
ground
1513:40 222 221.8 218.0
1514:06 224 224.2 220.0
1514:36 226 225.8 222.0
    Table 1: Comparison of heading being steered and course over the ground 
immediately prior to grounding
2.8.3 Monitoring
Positional awareness in the Little Russel was primarily achieved visually using the 
220º transit; however, the margins of safety were extremely limited.  At the point 
of grounding, the vessel was 100 yards to port of the intended track where only 
about 50 yards of safe water existed.  Such distances require highly accurate levels 
of situational awareness to remain on track; there is also effectively no sea-room 
to allow for other vessels.  Nevertheless, had the master followed, with precision, 
the company route through the Little Russel, Commodore Clipper would not have 
grounded.
Teamwork on a bridge is vital, especially in pilotage waters where maintaining 
continuous, high levels of situational awareness is required and frequent 
decisions relating to navigational safety are being made.  Key to this is a common 
understanding of the plan.  Pre-departure and pre-arrival briefings, both of which 
were required by the vessel’s SMS, provide one method of delivering this.  This was 
particularly important on board Commodore Clipper as evidence from its AIS history 
(Figure 17) indicated that its masters routinely deviated from the recommended 
route.  
Had the master briefed the bridge team on his intentions prior to Commodore 
Clipper entering the Little Russel, he would have improved the capability of the 
chief officer and OOW to monitor his subsequent actions.  Absence of this insight 
hampered the chief officer and OOW’s ability to assist the master by monitoring his 
actions and providing timely inputs to the command decision making process.
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2.8.4 Use of electronic navigational aids
Although the primary means of maintaining track in the Little Russel was visual, 
electronic navigation aids can provide vital additional data, aiding the bridge team.  
The master’s radar and ECDIS displays at the time of grounding (Figures 26 and 
27) both showed the company approved route and the vessel’s position relative to 
track.  The radar display showed a digital readout of the distance off track of 0.05nm 
(100 yards).  However, given the setting on a 3nm range scale, it would be difficult to 
use this information for navigational safety.  The ECDIS display showed the vessel’s 
course over the ground, which took tidal stream into account and therefore provided 
an immediate assessment of drift. 
Although good visual situational awareness was available to both the chief officer 
and the master from their seated positions (Figure 2), the layout of the bridge 
console prevented the chief officer having ready access to the ECDIS.  This 
restricted his ability to gain situational awareness from the system and, in turn, 
adversely affected the level of support he could give to the master.  
The echo sounder’s safety alarm depth was set to 0m so the alarm feature was 
not effective.  However, the system was switched on and the display was visual to 
all on the bridge.  Use of an echo sounder as a safety barrier during pilotage can 
be effective but relies on two conditions: the expectation of danger, and seabed 
contours that would show reducing soundings in sufficient time to react.  In this 
case, neither of these conditions were present; the bridge team were unaware of 
the approaching hazard and the steep sided nature of the rocky pinnacles in the 
area would not have provided sufficient forewarning that the vessel was about to run 
aground.  
2.9 EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE
The grounding caused significant hull damage along two thirds the length of the 
vessel.  The hull was holed in several places and internal structural damage was 
caused by the upwards forces acting on the transverse frames.  Seawater flooded 
into two void spaces but was contained by the vessel’s double-bottom construction.  
The ballast tanks that were holed were already full of water and therefore there was 
no adverse effect on the vessel’s stability.  However, this was an extremely fortunate 
outcome because if the vessel had been damaged in more vulnerable areas such as 
stabilisers, steering or propellers, the situation could have posed a serious hazard to 
the vessel, its crew, passengers and the environment. 
2.10 EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
2.10.1 Denial
The severity of the noise and vibration during the grounding alarmed many of the 
crew.  The fact that the master immediately reduced power and directed both of 
the other officers on the bridge to look astern is evidence that he knew something 
significant had happened.  However, the master was convinced that there had been 
sufficient water where the vessel had passed and concluded that the vibration had 
probably been caused by a string of fishing pots becoming snagged around the 
propellers.  
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Even the chief engineer, who described to the master the severity of the shudder 
experienced in the engine control room, could not influence the master’s view that 
the vessel had not grounded.  After their phone conversation, the chief engineer 
trusted the master's judgment and advice, and took no further immediate action.  
Additionally, soon after passing Roustel, the vessel was in the final approaches to 
St Peter Port and the bridge team’s focus was on safely negotiating the harbour 
entrance; this deflected their attention from analysing the event further.
The master’s firm conviction was underpinned by the absence of alarms and the 
normal functioning of the vessel’s steering and propulsion systems. However, there 
was no evidence of fishing pots being snagged; nothing had been seen astern and 
the shafts were not fouled.  This should have led to consideration being given to 
alternative possibilities for the cause of the vibration, particularly raking over the 
ground given the vessel was in shallow water.
2.10.2 Appropriate response
In the event of such a loud and shuddering vibration, it is vital that action is taken 
immediately to identify any damage that might have been suffered.  The grounding 
and raking checklists (Annex B) included requirements to search for and assess 
damage as well as taking tank soundings.  Notwithstanding the command priority 
to enter harbour safely, action should have been taken by the crew to check for 
damage.  Had such an effort commenced immediately after the event, it is likely that 
the water ingress would have been identified earlier.  This would then have triggered 
a more prompt assessment of the situation, including a stability assessment, and 
any damage control action necessary.  Had the damage to the hull been more 
severe, such delays could have led to the loss of the vessel or the loss of life.
2.11 USE OF ECDIS
2.11.1 Audible alarms
ECDIS audible alarms on board Commodore Clipper and the rest of the Condor 
vessels had been disabled.  However, the audible alarm is a mandated feature of 
an ECDIS; therefore, disabling it meant that the system was not compliant with IMO 
performance standards.  
After the installation of ECDIS in Condor’s vessels, the audible alarm was reported 
as sounding frequently, causing a distraction on the bridge particularly in pilotage 
waters.  As a result, the company took the decision to disable the ECDIS audible 
alarms based on its assessment that this would improve safety by reducing this 
persistent distraction.  However, the audible alarm was permanently disabled, so 
could not have audibly alerted watchkeepers under any circumstances.
Persistent ECDIS audible alarms are recognised as a significant distraction to bridge 
teams and there are evidently situations, such as operating in pilotage waters with 
enhanced bridge teams at high readiness, where silencing the audible alarm would 
be helpful.  Furthermore, the disabling of ECDIS audible alarms is increasingly 
apparent in MAIB investigations26.  However, accidents investigated by MAIB where 
bridge alarms were silenced have, unlike this accident, occurred outside pilotage 
waters and often with a lone watchkeeper.  In such circumstances, audible alarms 
26 MAIB Report 24/2014 (grounding of Ovit) and MAIB Report 02/2012 (grounding of CSL Thames) both 
identified and assessed the consequences of the ECDIS audible alarm being disabled.
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are critical and will alert fatigued or distracted watchkeepers to danger.  Thus, 
improving the management of ECDIS alarms needs to be addressed through future 
developments of the system, delivering an alarm capability that only activates when 
there is a genuine danger and gives the operator sufficient time to react. 
2.11.2 Safety planning
The master had selected company ‘Route 06’ for Commodore Clipper’s voyage to 
St Peter Port, but neither the track nor the ECDIS safety features were checked as 
safe.  While the exact track itself was inherently safe, the ECDIS safety contour, 
safety depth and XTD should have been adjusted for each passage taking the local 
conditions into account.  
The ECDIS safety depth setting of 7m was appropriate for the voyage, but the safety 
contour value of 5m was not.  The safety contour could have been set at a minimum 
value of 6.3m (see Section 2.7) and the ECDIS would have defaulted to the next 
deeper ENC contour of 10m.  However, a 10m safety contour would have given 
the impression that the Little Russel was impassable.  It would have been possible 
to draw an LDL in ECDIS at 6.3m, which would have given the most accurate 
electronic picture of the safe water available.   An illustration of such a manually 
constructed ECDIS LDL is at Figure 28.  Although this facility was available and the 
crew had been trained in its use, it was not practiced on board.  Whilst this method 
could have provided a more realistic ECDIS picture of the available safe water, it is 
a method that carries significant risk as the LDL value is unique to a specific height 
of tide value and would need to be adjusted if the planned time of the passage 
changed.  Nevertheless, on board Commodore Clipper the safety depth and safety 
contour settings were never routinely adjusted for the local conditions.
2.11.3 Cross track distance errors
Although the company’s approved route did not specify XTD values for use in 
ECDIS, the settings at the time of the accident were appropriate.  Figure 29 is a 
detail of the ECDIS picture in the vicinity of the grounding position where it is evident 
that, had the vessel remained within the XTD, the grounding would have been 
avoided.  The XTD error alarm (visual on the display, but not audible) was active 
in the final approach to the grounding, but the bridge team did not respond.  Had 
the bridge team appreciated the significance of crossing outside the XTD then this 
alarm could have acted as a trigger to indicate that the vessel was heading into 
danger.
2.11.4 Safety frame 
The ECDIS safety frame is a feature that offers forewarning of danger, primarily 
intended to prevent grounding, but this feature was switched off.  However, the 
minimum width setting for the safety frame was 0.1nm (200 yards); this meant that 
the safety frame feature would have raised an alarm when the vessel was on track 
and in safe water as well as when it was unsafe (off-track).  Figure 30 shows a 
reconstructed ECDIS display with the vessel on the 220º transit approaching Roustel 
and the safety frame active - a 6.3m LDL is also drawn around the grounding 
position.  It can be seen from this image that the safety frame would have activated 
an alarm with the vessel on the 220º transit.  Thus, the safety frame feature would 
have been unable to discriminate between safety and danger when passing Roustel. 
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Figure 29: Detail of ECDIS display when grounding showing cross track distances
Vessel
outside XTD 
when aground
XTD
corridor 
(starboard)
Figure 30: Reconstructed ECDIS display showing safety frame crossing 6.3m LDL
XTD
corridor 
(port)
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2.12 SAFETY MANAGEMENT 
2.12.1 Onboard guidance
Although spread across all four manuals, Commodore Clipper’s SMS contained 
extensive guidance on navigational safety, bridge procedures and passage planning. 
Also embedded within the various manuals was some guidance on controlling 
interaction effects and the application of squat values to ECDIS formulas.  There 
was, however, some contradictory advice in the SMS such as whether or not the 
Little Russel could be used by conventional ferries in poor visibility.
As a supplement to the SMS, the master’s standing orders should provide further 
guidance on the conduct of navigation and safe operation of the vessel.  The 
orders on board Commodore Clipper did offer some advice but it was evidently not 
followed; for example, parallel indexing was not applied and the effects of the tidal 
stream were underestimated.  In addition, the orders had not been updated following 
the introduction of ECDIS, which was unhelpful as this document could have been 
used to establish advice or best practice in the use of this primary navigational aid.
2.12.2 Audits and inspections
The degree of navigational risk routinely being taken on board Commodore Clipper 
and highlighted in this investigation had not been identified as a concern by any 
of the recent internal or external audits or inspections of the vessel.  Additionally, 
Condor Marine Services did not consult the Flag State before deactivating 
the ECDIS audible alarms on its vessels and none of the four inspections of 
Commodore Clipper undertaken after ECDIS had become the primary means of 
navigation identified the audible alarm non-conformity.  
Audits and inspections are recognised as a sampling process, and it is not possible 
to check every facet of a vessel’s navigational safety and compliance.  Nevertheless, 
Commodore Clipper’s ECDIS alarm deactivation was a non-conformity that ought 
to have been detected by audits and inspections.  However, many of the auditors 
and inspectors used by Flag States or their recognised organisations, may have 
limited experience with ECDIS.  It is also more challenging for them to scrutinise 
the performance of a bridge team using ECDIS compared to one that uses paper 
charts.
The MAIB report into the grounding of Ovit27 has already addressed this issue 
through a safety recommendation intended to improve understanding of ECDIS 
knowledge and enhance questions used by auditors and inspectors.  
2.12.3 Training and readiness
It is evident from Commodore Clipper’s internal training records that the response to 
grounding was not routinely rehearsed.  Despite the requirement for damage control 
training, onboard drills were dominated by fire exercises and crew musters.  Fire 
may be a significant risk, but so too is the possibility of grounding when operating 
close to the coast as frequently as Commodore Clipper was required to.  Thus, if 
grounding or damage control had been strong themes in the programme of internal 
training, then tasking the crew to search for damage would potentially have been 
more instinctive. 
27  MAIB Report 24/2014
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2.13 GUERNSEY HARBOURS 
2.13.1 Notification and emergency response
Guernsey Harbours' staff were unaware of the incident until a call made by the 
company to the harbourmaster over 2 hours after the grounding. Even then, the 
severity of the matter was not fully understood and the harbourmaster was initially 
only informed that the vessel had touched the bottom.  Given this brief and the 
evidence from his visit on board, which established that the situation was stable and 
there were no casualties, it is understandable that no emergency response reactions 
were taken by the harbourmaster or his team.   
Nevertheless, had the harbour authority been informed of the grounding at the time 
of the accident, there would have been an opportunity to consider the full range of 
potential emergency responses and, where necessary, prepare for a contingency 
response such as pollution containment or casualty management that may have 
been required.  
2.13.2 Risk assessments and safety plans
It was apparent in the course of this investigation that some operational aspects 
of Guernsey Harbours’ work had not been subject to a formal risk assessment or 
were not undertaken in accordance with an endorsed safety plan.  In particular, the 
conduct of pilotage and boat transfers had not been risk assessed and the safety 
plan prepared in 2001 had not been updated.  The risk assessment that did exist for 
navigation (Annex G) was strategic in nature and therefore did not seek to mitigate 
operational risks.  
The UK PMSC offers guidance on the development of risk-based safety 
management of pilotage and harbour services.  Developing a safety management 
system employing such principles would highlight where risk was present and the 
actions necessary to mitigate.  In particular, the development of a port passage plan 
would serve as a guide for pilots, vessels and shore authorities to safely manage the 
conduct of navigation in the statutory pilotage area.
2.13.3 Special pilotage licences
The special pilotage licence training process was comprehensive, thorough and 
provided candidates with the knowledge and competence necessary to pilot their 
vessels in the waters approaching St Peter Port.  The training documentation 
also provided a useful guide to the pilotage area after the training was complete.  
However, once a candidate was qualified, the only further requirement was evidence 
of 20 entries and exits from St Peter Port in order for the licence to be revalidated 
annually.  Over time, it is inevitable that changes in best practice will be made and 
new surveys will highlight changes to the local environment.  As a result, there is 
a strong case for delivery of a continuous professional development programme 
for special pilotage licence holders; this could take the form of ‘check rides’ by 
Guernsey pilots or written/classroom updates for licence holders.
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2.13.4 Harbour control
The operations room watchkeepers in St Peter Port were fulfilling the roles of both 
an MRCC and harbour control with radar, visual, AIS and VHF/DSC equipment for 
situational awareness.  However, important information such as tidal and weather 
data was not routinely transmitted to approaching vessels.  Given the critical 
importance of the height of tide, it is reasonable to conclude that, had Commodore 
Clipper been reminded of the extremely low water before entering the Little Russel, 
this information might have been considered more carefully on board.  Although only 
strictly applicable to UK ports, upgrading the arrangements in St Peter Port to meet 
the requirements of an information level VTS would deliver an improved service.     
2.13.5 Hydrographic data
SOLAS requires that governments make every effort to ensure that hydrographic 
surveying is carried out, adequate to the requirements of safe navigation.  Given the 
nature of shipping traffic in St Peter Port, particularly cruise ships and ferries, it is 
important for Guernsey Harbours to sustain a programme of prioritised survey effort 
to meet users’ requirements.
At the time of the grounding, data from the survey conducted in March 2014, which 
showed a depth of 4.6m in the grounding location, was still being processed by 
UKHO28.  If this data met the criteria for CATZOC A1, then the depth accuracy to 
be applied would be +/- 0.6m and, therefore, navigators should have expected a 
‘worst case’ depth of 4.0m below chart datum.  However, the source data of the ENC 
in use by Commodore Clipper at the time of the grounding was based on 1960s 
surveys, and the feature that was struck fell within the source data accuracy, and 
this also gave a worst case minimum depth of 4.0m.
Therefore, in both cases of the 1960s data (charted depth 5.2m) and the March 
2014 information (surveyed depth 4.6m), applying the source data accuracy to the 
position of the grounding gave the same worst case minimum depth value of 4.0m.  
This is the figure that should have been used for passage planning.
28  The March 2014 survey data had only been held by the UKHO for 2 weeks prior to the grounding; this was less 
than the minimum time, agreed between all concerned parties, that the UKHO needs to assess such complex 
data, and prepare and quality assure any navigational corrections that may be required.
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SECTION 3 - CONCLUSIONS 
3.1 SAFETY ISSUES DIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT THAT 
HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED OR RESULTED IN RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Commodore Clipper grounded on a charted, rocky shoal in the Little Russel 
because insufficient passage planning had been undertaken.  In particular, the 
extremely low tide and the effect of squat had not been properly taken into account. 
[2.3, 2.4, 2.5]
2. Had all the factors affecting under keel clearance been accurately assessed, it 
would have been apparent that it was potentially unsafe to pass over any charted 
depth less than 7.5m in the Little Russel. [2.6, 2.7]
3. The absence of sufficient passage planning meant that the bridge team was 
unaware of the limits of safe water so approached danger without appreciating the 
hazard.  Furthermore, a safer course of action was available - use of the wider Big 
Russel channel. [2.3, 2.7]
4. Course alterations intended to regain track were insufficient given the strength of the 
tidal stream setting Commodore Clipper off course. [2.8.2]
5. The highly repetitive nature of Commodore Clipper’s schedule induced a degree of 
planning complacency. [2.3]
6. Although the primary method of navigating in the Little Russel was visual, ECDIS 
was not utilised effectively as a navigation aid.  In particular, the safety contour value 
was inappropriate, the cross track error alarm was ignored and the audible alarm 
was disabled.  [2.11]
7. The layout of the central bridge console prevented the chief officer from utilising the 
ECDIS display to support the master during pilotage. [2.8.4]
8. The significant navigational risk routinely being taken by the crew of Commodore 
Clipper and the ECDIS non-conformity went undetected by audits and inspections. 
[2.12.2]
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3.2 SAFETY ISSUES NOT DIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING TO THE 
ACCIDENT THAT HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED OR RESULTED IN 
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. After the accident, Commodore Clipper passed within 100 yards of the Grune 
au Rouge rock and over the Boue de la Rade shoal; both events created an 
unnecessarily high risk of further groundings.  These events reinforced the analysis 
that the bridge team was not distinguishing between safe and unsafe water. [2.8.1]
2. The grounding caused significant damage, including flooding; however, it was 
extremely fortunate that this was contained within double-bottom void spaces.  [2.9]
3. Despite a noisy, shuddering vibration, the crew did not immediately search for 
damage or follow the grounding-raking checklist. [2.10.1]
4. The possibility that the vessel had grounded was denied; this was reinforced by 
the absence of alarms, the steering and propulsion responding normally, and the 
master’s conviction that there had been sufficient depth of water where the vessel 
had passed. [2.10.1]
5. No contingency planning or emergency response measures were activated by 
Guernsey Harbours’ staff as they were unaware of the grounding until over 2 hours 
after the incident.  [2.13.1]
6. As the responsible authority, Guernsey Harbours did not have an effective risk 
assessment or safety management plan for the conduct of navigation in the statutory 
pilotage area. [2.13.2]
7. Special pilotage licence holders were thoroughly trained; however, there was no 
provision for continuous professional development after their initial qualification. 
[2.13.3]
8. Guernsey harbour control was not routinely transmitting important navigational 
safety information to approaching vessels.  [2.13.4]
9. The grounding position was charted at 5.2m; however, it was subsequently 
established as being 4.6m below chart datum.  Nevertheless, the difference 
between the charted and actual depths in the grounding position was within the 
source data accuracy for the quality of the survey of the area. [2.13.5]
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SECTION 4 – ACTIONS TAKEN
Condor Marine Services Limited has:
• Conducted an investigation into the grounding, identified the causal factors 
and circulated its report to other command teams. 
• Imposed a minimum 4.0m height of tide restriction for conventional vessels 
using the Little Russel.
• Undertaken a study of the interaction characteristics of all its vessels, leading 
to publication of advice to masters on the calculation and application of squat.
• Fitted an ECDIS repeater display at the chief officer’s position on board 
Commodore Clipper. 
• Included a plan to install bilge alarms into Commodore Clipper's double-
bottom void spaces during the next refit period.
• Provided additional bridge team management training for all command teams, 
using a refreshed training syllabus taking into account the lessons identified in 
the accident, in particular the utility of ECDIS.
• Updated the safety management system to include:
 ◦ Additional guidance on application of survey data accuracy
 ◦ Additional advice for all company approved routes to include options for 
secondary routes and to ensure that these plans provide appropriate 
margin for error
 ◦ A revision of random voyage data recorder review processes.
Guernsey Harbours has:
• Committed to delivering a safety management system for pilotage and 
navigation operations, adopting the principles of the UK Port Marine Safety 
Code where applicable.
• Secured additional resources for the provision of an assistant harbourmaster 
with specific responsibility for implementation of the Port Marine Safety Code.
• Enhanced knowledge of port management by the harbourmaster attending 
UK MCA approved training in National Occupational Standards and the Port 
Marine Safety Code.
• Established a routine for St Peter Port harbour control watchkeepers to 
transmit tidal and weather information by VHF radio to inbound vessels prior 
to entering the pilotage area.
• Procured and installed a new remote tide gauge system.
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SECTION 5 - RECOMMENDATIONS
Condor Marine Services Limited is recommended to:
2015/144 Continue to improve the standard of passage planning by its bridge teams   
  through implementing measures to ensure that:
• Proper account is taken of all factors affecting draught and available depth 
of water; in particular, an assessment of how such factors affect the width 
of safe water available.
• Use of ECDIS safety features is improved, including adjustment of the 
safety contour relevant to the local conditions and observation of all 
alarms.
The Government of Guernsey is recommended to:
2015/145 Improve the standard of vessel traffic services within the Guernsey Ordnance  
 statutory pilotage area by implementation of an information level service   
 to shipping as guided by the applicable elements of the Maritime and   
 Coastguard Agency’s Marine Guidance Note 401.
2015/146 Implement measures designed to provide assurance that, post-qualification,  
 its Special Pilotage Licence holders continue to demonstrate the required   
 level of proficiency when conducting acts of pilotage.  
Safety recommendations shall in no case create a presumption of blame or liability
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1CHIEF INSPECTOR'S FOREWORd
This is the third grounding investigated by the MAIB where watchkeepers’ failure 
to use an electronic chart display and information system (ECDIS) properly has 
been identified aV one oI the cauVal IactorV. $V thiV report iV publiVhed there are 
over 30 manufacturers of ECDIS equipment, each with their own designs of user 
interface, and little evidence that a common approach is developing. Generic 
ECDIS training is mandated by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), but 
it iV leIt to )lag 6tateV and ownerV to decide whether or not typeVpecific training iV 
necessary and, if so, how it should be delivered. As experience of ECDIS systems 
improveV evidence indicateV that many ownerV are concluding that typeVpecific 
training is essential, though some are resorting to computer-based training once 
the watchkeeper is on board. In this accident, however, despite dedicated training 
ashore on the system they were to use, the operators’ knowledge of the ECDIS and 
ability to navigate their vessel safely using the system were wholly inadequate.
8nIortunately the current generation oI (&',6 VyVtemV though certified aV 
complying with regulatory requirements, can be operated at a very low level of 
functionality and with key safety features disabled or circumvented. Training and 
company culture may mitigate these shortcomings to some extent, but can only go 
so far. While systems allow individuals to operate them in a sub-standard manner, 
there are those who will do so: such is human nature. For all shipping companies 
navigation is a safety-critical function and failure to navigate effectively can and 
does result every year in pollution, loss of vessels, and loss of life. It is to be hoped, 
therefore, that the next generation of ECDIS will embody features making them 
less vulnerable to the vagaries of human performance to achieve a better level of 
assurance that safe navigation is being consistently achieved.
Steve Clinch
Chief Inspector of Marine Accidents
2SYNOPSIS 
At 0434 on 18 September 2013, the Malta registered chemical tanker, Ovit, ran 
aground on the Varne Bank in the Dover Strait while on passage from Rotterdam, 
Netherlands, to Brindisi, Italy.  The vessel, which was carrying a cargo of vegetable 
oil, remained aground for just under 3 hours; there were no injuries and damage to 
the veVVel waV Vuperficial.  7here waV no pollution. Ovit reÀoated on the riVing tide 
and subsequently berthed in Dover. 
Ovit’s primary means of navigation was an electronic chart display and information 
VyVtem (&',6.  7he oIficer oI the watch waV Iollowing a route Vhown on the (&',6 
display; the route passed directly over the Varne Bank.    
The investigation established that:
• 7he paVVage waV planned by an ine[perienced and unVuperviVed Munior oIficer. 
7he plan waV not checNed by the maVter beIore departure or by the oIficer oI the 
watch at the start of his watch.  
• The ship’s position was monitored solely against the intended track shown on the 
ECDIS. Navigational marks on the Varne bank were seen but not acted upon.
• The scale of the chart shown on the ECDIS was inappropriate. The operator-
defined VettingV applied to the VyVtem were unVuitable and the VyVtem¶V audible 
alarm did not work.
• 7he oIficer oI the watch¶V Vituational awareneVV waV Vo poor that it tooN him  
minutes to realise that Ovit had grounded.
• $lthough training in the uVe oI the (&',6 fitted to the veVVel had been provided 
the maVter and decN oIficerV were unable to uVe the VyVtem eIIectively. 
• A Channel Navigation Information Service (CNIS) procedure, which should have 
alerted Ovit¶V oIficer oI the watch aV the tanNer approached the 9arne %anN waV 
not Iollowed becauVe the procedure had not been IormaliVed and an unTualified 
and unsupervised CNIS operator was distracted.
Recommendations have been made to the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, 
Transport Malta, The International Chamber of Shipping, the Oil Companies 
International Marine Forum and Ayder Tankers Ltd aimed at improving the standard 
of navigational inspections of vessels using ECDIS as the primary means of 
navigation. A further recommendation to the Maritime and Coastguard Agency is 
intended to ensure that the Channel Navigation Information Service is manned 
appropriately. A recommendation has also been made to Marine Information 
Systems AS intended to improve the functionality of its ECDIS 900. 
3SECTION 1 - FACTUAL INFORMATION 
1.1 PARTICULARS OF Ovit ANd ACCIdENT
SHIP PARTICULARS
Vessel’s name Ovit
Flag Malta
&laVVification Vociety American Bureau of Shipping
IMO number 9466611
Type Oil/chemical tanker
Year of build 2011
Registered owner Ovit Shipping Limited
Manager(s) Ayder Tankers Limited
Construction Steel 
Length overall 117m
Gross tonnage 6,444
Minimum safe manning 14
Authorised cargo Oil/chemicals
VOYAGE PARTICULARS
Port of departure Rotterdam, Netherlands
Port of arrival Brindisi, Italy 
Cargo information 9,500 tonnes of vegetable oil
MARINE CASUALTY INFORMATION
Date and time 0434 UTC on 18 September 2013
Type of marine casualty or incident Less Serious Marine Casualty
Location of incident Varne Bank, Dover Strait
Injuries/fatalities None
Damage/environmental impact Hull coating loss. No pollution
Ship operation In passage
Voyage segment Mid-water
External environment Wind: South-west force 3-4. 
Sea state: moderate. Visibility: good
Persons on board 14
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51.2 NARRATIVE
1.2.1 The grounding
During the early morning of 18 September 2013, the Malta registered tanker Ovit 
was transiting the Dover Strait. The vessel was on passage from Rotterdam, 
Netherlands, to Brindisi, Italy carrying a cargo of vegetable oil. The intended route 
through the Dover Strait (Figures 1 and 2) was prepared using the ship’s electronic 
chart display and information system (ECDIS).  
At 02301 the chieI oIficer arrived on the bridge and tooN over Irom the Vecond 
oIficer aV the oIficer oI the watch 22W.  +e waV Moined by the decN cadet who waV 
the assigned lookout. Ovit was following an autopilot controlled heading of 206° at a 
speed of between 12 and 13 knots (kts). The OOW selected the scale on the ECDIS 
display that closely aligned with the 12 nautical miles (nm) range scale set on the 
adjacent radar display.  He then sat in the port bridge chair where he had a direct 
view of both displays (Figure 3). At about 0300, the heading on the autopilot was 
adjusted to 225°.
As Ovit approached the Varne Bank, the deck cadet, who was standing on the 
Vtarboard Vide oI the bridge and uVing binocularV became aware oI ÀaVhing white 
lights ahead.  He did not identify the lights or report the sighting to the OOW.  
At approximately 0417, Ovit passed close by the Varne Light Float. From 0432 the 
ship’s speed slowly reduced until the vessel stopped when it grounded on the Varne 
Bank at 0434 (Figure 4).
1.2.2 Shore monitoring
At 0411, Ovit’s radar vector2 crossed into the Channel Navigation Information 
Service’s (CNIS) Varne Bank alerting zone.  This activated an audible alarm in 
the operations room at Dover Coastguard. The ship’s symbol on the CNIS display 
alVo changed Irom blacN to red and Vtarted to ÀaVh (Figure 5).  The CNIS operator 
‘authorised’ Ovit’s approach to the Varne Bank using a drop down menu on the 
CNIS display. This action silenced the audible alarm, and the ship’s symbol stopped 
ÀaVhing and itV colour changed to blacN. 7he operator then returned to a very high 
frequency (VHF) radio exchange with another vessel inside the CNIS area. 
1.2.3 Post grounding
The OOW did not appreciate that Ovit had grounded.  At 0437, an engineering 
alarm sounded and the OOW placed both azipod control levers to zero.  He then 
telephoned the master in his cabin to inform him of the alarm. He also telephoned 
the second engineer and instructed him to check the engines.
At 0443, the second engineer telephoned the bridge and informed the OOW that 45° 
of ahead pitch was available on the starboard azipod.  Accordingly, the OOW moved 
the starboard azipod control lever to 45° pitch ahead. The ship remained stationary, 
which led the OOW to assume that there was still a problem with the ship’s engines.
1 This was 0430 ship’s time (UTC+2 hours).
2 A computer projection ahead of the ship, the length of which is a function of the ship’s speed.
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Between 0449 and 0452, a series of VHF radio exchanges took place between the 
OOW and the CNIS operator.  A transcript of these exchanges is shown at Table 1:
Time Station VHF transmission
04:49:15 CNIS “Ovit, Ovit, this is Dover Coastguard, channel 11, over”
04:49:20 Ovit “Yes, this is Ovit, go ahead please”
04:49:22 CNIS “Ovit, this is Dover Coastguard, according to our radar, 
sir, you may be on the Varne Bank, is everything OK on 
board sir?”
04:49:30 Ovit “Yes, we have an engine breakdown problem, but I think 
in 5 minutes it will be OK”
04:49:38 CNIS “Roger sir, that is understood, what is your current depth 
of water, over?”
04:49:48 Ovit “Dover Coastguard, this is Ovit, could you please re-
peat”
04:49:50 CNIS “Roger sir, what is your depth of water?  How much wa-
ter is currently underneath your vessel, over?”
04:50:05 Ovit “My present draught is 7.9m, 7.9m, over”
04:50:10 CNIS “Negative sir, what is the under keel clearance, over?”
04:50:32 Ovit After a pause
“It’s approximately 10m, the under keel clearance”
04:50:58 CNIS “Roger sir, this is Dover Coastguard, what is the nature 
of your engine difficulty over?”
04:51:13 Ovit “My engine is azimuth pitch propellers”
04:51:17 CNIS “Say again sir, over”
04:51:21 Ovit “My engine is azimuth pitch propeller engine”
04:51:58 CNIS  “Roger sir, how long do you believe it will take to effect 
repairs, over?”
04:52:04 Ovit “I think in 10 minutes, the problem will be solved”
04:52:16 CNIS “Roger sir, if you could call us back in 10 minutes or 
once you have effected repairs, over”
04:52:20 Ovit “OK, I understand”
Table 1: Transcript of VHF radio exchanges between 0449 and 0452
At approximately 0453, the OOW zoomed in on the ECDIS display and noticed that 
Ovit was in an area of shallow water and he realised the vessel was aground.  The 
OOW placed the starboard lever back to zero pitch and called the master, who came 
to the bridge.  Between 0506 and 0509, there was a further exchange between 
CNIS and Ovit’s OOW (Table 2). 
12
05:06:28 CNIS “Ovit, Dover Coastguard”       
05:06:30 Ovit “Yes, go ahead please”
05:06:35 CNIS “Ovit, Dover Coastguard, may I have a situation report 
on the repairs, over?”
05:06:42 Ovit “Now the engineers are working and I think in 5, 10 min-
utes it will be OK”
05:07:02 CNIS “Ovit, this is Dover Coastguard, please can you confirm 
sir; are you aground?  Have you touched the bottom, 
over”
05:07:36 Ovit “Dover Coastguard, this is motor tanker Ovit, now the 
speed over the ground is zero and, yes, there is a pos-
sibility of a grounding and now we are checking ballast 
tanks but it seems like there are no leakage to the bal-
last tanks”
05:08:00 CNIS “Roger sir, say again regarding the ballast tanks over”
05:08:08 Ovit “Now we are checking the ballast tanks manually, we are 
checking the soundings but there is no water inlet to the 
ballast tanks”
05:08:20 CNIS “Roger sir, is there any damage to the vessel, over?
05:08:26 Ovit “For now, there is no damage, for now there is no dam-
age but we are keep checking”
05:08:40 CNIS “Roger, and the state of the crew, is everyone okay, 
there are no injuries, over?”
Ovit “Negative, negative, no injuries, everybody is OK”
05:08:50 CNIS “Roger sir, and what are your intentions?”
05:09:14 Ovit “Now I think it is low water time and we will wait for the 
water level to get high, to the high water time, I think it’s 
close to the noon time and when it’s high water time, we 
will try to move the vessel”
Table 2: Transcript of VHF radio exchanges between 0506 and 0509
During this period, the general alarm was not sounded and the crew were not 
mustered.  As soon as it had been established that the ship had grounded, ballast 
tanks were checked for internal leaks and a visual search was made around the ship 
for pollution.  
A photograph taken of the ECDIS display at 0602 is at Figure 6. Between 0716 and 
0722, Ovit reÀoated on the riVing tide. 7he veVVel VubVeTuently berthed alongVide in 
Dover, UK, to enable the hull to be inspected by divers. 
13
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1.3 VESSEL EXAMINATION 
While Ovit was berthed alongside in Dover:
• $ dive Vurvey eVtabliVhed that damage to the veVVel waV limited to Vignificant hull 
coating loss, particularly on the plating below the bilge keel on the starboard side.
• 0$,% inVpectorV e[amined the (&',6. $mong their findingV which are included 
in paragraph 1.8, was that the system’s audible alarm was not functioning.
• A port state control (PSC) inspection was undertaken by a surveyor from the 
Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA).  Ovit was detained subject to an 
aVVeVVment oI VeaworthineVV and rectification oI the deIective (&',6 audible 
alarm.   
• A service engineer repaired the ECDIS after seeking advice from the equipment 
manufacturer’s customer support team.
1.4 ENVIRONMENTAL dATA
Wind:     South-westerly, force 3 - 4
Sea state:    moderate
Visibility:     good
Morning civil twilight :  0502
Sunrise (Dover):   0535
Predicted low water:  0507 (1.1m)
Predicted high water:  1001 (6.7m)
Height of tide (0434 - grounding): 1.4m, falling
+eight oI tide   reÀoat .m riVing
1.5 CREW
1.5.1 General
All of Ovit’s 14-man crew were Turkish nationals. The crew’s morale was reported as 
low. Several of the crew had expected to leave the vessel during recent port visits, 
including Hamburg, Germany, on 14 September 2013, but the crew changes had 
been cancelled. A planned delivery of cigarettes in Hamburg also did not arrive.
1.5.2 Deck officers
$ll the decN oIficerV¶ ,nternational &onvention on 6tandardV oI 7raining &ertification 
and WatchNeeping Ior 6eaIarerV  aV amended 67&W certificateV had been 
endorsed by the Malta Transport Authority.
15
The master was 35 years old and had been on board for 3 months.  He had been at 
Vea Ior  yearV and had held an 67&W ,, certificate oI competency &o& Ior  
years.  Ovit waV hiV firVt Vhip on which (&',6 waV the primary meanV oI navigation. 
In March 2013, he had completed a bridge resource management (BRM) training 
course.  
7he chieI oIficer waV  yearV old and had been on board Ior  monthV it waV hiV 
firVt contract aV a chieI oIficer.  +e had  yearV¶ Veagoing e[perience and held an 
STCW II/2 CoC. 
7he Vecond oIficer waV  yearV old and had been on board MuVt over  monthV.  
He had been expecting to leave the ship in Hamburg and was disappointed and 
demotivated by having to e[tend hiV time on board. 7he Vecond oIficer had  yearV¶ 
seagoing experience and held an STCW II/1 CoC.       
7he third oIficer had been on board Ior  monthV and it waV hiV firVt contract Vince 
being awarded an STCW II/1 CoC.  His previous seagoing experience was as a 
deck rating for 4 years followed by 7 months as a deck cadet on board a general 
cargo Vhip.  7he third oIficer waV e[pecting to be promoted to Vecond oIficer when 
the Vecond oIficer leIt the Vhip.
The deck cadet had been on board for 6 months and held an STCW II/4 CoC, which 
Tualified him to Vtand a watch aV a bridge looNout. +e routinely accompanied the 
chieI oIficer during hiV bridge watcheV at Vea.
1.5.3 Watchkeeping routine
$t Vea the decN oIficerV Nept bridge watcheV aV IollowV 
• Vecond oIficer       and   
• chieI oIficerdecN cadet      and   
• third oIficer       and   
'uring cargo operationV in harbour the chieI oIficer worNed the hourV neceVVary to 
VuperviVe loading or diVcharge and the Vecond oIficer and third oIficer alternated in 
 hour watcheV aV the duty decN oIficer. 
1.5.4 ECdIS training
All of Ovit¶V decN oIficerV had attended a generic (&',6 courVe and a typeVpecific 
ECDIS training course which focused on the Marine Information System AB Type 
 (&',6 0ariV  fitted on board Ovit. 7he typeVpecific training waV delivered 
by STT Marine Electronics in Istanbul, which was endorsed by Marine Information 
Systems AS (Maris) as an authorised training provider for its systems.  
$ttendeeV at the 0ariV  training courVeV were a mi[ oI Venior and Munior oIficerV 
with varying degrees of experience at sea and with ECDIS. Ovit’s master was 
uncomIortable completing the courVe with Munior oIficerV. ,n particular he Iound it 
embarrassing to ask questions.
16
1.6 NAVIGATION
1.6.1 Responsibility 
7he Vecond oIficer waV the Vhip¶V navigator. +owever the maVter inVtructed the third 
oIficer to plan the paVVage Irom 5otterdam to %rindiVi becauVe it waV aVVumed he 
would be taNing over the Vecond oIficer¶V reVponVibilitieV when the Vecond oIficer 
leIt the veVVel. ,n eIIect the maVter inVtructed the third oIficer to aVVume the dutieV 
oI navigator while the Vecond oIficer waV Vtill on board. +owever there waV no 
handover in thiV reVpect between the Vecond and third oIficerV and the maVter 
had not submitted his intended re-designation of duties to the ship’s manager for 
approval.  
1.6.2 Passage planning 
The passage plan for the voyage between Rotterdam and Brindisi was prepared 
by the third oIficer on  6eptember  while the veVVel waV at anchor oII 
Rotterdam. He was not given any guidance by the master on how it should be 
prepared and no reference was made to previous, similar passages.  
When the paVVage plan waV completed it waV checNed by the third oIficer by 
scrolling ahead and zooming in on each of the route’s legs in order to identify the 
navigational dangerV. 7he third oIficer¶V worN waV not VuperviVed by the Vecond 
oIficer.  3rior to departure the intended route waV not checNed by the maVter and 
there waV no predeparture brieI among the decN oIficerV. 
The passage plan checklist, which was included in Ovit’s safety management 
VyVtem 606 and waV completed by the third oIficer iV at Annex A.  Against the 
line ‘Are there any routing hazards?’ the ‘no’ box had been ticked.  In addition, for the 
question, ‘Have the team members been made aware of any defective equipment?’ 
the response was ‘yes¶.  $ voyage planning checNliVt Ior uVe in (&',6 fitted VhipV 
which was also included in the vessel’s SMS but had not been completed, is at 
Annex B.  
1.7 MARIS 900 ECdIS 
1.7.1 Approval and installation
7he 0ariV  (&',6 waV certified by 'et 1orVNe 9eritaV '19 to be compliant 
with the necessary regulations from the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) in November 2009 (Annex C).  
)or itV certification the VyVtem waV teVted uVing the ,nternational (lectrotechnical 
Commission (IEC) standard 61174 (2008). 
7he 0ariV 7ype  fitted on board Ovit was supplied and installed by STT Marine 
(lectronicV in ,Vtanbul.  7he inVtallation certificate (Annex d) dated 1 April 2011 
stated that ‘all configuration have been done [sic]. System is tested in sea trial and 
seen OK [sic].’ 
The system comprised a planning terminal on the starboard side of the bridge by 
the chart table (Figure 7) and a monitoring terminal on the port side bridge console 
(Figure 8).  Both computers were connected in a local area network and each 
system was supported by an independent, uninterrupted power supply.  
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Figure 7: ECDIS planning terminal
Figure 8: ECDIS monitoring terminal
System: Maris Type 900
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The ship’s gyro data, global positioning system (GPS), log speed, echo sounder, 
wind inIormation and automatic identification VyVtem $,6 were all connected to the 
ECDIS.  
Ovit¶V &argo 6hip 6aIety (Tuipment &ertificate iVVued by the $merican %ureau 
oI 6hipping $%6 confirmed that µthe ship complied with the requirements of 
the Convention as regards ship borne navigational equipment…and nautical 
publications.’  7hiV certificate waV valid until  0ay .
1.7.2 Electronic navigational charts
The Maris 900 uses electronic navigational charts (ENC). An ENC is a ‘vector chart, 
issued by or on behalf of a Governmental body that complies with the IHO3 ENC 
product specification that is part of the chart data transfer standard known as S574’. 
ENC data is divided into ‘cells’ that contain hydrographic data intended for use 
between defined ma[imum and minimum VcaleV.  7he firVt digit oI the cell¶V number 
indicates the intended use and appropriate range scale as shown in Table 3.
Table 3: ENC cell range scales
1.7.3 Contours and depths 
The following contour depths (in metres) could be set on the Maris 900 ECDIS:
• Deep contour
• Safety contour
• Shallow contour
• Safety depth
These values were selected on the S57 settings page (Figure 9).  The deep 
and shallow contour values only control colour shading.  The safety contour and 
safety depth settings require values which are appropriate to the local navigational 
conditions and take into account; the ship’s draught, the effect of squat and, where 
necessary, height of tide5.  
3 International Hydrographic Organization
4  $n openly available data Iormat defined in ,+2 'ocument 6 (dition  µFacts about Electronic Charts and 
Carriage Requirements’
5 The safety contour is a critical feature intended to show the operator a difference between safe and potentially 
unsafe water; crossing the safety contour is a mandatory ECDIS alarm.  When a safety contour depth is 
set, if the selected contour is not available, the system defaults to the next deepest contour available.  (For 
example, if the safety contour was set to 15m but the ENC contours available were only every 10m, then the 
display would show the safety contour at 20m.)  The safety depth value is intended to assist the operator by 
highlighting spot depths less than the chosen setting by the use of a bold font.
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1.7.4 Guard zone
The Maris 900 ECDIS uses a guard zone ahead of the ship to provide advance 
warning oI dangerV.  7he e[tent oI the guard ]one iV defined by Vetting a time and 
an angle across the bow (Figure 10)6.  The operator is also able to select whether 
the dangerV identified in the guard ]one are highlighted on the diVplay.  +owever 
even if the operator selects for the dangers not to be highlighted, an audible alarm 
Vhould Vtill Vound when a danger iV identified inVide the guard ]one. 
1.7.5 depth alarms
The Maris 900 incorporates two depth alarms: 
• The safety contour alarm activates if the guard zone crosses the selected safety 
contour. This is a mandatory alarm required by the IMO performance standards.  
The Maris 900 factory default setting value for the safety contour was 30m.
• The grounding alarm activates when the depth at the ship’s position is less than 
the selected safety depth.
6 The setting of an angle across a ship’s bow generates a cone, the extent of which is determined by speed and 
the time set. For example, with an angle of 50° and a time of 5 minutes set, the guard zone of a ship at 12kts 
would extend 25° either side of the bow out to a range of 1nm.
Figure 9: Maris 900 ECDIS ‘S57’ input page
20
1.7.6 Alarm management
When a safety parameter is exceeded, the Maris 900 system activates an audible 
alarm. It also provides the reason for the alarm in the alarm panel on the display.  
Once the operator acknowledges the alarm, the audio signal is cancelled. However, 
the user guide states:
‘The same alarm will not be triggered again but the message will remain 
displayed for as long as the relevant limitation is exceeded or until the function is 
purposely switched off.  For example after acknowledgement, the message ‘XtD 
out limits’ will remain displayed for as long as the XTD7 exceeds the XTD limit 
value defined in the system or until the route is deactivated.’
1.7.7 Route checking
When a passage plan has been completed and is activated for use, the Maris 900 
ECDIS automatically defaults to the ‘check-route’ function.  This feature checks the 
intended route Ior navigational ha]ardV within a uVerdefined diVtance both VideV oI 
the track.  When a vessel is underway, deviation from a pre-determined route (by 
exceeding the XTD value) is a mandatory ECDIS alarm.
7 Cross Track Distance
Figure 10: Maris 900 ECDIS guard-zone settings page
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1.7.8 Over-zoom notification
Referred to as the ‘jail bars’, the Maris 900 ECDIS system contained an over-zoom 
notification to alert an operator to the Iact that important navigational detail may be 
missing from the display because of the scale in use.  The jail bars can be seen at 
Figure 6. In addition, the Maris 900 ECDIS system had an ‘auto-load’ feature which, 
if selected, loaded the most appropriate scale ENC available.    
1.7.9 Logbook and track recording
The Maris 900 user guide states that:
‘During the process of its operation, ECDIS automatically maintains two different 
electronic logbooks:
• Voyage record
• Twenty four hours logbook
The voyage record stores every two hours the position, course and speed of the 
ship for half a year.  The twenty-four hour logbook records both the navigational 
events and system events.’
The Maris 900 system also had a user-controlled track recording function which, if 
enabled would diVplay and record the Vhip¶V poVition at predefined intervalV. 
1.8 ECdIS USE ON BOARd Ovit
1.8.1 Examination
Following the grounding, MAIB examined and analysed Ovit¶V (&',6. 7he findingV 
included:
• The audible alarm was not functioning. The audio output communications port 
had not been configured8.  Therefore, when an alarm activated, no signal was 
sent to the integral speaker in the ECDIS display.  
• The route in use was named ‘Rotterdam-Vasto’ and had been selected for 
navigation on 16 September 2013.  It had 47 waypoints and totalled 2749.84nm.
• The ENC cell in use was GB202675.  ENC cell GB401892 was available.  The 
ENC auto-load feature was switched off.
• The depth settings (Figure 9) were:
 ƕ Deep contour:  30m
 ƕ Safety contour:  30m
 ƕ Shallow contour:  9m
 ƕ Safety depth:  13m.
8 $nalyViV oI the (&',6 hard drive VhowV that other computer configuration VettingV were correctly Vet up at the 
point of installation.
22
• The cross track distance (XTD) was set to 0.00nm.  The safety guard zone was 
set to 50° and 15 minutes.  The ‘display and highlight dangers’ sub menu was 
selected to ‘never’ (Figure 10).
• With the Rotterdam - Vasto route selected, the ‘check-route’ page highlighted a 
Vignificant liVt oI potential ha]ardV including the riVN oI grounding on the 9arne 
Bank (Figure 11). The page was shown to Ovit¶V decN oIficerV who interpreted 
the ‘no alarms’ notation on the lower half of the page to mean that there were no 
hazards along the route.
• Logbook recording was switched off. However, Ovit’s position at 0412 on 18 
September 2013 was recovered.  Neither MAIB nor Maris technical staff were 
able to recover historical track data between 16 and 29 September 2013. Data 
had been recorded outside of these dates.  
• System alarms were recorded in the chart system log, which showed numerous 
XTD out of limits alarms.  
Figure 11: Maris 900 ECDIS check-route page  
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1.8.2 display in use
Figure 6 is a photograph of the ECDIS display on board Ovit, which was taken when 
the vessel was aground. Information shown includes: 
• 7he over]oom notification had activated Mail barV.
• 7he ne[t waypoint waV µW3B¶ which confirmed the route in uVe.
• The XTD in the grounding position was 202 metres (m) to port of the intended 
track.
• The 30m contour was highlighted as the safety contour.
• Two alarms were active:
 ƕ ‘XTD out limits’
 ƕ ‘Grounding alert’.
1.9 RECONSTRUCTION
1.9.1 Set up and limitations
With the assistance of Warsash Maritime Academy, Ovit’s grounding was 
reconstructed in a bridge simulator to gain an appreciation of the various factors 
potentially inÀuencing the 22W¶V Vituational awareneVV. 7he inputV Ior the 
reconstruction included waypoints from Ovit’s passage plan, environmental data 
corresponding to that at the time of the accident, Ovit’s characteristics and positional 
data from the vessel’s voyage data recorder (VDR).  
Two independent ECDIS (not Maris) were used during the reconstruction.  One 
system was set up to replicate the settings used in Ovit during the grounding, 
the other VyVtem waV configured to Vhow the optimum diVplay available.  The 
reconstruction considered both the planning and the monitoring aspects of the 
grounding.
1.9.2 Findings
Observations made during the reconstruction included:
• Ovit crossed the 30m safety contour at 0251 (Figure 12) and 0417.
• Ovit passed over a charted depth of 13m at 0427 which initiated the ‘grounding 
alarm’. 
• The Varne Light Float was sighted at a range of just over 10nm.
• The lights on the cardinal buoys marking the east and west sides of the Varne 
Bank were sighted at 5nm.
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• There was a considerable difference between the ECDIS display with a safety 
contour set at 20m, and the display with the safety contour set at 30m (Figure 
13). 
1.10 VESSEL OPERATION ANd MANAGEMENT
1.10.1 General
Ovit was a 6,444 gross tonnage (gt) liquid chemical carrier built in Istanbul in 2011.  
The vessel was primarily engaged on European and Mediterranean routes and had 
transited the Dover Strait on 3 occasions in the 3 months before the grounding.
The vessel was owned by Ovit Shipping Ltd, registered in Malta and was one of 
nine chemical carriers operated by Ayder Tankers Ltd. The company, which was 
eVtabliVhed in  managed every aVpect oI itV Àeet Irom itV head oIfice in 7u]la 
Istanbul. Its Document of Compliance (DoC) had been issued by Bureau Veritas 
(BV) and was valid until 25 September 2016. Ovit¶V 6aIety 0anagement &ertificate 
(SMC) was also issued by BV and was valid until 14 February 2017.
1.10.2 Navigation equipment
In addition to the Maris 900, Ovit’s navigational equipment included:
• Sperry Marine Vision Master 3cm (X Band) radar
• Sperry Marine Vision Master 10cm (S Band) radar
• Sperry Marine R4 GPS navigation receiver
• Rutter NW04 VDR
• Martek Marine ‘Nav-guard’ Bridge Navigational Watch Alarm System (BNWAS)
• Sperry Marine Nav-pilot 4000 autopilot
• Sperry Marine ES5100 echo sounder.
At the time of the grounding, the BNWAS was switched off and no alarm depth had 
been set on the echo sounder.
1.10.3 Recruitment policy
$yder 7anNerV /td recruited itV crewV through itV manning oIfice manning agencieV 
were not used. Job applications were scrutinised and then potential recruits were 
interviewed beIore a contract waV Vigned.  1ewly employed Venior oIficerV Vpent 
a minimum oI  dayV at the company¶V oIficeV to be brieIed on the 606 and their 
responsibility for its implementation on board.  Ovit’s master had attended the ship 
manager¶V oIfice beIore Moining the Vhip.
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ECDIS 30m safety contour
ECDIS 20m safety contour
Figure 13: ECDIS display comparison of 30m and 20m safety contours 
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1.10.4 Safety management system
The implementation of the Safety Management Systems (SMS) on board Ayder 
Tankers’ vessels was the responsibility of the Designated Person (DP), who was 
an experienced master and well established within the organisation.  The company 
regularly issued circulars with updated safety information and the DPA conducted 
frequent visits to ships.  The SMS contained detailed guidance and procedures for 
the safe operation of the ship. In particular:
Master’s responsibility
The SMS set out the responsibilities of masters, which included:
'1.1.1 Master’s responsibility:
• Ensuring that all bridge personnel are fully familiar with the location 
and operation of all bridge controls and equipment
• Ensuring that the bridge is properly manned for the prevailing 
conditions
• Ensuring that a berth-to-berth passage plan is prepared and that safe 
distance from nearest grounding line are maintained'
Passage planning
7he 606 Vtated that the Vecond oIficer waV deVignated aV the navigating oIficer 
and responsible for preparing a berth-to-berth passage plan and presenting it to the 
master.  Key points included:
‘3.2 Principles of passage planning:
The passage plan is to be in three sections:
• Berth to commencement of sea passage (outward pilotage)
• Sea passage
• End of passage to berth (inward pilotage)
3.2.1 The passage plan preparation checklist must be used.  An overall 
assessment of the intended passage must be made by the master, 
in consultation with the navigating officer and the other deck officers. 
This will be when all relevant information has been gathered.  This 
appraisal will provide the master and his bridge team with a clear and 
precise indication of all areas of danger, and identify the areas in which 
it will be possible to navigate safely taking into account the calculated 
draught of the ship and planned under keel clearance.’
Use of ECDIS
The SMS provided detailed instructions to ships on which ECDIS was the primary 
meanV oI navigation. 6pecifically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‘7.12.13 safety checks:
• The master and officers should ensure that ECDIS both visual and 
audible alarms are KEPT ON in the ECDIS. [sic]
• After completion planned passage plan, planned passage should be 
checked with entered parameters in ECDIS.  This is called by safety 
checks. When safety checks carried out, ECDIS will warn you, if there 
are some unsafe situation [sic].  
SMS Section 7.12.14 provided guidance on the calculation of safety settings 
including the XTD (Annex E).
Watch conditions
7he 606 alVo included definitionV Ior three watch conditionV (Annex F) which were 
based on proximity of danger:
• &ondition $ little traIfic and good viVibility
• &ondition % heavy traIfic poor viVibility entering  leaving port or croVVing  
entering separation zone 
• &ondition & heavy traIfic denVe Iog.
1.10.5 Master’s orders 
Ovit’s master had issued a personal set of bridge standing orders to accompany 
the company’s SMS bridge manual. On 17 September 2013, he had also issued 
handwritten sea orders which were for ‘From Rotterdam to Brindisi.’   However, 
neither the master’s bridge nor sea orders included guidance on ECDIS safety 
settings.
1.10.6 defect reporting
Ayder Tankers Ltd had a well-established procedure for its crews to record and 
report defects on board.  However, no records were found indicating that the 
absence of an audible alarm in the ECDIS on board Ovit had been reported.
1.10.7 Navigation risk assessment
A risk assessment for navigation (Annex G) was held on board, which included the 
Iollowing identified ha]ardV
• ‘High draft/less under keel clearance (UKC) [sic]
• Uncorrect position fixing [sic]
• Faulty passage plan’
The mitigation for ‘Faulty passage plan’ was ‘Navigational Checklists / Bridge 
Procedures Guide’. 
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1.11 AUdITS, INSPECTIONS ANd SURVEYS
1.11.1 Navigation audits and survey 
Ayder Tankers Ltd conducted an internal audit on board Ovit on 27 August 2012. 
The audit report stated that passage planning was ‘okay’ and that the oIficerV 
were familiar with ECDIS and its functions. A Flag State inspection in Malta on 1 
1ovember  identified that the Vhip¶V decN oIficerV were µnot in possession of 
type-specific ECDIS certificates.’ An annual safety equipment survey conducted 
by ABS on 16 July 2013 did not identify any problems with the vessel’s navigation 
equipment.
1.11.2 Ship Inspection Report Programme
7he 6hip ,nVpection 5eport 3rogramme 6,5( iV a Vignificant induVtry initiative 
introduced by the Oil Companies’ International Marine Forum (OCIMF) to enable 
risk-based analyses using data from vessel inspections. 
A SIRE inspection was conducted on board Ovit on 8 September 2013. The 
navigation section of the inspection report contained two observations:
• ‘Admiralty Pilot North Sea (East)(NP55) was out of date
• Port side gyro repeater was not operational’
The report also commented that the passage plan was well prepared, ECDIS 
training certificateV were held and detailed (&',6 procedureV were included in the 
company bridge manual. 
1.12 ECdIS CARRIAGE REqUIREMENTS
1.12.1 International 
SOLAS Chapter V, Regulation 19 states:
'2.1.4. All ships…shall have nautical charts and publications to plan and display 
the ship’s route for the intended voyage and to plot and monitor positions 
throughout the voyage. An electronic chart display and information system 
(ECDIS) is also accepted as meeting the chart carriage requirements of this 
subparagraph. Ships to which paragraph 2.10 applies shall comply with the 
carriage requirements for ECDIS detailed therein;
2.1.5 back-up arrangements to meet the functional requirements of 
subparagraph .4, if this function is partly or fully fulfilled by electronic means
2.10 Ships engaged on international voyages shall be fitted with an Electronic 
Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) as follows:
.1 passenger ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards constructed on or after 1 
July 2012;
.2 tankers of 3,000 gross tonnage and upwards constructed on or after 1 July 
2012;
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.3 cargo ships, other than tankers, of 10,000 gross tonnage and upwards 
constructed on or after 1 July 2013;
.4 cargo ships, other than tankers, of 3,000 gross tonnage and upwards but less 
than 10,000 gross tonnage constructed on or after 1 July 2014;
.5 passenger ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards constructed before 1 July 
2012, not later than the first survey* on or after 1 July 2014;
.6 tankers of 3,000 gross tonnage and upwards constructed before 1 July 2012, 
not later than the first survey* on or after 1 July 2015;
.7 cargo ships, other than tankers, of 50,000 gross tonnage and upwards 
constructed before 1 July 2013, not later than the first survey* on or after 1 July 
2016;
.8 cargo ships, other than tankers, of 20,000 gross tonnage and upwards but 
less than 50,000 gross tonnage constructed before 1 July 2013, not later than 
the first survey* on or after 1 July 2017; and
.9 cargo ships, other than tankers, of 10,000 gross tonnage and upwards but 
less than 20,000 gross tonnage constructed before 1 July 2013, not later than 
the first survey* on or after 1 July 2018.'
1.12.2 Flag State 
The Malta Transport Authority requirements for the carriage of ECDIS were set out 
in Transport Malta’s Administration Requirements Document, Section 1, Article 1.20 
which stated:
‘Ships fitted with an ECDIS type approved in accordance with relevant 
international standards, including IMO Resolution A.817(19) as amended, 
and with adequate back up arrangements are accepted as meeting the chart 
carriage requirements of SOLAS 74 Chapter V regulation 27 when navigating 
in waters covered by Electronic Navigation Charts (ENC) officially issued by an 
authorised Hydrographic Office.
The following arrangements are accepted as fulfilling the back-up requirement:
• A second type-approved ECDIS’
The document did not specify the training standards required for ships’ crews 
navigating solely using ECDIS.
1.13 ECdIS PERFORMANCE STANdARdS 
7he perIormance VpecificationV Ior (&',6 are detailed in ,02 5eVolution 06& 
232(82) which was adopted by the Organization on 5 December 2006.  The 
requirement for performance standards includes:
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5.8. It should be possible for the mariner to select a safety contour from the 
depth contours provided by the system ENC. ECDIS should emphasize 
the safety contour over other contours on the display, however, if the 
mariner does not specify a safety contour, it should default to 30m.
6.1. ECDIS should provide an indication if:
1. the information is displayed at a larger scale than that contained 
in the ENC: or
2. own ship’s position is covered by an ENC at a larger scale than 
that provided by the display.
11.3.4. An indication is required if the mariner plans a route across an own 
ship’s safety contour.
11.4.3. ECDIS should give an alarm if, within a specified time set by the 
mariner, own ship will cross the safety contour.
11.5.1. ECDIS should store and be able to reproduce certain minimum 
elements required to reconstruct the navigation and verify the official 
database used during the previous 12 hours.  The following data 
should be recorded at 1 minute intervals:
1. to ensure a record of own ship’s past track: time, position, 
heading and speed; and
2. to ensure a record of official data used: ENC source, edition, 
data, cell and update history.
11.5.2. In addition, ECDIS should record the complete track for the entire 
voyage, with time marks at intervals not exceeding 4 hours.
11.5.3. It should not be possible to manipulate or change the recorded 
information.
Appendix 5 lists the ECDIS features which are specified as alarms or indications. 
The 5 mandated alarms are;
• 'Crossing safety contour
• Deviation from route
• Positioning system failure
• Approach to critical point
• Different geodetic datum'.
$n alarm iV defined aV ‘an alarm or alarm system which announces by audible 
means or audible and visual means, a condition requiring attention’.
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1.14 OPERATOR STANdARdS
1.14.1 OOW
7he ,nternational &onvention Ior 6tandardV oI 7raining and &ertification oI 
Watchkeepers 1995 (STCW) Table A-II/1 sets out the requirement for competence of 
oIficerV in charge oI a navigational watch in VhipV oI gt or more.  6pecifically Ior 
thoVe oIficerV Verving on VhipV fitted with (&',6 their Nnowledge oI the capability 
and limitation of ECDIS operations should include:
• ‘a thorough understanding of ENC data, data accuracy, presentation rules, 
display options and other chart data formats
• the dangers of over-reliance
• familiarity with the functions of ECDIS required by the performance standards 
in force’.
3roficiency in operation interpretation and analyViV oI inIormation obtained Irom 
ECDIS should include:
• ‘safe monitoring and adjustment of information, including own position, chart 
data displayed and route monitoring
• efficient use of settings to ensure conformance to operational procedures, 
including alarm parameters for anti-grounding
• situational awareness while using ECDIS including safe water and proximity of 
hazards, set and drift, chart data and scale selection and suitability of route’.
1.14.2 Senior officers
67&W 7able $,, VpecifieV the minimum Vtandard oI competence reTuired Ior 
masters and chief mates on ships of 500gt or more.  It expands the knowledge 
levels detailed in Table A-II/1 to include, among other things:
• 'Use ECDIS log-book and track history functions for inspection of system 
functions, alarm settings and user responses
• Use ECIDS playback functionality for passage review, route planning and 
review of system functions.'
1.15 OPERATOR TRAINING REqUIREMENTS
1.15.1 International Safety Management Code
The International Safety Management Code (ISM Code) provides a standard for the 
safe management of ships.  Guidance in the ISM Code includes:
‘6.2 The company should establish procedures to ensure that new 
personnel and personnel transferred to new assignments related 
to safety and protection of the environment are given proper 
familiarization with their duties.'
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1.15.2 Generic training
IMO model course 1.27 was issued by the IMO’s STW sub-committee and offered 
guidance on generic ECDIS training.  The model course 1.27 syllabus was intended 
to meet the reTuirementV oI the 67&W &ode Vpecifically the reTuirementV oI 
tables A-II/1 and A-II/2.  Students completing the course should be equipped with 
the knowledge, skill and understanding to keep a safe navigational watch using an 
ECDIS system.
1.15.3 Familiarisation 
The IMO published guidance regarding ECDIS familiarisation to member states in 
STCW.7 Circular Note, dated 22 May 2012.  This guidance included:
‘.5 Masters and officers certified under chapter II of the STCW Convention 
serving on board ships fitted with ECDIS are to be familiarized (in 
accordance with STCW regulation 1/14) with the ship’s equipment 
including ECDIS;
.6 ECDIS manufacturers are encouraged to provide resources, such as 
type-specific materials, which could be provided on a CD or DVD.  
These resources may form part of the ECDIS familiarization training;
.9 Regulation 1/14, paragraph 1.5 of the STCW Convention, as well as 
sections 6.3 and 6.5 of the International Safety Management (ISM) 
Code requires companies to ensure that seafarers are provided with 
familiarization training.  A ship safety management system should 
include familiarization with the ECDIS equipment fitted including its 
backup arrangements, sensors and related peripherals.  To assist 
Member Governments, Parties to the STCW Convention, companies 
and seafarers, a record of such familiarization should be provided;
.10 Administrations should inform their Port State Control officers of the 
requirements for ECDIS training as detailed in paragraph 9 above.  A 
certificate of competency issued in accordance with the 2010 Manila 
Amendments would be prima facie evidence of generic ECDIS training; 
however, a record of the ship specific familiarization of the ECDIS 
should be provided.’
1.16  VOYAGE PLANNING
STCW Section A-VIII/2, Part 2, states that:
‘Prior to each voyage the master of every ship shall ensure that the intended 
route from the port of departure to the first port of call is planned using adequate 
and appropriate charts and other nautical publications as necessary for the 
intended voyage, containing accurate, complete and up-to-date information 
regarding those navigational limitations and hazards which are of a permanent or 
predictable nature and which are relevant to the safe navigation of the ship.’
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1.17 WATCHkEEPING STANdARdS
STCW Section A-VIII/2, Part 3, states that:
‘9. The master of every ship is bound to ensure that watchkeeping 
arrangements are adequate for maintaining a safe navigational watch.  
Under the master’s general direction, the officers of the navigational 
watch are responsible for navigating the ship safely during their 
periods of duty, when they will be particularly concerned with avoiding 
collision and stranding.
14. The lookout must be able to give full attention to the keeping of a 
proper lookout and no other duties shall be undertaken or assigned 
which could interfere with that task.
20. Prior to taking over the watch, relieving officers shall satisfy themselves 
as to the ship’s estimated or true position and confirm its intended 
track, course and speed, and UMS9 controls as appropriate and shall 
note any dangers to navigation expected to be encountered during 
their watch.
36. Officers of the navigational watch shall…bear in mind that the echo 
sounder is a valuable navigational aid.
42. The officer in charge of the navigational watch shall give watchkeeping 
personnel instructions and information which will ensure the keeping of 
a safe watch, including a proper lookout.
48. The officer in charge of the navigational watch shall positively identify 
all relevant navigational marks.’
1.18 CHANNEL NAVIGATION INFORMATION SERVICE
1.18.1 Purpose
The CNIS was introduced in 1972 and provides a 24-hour radio and radar 
safety service for shipping within the Dover Strait.  By collecting, recording and 
disseminating maritime information, the CNIS aims to provide the latest safety 
information to shipping in the CNIS area. CNIS is jointly provided by the UK and 
French Maritime authorities in Dover and Gris Nez respectively. In the UK, the MCA 
is responsible for the operation of CNIS, which it delegates to Dover Coastguard.  
The CNIS area is shown at Figure 14.
9  Unmanned Machinery Space
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1.18.2 Vessel traffic services
Merchant Shipping Notice (MSN) 1796, issued by the MCA in April 2006, designated 
veVVel traIfic Vervice 976 VtationV in the 8. in accordance with the 0erchant 
6hipping 976 5eporting 5eTuirementV 5egulationV .  7hiV notice defined the 
level of service available to shipping operating in designated VTS areas. Annex A of 
061  deVignated the &1,6 aV an µinIormation Vervice¶ which it defined aV
• ‘A service to ensure that essential information becomes available in time for 
on-board navigational decision making’.
1.18.3 Equipment and manning
The CNIS station within Dover Coastguard contains an array of displays showing 
integrated radar and AIS information which provide operators with a good situational 
awareness of shipping in the area. Operators also have access to VHF voice and 
digital selective calling (DSC) communication systems.  
The CNIS operator’s tasks include preparing and transmitting routine broadcasts 
as well as managing reports from ships entering the area.  The CNIS station is 
continuouVly manned by a Vuitably Tualified watch oIficer.  +owever it iV acceptable 
Ior a trainee to operate the &1,6 Vtation provided a Iully Tualified operator iV 
supervising.  
1.18.4 Varne Bank alerting system
2ne oI the dutieV oI a &1,6 watch oIficer iV to monitor the 9arne %anN alerting 
system. A warning activates in two stages: 
• When a vessel’s radar vector (based on the distance a vessel will travel in 6 
minutes) (Figure 5) enters a radar guard zone set around the Varne Bank.
•  When the vessel itself enters the guard zone.
When a vessel’s vector crosses the boundary of the guard zone, an audible alarm 
is activated and the ship’s symbol on the radar display changes colour from black 
to red and ÀaVheV. 7he alert iV Vhown aV µApproaching Varne’ on the operator’s 
display. The operator then has two options:
1. Acknowledge – this mutes the audible alarm but the radar target 
continueV to ÀaVh red. ,I thiV option iV Velected the audible alarm will 
reactivate when the ship enters the radar guard zone.
2. Authorise ± thiV muteV the audible alarm and the ÀaVhing red Vhip Vymbol 
turnV blacN and VtopV ÀaVhing. 7he alarmV do not reactivate when the 
ship enters the radar guard zone.
When the alarm firVt VoundV the operator iV reTuired to eVtabliVh the veVVel¶V 
intentionV and iI a riVN oI grounding iV identified iVVue a warning via 9+) radio.  
When the alarm is activated by a vessel which is able to navigate safely across the 
bank and is permitted to so, the vessel’s movement is ‘authorised’. 
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The procedure to be followed on activation of the Varne Bank alerting system was 
circulated to all watch oIficerV by email by the &1,6 manager on  $pril . ,t 
was not included in Dover Coastguard’s written procedures. 
1.18.5 CNIS operator training
,n order to TualiIy aV a &1,6 operator watch oIficerV were reTuired to hold 
a 976 certificate 9 and complete the µCNIS Operator Assessment and 
Endorsement Procedure’.  7he 9 Tualification iV the nationally recogniVed 
VTS operators’ training scheme, which is endorsed by the MCA as the National 
Competent Authority for VTS services in the UK.  The syllabus covers all aspects 
oI 976 operationV including traIfic management 9+) radio worN communication 
co-ordination and dealing with emergency situations.
The ‘CNIS Operator Assessment and Endorsement Procedure’ is also endorsed 
by the 0&$ and iV a detailed training Vcheme covering the VpecificV oI the &1,6 
system.  Candidates were required to demonstrate a thorough knowledge of the 
system through supervised watchkeeping and a written exam.  However, the 
VyllabuV did not contain a Vpecific reTuirement Ior training on the 9arne %anN 
alerting system.  
1.18.6 Watch system
To provide 24 hour coverage, Dover Coastguard operates a four watch system. The 
duty watch is responsible for four key functions: CNIS, Sunk VTS10, the monitoring 
of VHF channel 16 and search and rescue (SAR).  This requires a minimum of four 
Tualified operatorV within each watch to be available at all timeV.  +owever it waV 
policy to have six operators (including trainees) available for day watches11 and five 
for night watches12.
The watch on duty overnight on 17/18 September 2013 comprised: 
• a watch manager 
• a watch oIficer 
• two trainee watch oIficerV one Irom a diIIerent watch
• a watch assistant.
2nly three Tualified operatorV were on watch becauVe the Venior watch manager 
and a parttime watch oIficer were both on leave.  $t the time oI the grounding the 
watch manager and watch oIficer were both abVent Irom the operationV room on a 
meal break.  The responsibilities of the personnel remaining were:
• 6unN 976  watch aVViVtant 9 Tualified 
• &1,6  trainee watch oIficer 
• 9+) channel 6$5   trainee watch oIficer
10 The North Sea Sunk area VTS is operated by Dover Coastguard
11  0800-2000 local time
12 2000-0800 local time
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None of the three remaining operators were nominated by the watch manager to be 
‘in charge’ during his absence.
1.18.7 CNIS manpower 
Manpower shortfalls meant the duty watch was frequently unable to meet watch 
commitments without augmentation by operators from the ‘non-duty’ watches.  As a 
result, it was commonplace for members of staff to work overtime on other watches 
to ensure the minimum manning levels were maintained. The risk associated 
with thiV diIficulty in VuVtaining appropriate manning had been reported by 'over 
Coastguard managers to the MCA headquarters, but its actions were ineffective in 
easing the manning shortfall.  
The Watch Staffing Planning and Risk Evaluation for the period 15-18 September 
2013 is at Annex H.  This assessment shows that, at the time of the grounding, the 
watch was at minimum manning. It also shows that the day watch on 15 September 
 waV two watch oIficerV below the minimum manning level. 7he VhortageV 
highlighted in the evaluation were typical of the shortages experienced at other 
times.
1.19 PREVIOUS ACCIdENTS
1.19.1 Lowlands Maine
On 26 April 2006, the bulk carrier Lowlands Maine ran aground on the Varne Bank.  
'uring paVVage through the 'over 6trait the Vhip¶V chieI oIficer made an alteration 
of course to regain track.  The new course headed directly for the Varne Bank.  
%eIore the veVVel had regained tracN the third oIficer tooN over the bridge watch.  
7he third oIficer fi[ed the Vhip¶V poVition and Vaw that the Vhip had regained tracN. 
However, he did not adjust the ship’s heading back to the base course and the ship 
continued to head for the Varne Bank until grounding.  
1.19.2 Lt Cortesia
On 2 January 2008, the container ship LT Cortesia ran aground on the Varne Bank, 
causing the buckling of an internal bulkhead.  The accident report published by the 
German Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation concluded that the OOW 
had not properly assessed the shipping situation and that communications with 
the looNout were ineIIective.  7he report alVo identified that the contour and alarm 
settings on the ECDIS were inappropriate.
1.19.3 CFL Performer – MAIB report 21/2008
On 12 May 2008, the Netherlands registered dry cargo ship, CFL Performer, ran 
aground on +aiVborough 6and.  7he grounding occurred aIter the chieI oIficer 
adjusted the passage plan in the ECDIS.  The adjusted route, which took the 
vessel directly over Haisborough Sand, was not checked by the master.  The 
MAIB investigation established that, despite ECDIS being used as a primary 
meanV oI navigation none oI the Vhip¶V oIficerV had been trained in itV uVe.  $ 
recommendation was made to the MCA to support a proposal that ECDIS 
competencies were included in the STCW Convention.
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1.19.4 CSL thames – MAIB report 02/2012
On 9 August 2011, the Malta registered self-discharging bulk carrier, CSL Thames, 
grounded in the Sound of Mull.  The grounding occurred after the OOW had made 
an alteration of course to avoid another vessel, but had not noticed that the new 
course would take the ship into shallow water.  The audio alarm on the ship’s ECDIS 
system, which could have alerted the OOW to the danger, was inoperative.  In 
addition, the master and other watchkeepers’ knowledge of the ECDIS system was 
inVuIficient.  
40
SECTION 2 - ANALYSIS
2.1 AIM
The purpose of the analysis is to determine the contributory causes and 
circumstances of the accident as a basis for making safety recommendations to 
prevent similar accidents occurring in the future.
2.2 OVERSIGHT ANd SCRUTINY 
It is evident from the planned track over the Varne Bank (Figures 1 and 2) that 
the route planned by the third oIficer waV unVaIe and had never been properly 
checNed. 7he third oIficer had ]oomed in on each leg oI the route on the (&',6 in 
order to visually identify navigational hazards. However, this very basic approach 
was unlikely to identify all the dangers associated with the passage. The ECDIS 
check-route page (Figure 11) would have been more accurate and reliable. 
Nonetheless, the danger of passing over the Varne Bank should have still been 
readily apparent had the visual check been completed diligently. 
The requirement to prepare a safe passage plan underpins safe navigation. 
7hereIore it iV important that oIficerV reVponVible Ior thiV taVN are VuIficiently 
experienced and competent. In this case, the master’s decision to direct the third 
oIficer to plan the paVVage waV reaVonable. 7he Vecond oIficer¶V departure Irom the 
veVVel waV imminent and the third oIficer waV Voon to be promoted. 7he third oIficer 
had also been trained in the use of ECDIS and had used the Maris 900 during his 5 
months on board. However, the complexity of the route and the inexperience of the 
third oIficer warranted a high degree oI VuperviVion and Vcrutiny.  ,nVtead there waV 
none. ,t iV aVtoniVhing that the Vecond oIficer did not aVViVt adviVe or monitor the 
third oIficer and that the maVter did not checN the intended route himVelI.
$lthough the Vecond oIficer had been e[pecting to leave the Vhip no Iormal 
handover oI navigation oIficer reVponVibilitieV had taNen place.  7he Vecond oIficer 
waV thereIore Vtill the navigating oIficer. +e waV demotivated becauVe he had not 
been able to leave the ship in Hamburg, but this should not have impinged on the 
Vecond oIficer¶V proIeVVional reVponVibility to provide overVight oI the third oIficer 
and paVV on the benefitV oI hiV e[perience. ,ndeed it iV a taVN that the maVter 
should have directed him to undertake.
2.3 BRIdGE WATCHkEEPING PRACTICES
2.3.1 Events leading to the grounding
When the chieI oIficer arrived on the bridge he did not checN the route ahead 
to identify potential navigational hazards or the navigational marks likely to be 
encountered during his watch.  Consequently, he was unaware that the ship’s 
intended track passed over the Varne Bank. He was also ignorant of the cardinal 
marks marking the danger. 
When Ovit grounded the chieI oIficer had been on watch Ior  hourV. 'uring thiV 
time, he had mainly remained seated in the chair in front of the ECDIS and radar 
displays (Figure 3). However, his alignment of the scale set on the ECDIS with the 
41
range scale on the adjacent radar display resulted in the ECDIS being on a scale of 
1:151712, which was totally inappropriate for the area. Consequently, safety critical 
information was not displayed. 
7he chieI oIficer did not appear to be concerned that the (&',6 diVplay waV 
showing ‘jail bars’ (Figure 6) which he could not avoid seeing. He was using ECDIS 
solely to monitor the vessel’s position relative to its intended track, nothing more.  
7he chieI oIficer probably did not Vee on the diVplay that Ovit crossed the safety 
contour at 0251 and 0417. Given the ECDIS settings, crossing the safety contour 
was a routine event which was likely to have been frequently ignored.
,t iV evident that the chieI oIficer either did not looN out oI the bridge window or 
he did not try and associate and correlate what he saw ahead of the ship with the 
information available from his radar, AIS and ECDIS. Therefore, even if the lookout 
had reported hiV Vighting oI lightV ahead it iV uncertain whether the chieI oIficer 
would have recogniVed their Vignificance.
During the reconstruction (paragraph 1.9) the east and west cardinal marks 
became visible at a range of 5nm. Consequently, they could potentially have been 
seen by the OOW and the lookout 25 minutes before Ovit grounded. This was ample 
time in which to identify the buoys, highlight the error in the passage plan, and take 
corrective action.
2.3.2 Events following the grounding
At 0434, when Ovit stopped in the water between the cardinal marks delineating 
the limits of the Varne Bank (Figure 4) the chieI oIficer¶V Vituational awareneVV 
was so poor that he did not know that the vessel had grounded. It was only when 
an engineering alarm sounded at 0437 that he became aware that something was 
wrong. Even then, it is evident that he thought that the ship was stopped because of 
a machinery breaNdown. 1onetheleVV that the chieI oIficer called the maVter aIter 
he moved the azipod control levers to zero pitch, indicates that he appreciated the 
VeriouVneVV oI being without propulVion in a traIfic Veparation Vcheme 766.
It was probably Dover Coastguard’s call on VHF radio (Table 1) stating that Ovit 
might be on the 9arne %anN that prompted the chieI oIficer to change the Vcale on 
the ECDIS in order to see more information.  Only then, at 0453, 19 minutes after 
Ovit had Vtopped did the chieI oIficer realiVe that the tanNer had grounded. 
$lthough the chieI oIficer then again telephoned the maVter the general alarm 
was not sounded and no crew muster was undertaken. Furthermore, it was not 
until prompted by the &1,6 operator at  that the chieI oIficer inIormed 'over 
Coastguard that Ovit was aground (Table 2). The vagueness and lack of accuracy 
oI the chieI oIficer¶V reVponVeV to the VubVeTuent TueVtionV aVNed by the &1,6 
operator were unhelpful, particularly as the operator was trying to establish what had 
happened and the level of assistance that might be required.
2.4 BRIdGE ORGANISATION
An important element of passage planning is ensuring that the ship is adequately 
prepared to meet the demands of any navigational situation. In this case, the master 
was aware that when Ovit sailed from Rotterdam, several hours of pilotage would be 
followed by a long transit through the TSS, including the Dover Strait.
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7he 'over 6trait iV a demanding paVVage which preVentV a VerieV oI Vignificant 
navigational ha]ardV Ior Vhipping including dangerouV VhallowV and a high traIfic 
density.  However, the area is well surveyed and charted, dangers are marked by 
navigation aids and it is closely monitored by VTS stations in the UK and France.  
Nevertheless, it is coastal navigation and requires a high state of alertness and the 
ability to react quickly to the potential dangers.  
The watch conditions detailed in Ovit’s SMS (Annex G) provided guidance on the 
levels of bridge manning in differing situations. In this case, Ovit was following a 
traIfic lane viVibility waV good and there were Iew other VhipV in the immediate 
area. Therefore, the applicable watch condition to be used arguably rested between 
‘watch condition A’ (OOW and lookout) and ‘watch condition B’ (master, OOW and 
lookout). Namely, the master would probably be required to be on the bridge when 
approaching and passing key choke points, such as the Varne Bank. 
+owever although the potential dangerV oI heavy traIfic and the pro[imity oI 
navigational hazards warranted a cautious approach, they did not trigger any 
additional precautions on board Ovit. The passage through the Dover Strait was 
treated in exactly the same way as a passage in open water. Indeed, the master’s 
deciVion to remain in hiV cabin when called by the chieI oIficer at  indicateV an 
astounding level of complacency given that his vessel was apparently drifting in the 
Dover Strait with no propulsion available.    
2.5 ECdIS
2.5.1 Use on board Ovit
ECDIS was the primary method of navigation on board Ovit; no paper charts were 
carried. Therefore, it was vital that the system was set up appropriately and that 
the oIficerV operating the eTuipment were Iully Iamiliar with itV IunctionV.  7he 
circumstances of the accident show that the Maris 900 was not used effectively. In 
particular:
Safety contour
The safety contour setting is intended to offer the OOW a distinct difference 
between safe and potentially unsafe water; crossing the safety contour initiates an 
alarm to alert the watchkeeper. Using the formula in Ovit’s SMS,13 (Annex E), the 
safety contour value should have been set at 13.35m. The ECDIS would then have 
defaulted to the nearest deeper contour on the chart in use, which was the 20m 
contour.  Instead, the safety contour was set to 30m, which was the manufacturer’s 
default setting.  A comparison of ECDIS displays using 30m and 20m safety 
contours (Figure 13) shows that use of the 20m setting would have provided a much 
clearer picture of where there was safe water available.
Route monitoring
A deviation from the planned route is a mandatory ECDIS alarm.  However, the 
;7' alarm iV only eIIective when the planned route iV VaIe in the firVt place and 
an appropriate value for XTD is set.  In this case, the XTD value was 0.00nm and 
therefore the XTD alarms were of no value.
13 (Draft + squat) x 1.5 = (7.9 + 1) x 1.5 = 13.35m
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ENC management
During the Dover Strait passage, the ENC in use was GB202657 which was a 
‘general’ chart on a scale of 1:350,000 (Figure 15).  In coastal waters, this scale of 
chart would only be effective for planning purposes.  ENC, GB401892 on a scale 
of 1:45,000 (Figure 16), which was suitable for coastal navigation, was available 
on board but it was not in use. The ECDIS ‘auto-load’ feature, which would have 
automatically selected the best scale chart, was switched off.  
Although the presence of the jail bars (Figure 6) should have alerted the OOW that 
Vomething waV wrong with the (&',6 diVplay the chieI oIficer did not recogniVe 
their Vignificance. &onVeTuently he did not manually load the better Vcale (1&.
Audible alarm
The ECDIS audible alarm is a mandated feature and is vital for alerting the operator 
to navigational danger or VyVtem IailureV.  Without the correct configuration oI the 
communications port, Ovit’s audible alarm was inoperable.  Although the installation 
report (Annex d) Vtated that all configurationV had been completed it iV poVVible 
that the audible alarm had never worked on board. However, it is also possible that 
the configuration oI the alarm¶V communication port had been tampered with during 
Ovit’s time in service. Either way, the evidence gathered during this investigation 
indicateV that the veVVel¶V decN oIficerV had operated the (&',6 without an audible 
alarm for a considerable period of time.
2.5.2 The Maris 900 system
In addition to the incorrect operation of the ECDIS by Ovit¶V decN oIficerV Vome 
IeatureV oI the 0ariV  (&',6 on board the veVVel were either diIficult to uVe or 
appeared not to comply with international standards, notably:
• At the top of the check-route page, it clearly stated that the selected 
route was unsafe (Figure 11).  However, it was unhelpful that the words 
‘no alarms’ could be seen in the bottom left of the same page.  The ‘no 
alarms’ information refers to system input data but, as shown by Ovit’s deck 
oIficerV¶ underVtanding oI the VyVtem it can be inadvertently linNed with the 
navigational safety data above it.  
• Despite its critical importance, the safety contour setting is one of several 
indistinguishable settings on the same page (Figure 9). The importance of the 
safety contour setting is not emphasised to the operator.
• The safety contour alarm should have activated shortly before Ovit crossed 
the 30m contour at 0417. However, the ECDIS display during the grounding 
(Figure 6) shows that only the XTD and grounding alarms were active. As the 
safety contour alarm is intended to activate when a vessel is about to cross 
the designated contour, it is almost certain that it did not function because 
the ‘display and highlight dangers’ option on the guard zone page was set to 
‘never’ (Figure 10). Effectively, this disabled a mandatory alarm.
• The ability to record and then retrieve a vessel’s track history is a mandatory 
feature listed in the ECDIS performance standards (paragraph 1.13).  Other 
than the vessel’s position at 0412, Ovit’s track history could not be recovered 
from the system after the grounding.
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2.6 ECdIS TRAINING ANd FAMILIARISATION
Ovit¶V maVter and itV decN oIficerV had completed generic training on the uVe oI 
(&',6. 7hey had alVo completed typeVpecific training on the 0ariV  VyVtem 
before joining Ovit.  Nonetheless, it is evident that they were unable to safely and 
confidently operate the (&',6 on board the veVVel. 7hereIore while the oIficerV¶ 
training VatiVfied the reTuirementV oI 67&W and the ,60 they were unaware oI the 
importance oI critical VaIety VettingV and the Vignificance oI the VyVtem¶V alarmV. 
,n Vhort the training which the Vhip¶V oIficerV had attended waV apparently either 
ineIIective or inVuIficient or both.
The relatively rapid introduction of ECDIS has led to a situation where large numbers 
oI decN oIficerV are having to be trained in itV uVe in a Vhort timeVcale. ,n thiV caVe 
it led to VhipV¶ oIficerV oI varying ranNV and e[perienceV being trained in the Vame 
classroom. From the outside, this did not appear to have been a problem. However, 
it clearly preVented diIficultieV Ior Ovit’s master, who felt unable to ask questions 
or admit a lacN oI Nnowledge becauVe it could be identified aV a weaNneVV.  
&onVeTuently he gained little Irom the typeVpecific training and waV unable to uVe 
the Maris 900 when he arrived on board. Therefore he was unable to meet his many 
responsibilities with regard to SOLAS and STCW. 
The requirements for the delivery and content of ECDIS familiarisation has been 
debated for some time. Currently, it is left to the discretion of Flag States and 
ship owners to decide. The options available include shore-based courses and 
computer-based training from a variety of training providers. However, Flag States 
Veem to diIIer on the Vuitability oI including training on Vpecific (&',6 modelV during 
generic courses.
Irrespective of the way the requirement for ECDIS familiarisation is met, it is 
essential that ship owners and managers ensure that it is effective. Given that some 
decN oIficerV are Iamiliar with and underVtand modern technology more than otherV 
and that cultural inÀuenceV alVo aIIect learning thiV will not alwayV be eaVy to 
achieve. 
2.7 ONBOARd LEAdERSHIP
The SMS bridge procedures provided on board Ovit by Ayder Tankers Ltd were 
comprehensive and included extensive guidance on the conduct of navigation using 
ECDIS. The master had also been briefed on the SMS by the ship managers during 
hiV viVit to itV oIficeV beIore he Moined Ovit. However, it is evident that the master and 
decN oIficerV did not implement the Vhip manager¶V policieV Ior VaIe navigation and 
bridge watchkeeping. 
The serious shortcomings in the supervision of the passage planning and bridge 
watchkeeping practices, the lack of awareness of the increased risk when transiting 
the Dover Strait, and the incorrect or inappropriate use of the ECDIS, have already 
been discussed (paragraphs 2.3, 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6). There are, however, a number 
of other departures from the onboard guidance which removed important safety 
barriers. These included:
• 1o preVailing brieI tooN place among the decN oIficerV beIore the Vhip Vailed. 
Indeed, it is likely that such briefs were rarely held.  
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• The inoperative ECDIS alarm had not been reported. Instead, the deck 
oIficerV were content to µlive¶ with the deIect. 
• The BNWAS was switched off and no safety depth setting was selected on 
the echo sounder.  
• The ECDIS –Voyage Plan – Check List (Annex B) was not used.
The on board management of Ovit was dysfunctional. Morale was low; the second 
oIficer did not want to remain on board and the newly promoted chieI oIficer had 
been put under pressure by the delays in crew handover and the unavailability of 
cigaretteV on board. 0ore importantly the maVter provided inVuIficient leaderVhip Ior 
a safety culture to be developed and instilled on his bridge.
$ Vhip¶V maVter Vhould have the confidence to Vet the VtandardV Ior hiV bridge team 
which should include leading by example and identifying and addressing training 
shortfalls.  To achieve this, a master should have the necessary technical knowledge 
and professional skill.  In this case, ECDIS was the primary means of navigation, 
but Ovit¶V maVter waV not confident uVing it. 7hereIore he waV reliant on hiV Munior 
oIficerV who were alVo unable to operate the (&',6 eIIectively.
At the time of the vessel’s grounding, the master had been on board Ovit for 3 
months. This was ample time for him to better familiarise himself with the ECDIS 
operation, particularly its check-route function, which would have enabled him to 
overVee the worN oI hiV oIficerV. %y not maNing the eIIort to do thiV the maVter Vet 
a poor example. Although Ovit’V maVter had been Tualified aV a maVter Ior  yearV 
and had completed a BRM course 6 months earlier, it is evident that his technical 
and management skills had not fully developed. 
2.8 NAVIGATION AUdIT ANd INSPECTION
2.8.1 Navigation audits
The serious shortcomings with the navigation on board Ovit highlighted in 
thiV inveVtigation had not been identified during the veVVel¶V recent auditV and 
inspections (paragraph 1.11).  However, other than the SIRE inspection, the audits 
and inspections pre-dated the vessel’s crew at the time of grounding, and the SIRE 
inVpection occurred when the Vecond oIficer waV the Vhip¶V navigator.
Although the SIRE inspection occurred only 10 days before the grounding, the two 
navigation-related observations reported indicate that the inspection went into some 
detail. Nevertheless, the inspection did not identify the crew’s lack of competence in 
uVing (&',6 or the Vignificant deIect with itV audible alarm.
It is recognised that audits and inspections are a sampling process; it would 
be impossible to check every facet of a ship’s navigation within a reasonable 
timescale. However, as ECDIS is replacing paper charts as the primary means of 
navigation on many vessels, it is imperative that auditors and inspectors are able 
to identify problems in the way ECDIS are managed, maintained and used. The 
degree of understanding required of an auditor to check that ENC data in an ECDIS 
is up to date is clearly more complex than that required to check a written passage 
plan, and the correction status of paper charts and nautical publications.  
48
Many auditors and inspectors do not have a background in navigation, and those 
that do might not have been trained in ECDIS. Consequently, few will have even 
a basic understanding of the system, leaving them ill-equipped to assess a core 
safety-critical function, that of safe navigation. Therefore, there is a strong case for 
the development and provision of tools that will enable auditors and inspectors to 
properly check the use and performance of this equipment.
2.8.2 Routine performance testing
(VtabliVhing that the 9'5 in a Vhip iV perIorming correctly can be diIficult due to the 
‘black box’ nature of the system.  As a result, VDR systems are subject to installation 
and annual performance checks.  This IMO requirement14 has to be conducted by a 
competent perVon and aimV to confirm compliance with international perIormance 
standards.  
$V (&',6 iV increaVingly widely fitted in accordance with mandatory ,02 carriage 
reTuirementV there would potentially be Vignificant benefit Irom a teVting regime 
similar to that for VDRs.  This would enable Flag State, PSC and other inspectors 
such as OCIMF to be assured that a ship’s ECDIS system had been subject to 
thorough and frequent performance testing.
2.9 dOVER COASTGUARd
2.9.1 Varne Bank alerting system
While the responsibility to avoid grounding lies with the ship’s master, the Varne 
Bank alerting system provides a valuable additional safety barrier against this 
Vignificant ha]ard in the 'over 6trait.  ,n thiV caVe the alerting VyVtem did not worN 
as intended.
An audible alarm sounded in the Dover Coastguard operations room at 0411 
when Ovit approached the radar guard zone. At the time, the CNIS operator was 
communicating with another vessel and, instead of calling Ovit on VHF radio to 
determine the tanker OOW’s intentions and if there was a risk of grounding, the 
operator cancelled both the audible and visual alarm by selecting ‘authorise’. By 
selecting ‘authorise’ rather than ‘acknowledge’ the alarms did not reactivate when 
the vessel entered the guard zone. 
Ovit grounded 23 minutes later, but the CNIS operator did not investigate the 
possibility that the tanker had grounded until 0449 (Table 1). Although it is evident 
that the operator was distracted at a crucial time, it is also apparent that the operator 
waV not Tualified Ior the role and waV not VuperviVed. ,n addition there waV no 
Vpecific training Ior operatorV in the uVe oI the alerting VyVtem and the alerting 
procedure had not been formalised. 
2.9.2 Supervision
$V the &1,6 operator at the time oI the grounding waV unTualified Ior the role it waV 
inappropriate Ior the two Iully Tualified memberV oI the watch to be abVent Irom the 
operations room at the same time, leaving no one in charge.  The presence in the 
operationV room oI either the watch manager or the watch oIficer could eaVily have 
been achieved through better management of the watch rota.  
14 IMO MSC.1/Circ.1222 dated 11 December 2006
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Had the CNIS operator been properly supervised when the Varne Bank alarm 
sounded, it is highly likely that a rapid re-prioritisation and re-allocation of tasks 
would have been prompted. As Dover Coastguard communicated with Ovit without 
diIficulty aIter the grounding it iV reaVonable to conclude that had a clear verbal 
warning been issued by Dover Coastguard on VHF radio at 0411, there would have 
been a good prospect of attracting the attention of either Ovit’s OOW or lookout in 
ample time to prevent the grounding.
2.9.3 Manpower
Notwithstanding that better management of the watch rotation could have avoided 
the trainee operator being left unsupervised, it is of concern that the chronic 
manpower shortages within Dover Coastguard constantly resulted in watches being 
under-manned and/or augmented by members of other watches. The Watch Staffing 
Planning and Risk Evaluation covering the period between 15 and 18 September 
2013 (Annex H) shows that the duty watches at Dover Coastguard were below 
the minimum manning levelV reTuired to maintain an eIficient Vervice in itV areaV 
of responsibility. As this evaluation was typical of other evaluations, the watch 
managers were clearly placed under considerable and enduring pressure.   
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SECTION 3 - CONCLUSIONS 
3.1 SAFETY ISSUES dIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIdENT THAT 
HAVE BEEN AddRESSEd OR RESULTEd IN RECOMMENdATIONS
1. The passage plan, which was prepared by an inexperienced and unsupervised 
Munior oIficer paVVed directly over the 9arne %anN and waV unVaIe. >.@
2. The passage plan was not properly checked for navigational hazards using the 
ECDIS check-route function and it was not checked by the master.  [2.2]
3. When taking over the watch, the OOW did not check the ship’s intended track 
relative to any dangers to navigation that would be encountered on his watch. [2.3.1]
4. The OOW monitored the vessel’s position solely against the intended track. 
Consequently, his situational awareness was poor. [2.3.1]
5. Although the lights from the cardinal buoys marking the Varne Bank were seen by 
the lookout, they were not reported. [2.3.1]
6. The passage through the Dover Strait was treated in exactly the same way as a 
passage in open water. Moreover, the master demonstrated an astounding level of 
complacency when his vessel was apparently drifting in the Dover Strait without 
propulsion. [2.4]
7. 7he decN oIficerV were unable to VaIely navigate uVing the veVVel¶V (&',6. 7he 
route was not properly checked, inappropriate depth and cross track error settings 
were used, and the scale of ENC in use was unsuitable for the area. [2.5.1]
8. The ECDIS audible alarm was inoperative.  Although the crew were aware of this 
defect, it had not been reported. [2.5.1] 
9. (&',6 training undertaNen by the Vhip¶V maVter and decN oIficerV had not eTuipped 
them with the level of knowledge necessary to operate the system effectively. [2.6]
10. The SMS bridge procedures provided on board Ovit by Ayder Tankers Ltd were 
comprehensive and included extensive guidance on the conduct of navigation using 
(&',6.  +owever it iV evident that the maVter and decN oIficerV did not implement 
the ship manager’s policies for safe navigation and bridge watchkeeping. [2.7]
11. The on board management of Ovit was dysfunctional and the master provided 
inVuIficient leaderVhip Ior a VaIety culture to be developed and inVtilled on hiV bridge. 
[2.7]
12. The serious shortcomings with the navigation on board Ovit highlighted in 
thiV inveVtigation had not been identified during the veVVel¶V recent auditV and 
inspections. There is a strong case to develop and provide tools for auditors and 
inspectors to check the use and performance of ECDIS. [2.8.1]
13. The Varne Bank alerting system operated by Dover Coastguard did not work as 
intended. A VHF warning was not broadcast to Ovit because the CNIS operator was 
diVtracted. $lVo the operator waV not Tualified Ior the role and waV not VuperviVed. 
,n addition there waV no Vpecific training in the alerting VyVtem and the alerting 
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procedure had not been formalised. [2.9.1]
14. ,t waV inappropriate Ior the two Iully Tualified memberV oI the 'over &oaVtguard 
watch to be absent from the operations room at the same time, leaving the 
unTualified operator unVuperviVed. >..@
15. It is of concern that chronic manpower shortages within Dover Coastguard resulted 
in watches constantly being under-manned and/or augmented by members of other 
watches. [2.9.3]
3.2 SAFETY ISSUES NOT dIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING TO THE 
ACCIdENT THAT HAVE BEEN AddRESSEd OR RESULTEd IN 
RECOMMENdATIONS
1. Several of the features of the Maris 900 ECDIS on board Ovit were either diIficult to 
use or appeared not to comply with international standards. [2.5.2]
2. $V (&',6 iV increaVingly widely fitted in accordance with mandatory ,02 carriage 
reTuirementV there would potentially be Vignificant benefit Irom a teVting regime 
similar to that required for VDRs. [2.8.2]
3.3 OTHER SAFETY ISSUES NOT dIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING TO THE 
ACCIdENT
1. It took the OOW 19 minutes to realise that Ovit was aground and a further 14 
minutes to report the accident to Dover Coastguard. The OOW’s vagueness when 
subsequently answering the coastguard’s questions was unhelpful and potentially 
could have delayed assistance. [2.3.2]
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SECTION 4 - ACTIONS TAkEN
Ayder Tankers Ltd has:
• Issued a company safety bulletin highlighting the issues raised by the 
grounding with the aim of increasing crew knowledge and safety culture.
• Included training on defect reporting system in in-house training.
• Directed all vessels to conduct a master-led risk assessment for navigation in 
the Dover Strait.
• Agreed a contract with a third party company for provision of navigational 
audits of ships.
• 0oved to computerbaVed training Ior the IamiliariVation oI decN oIficerV in 
typeVpecific (&',6.
• Taken action to ensure that ECDIS training imparted ashore is effectively 
implemented on board its vessels.
The Maritime Coastguard Agency/dover Coastguard has, inter alia:
• Included the Varne Bank alerting procedure in its written instructions and 
embedded the use of the procedure in its operator training and assessment. 
The procedure has also been updated to limit the authorisation of the Varne 
Bank alarm to senior watch managers and watch managers only.
• Issued instructions that, where a CNIS operator has not completed a V103/1 
VTS Operator course, the trainee operator is to be accompanied by a fully 
Tualified operator Vitting alongVide at all timeV.
• Taken action to ensure that watch rotations over meal breaks are properly 
managed.
• Included the composition of the Dover Coastguard watches as a standing 
agenda item at monthly management meetings.
• Made arrangements for adjacent coastguard stations to take over Dover’s 
SAR responsibilities in extremis to enable Dover Coastguard to focus on its 
VTS responsibilities (CNIS and Sunk).
• ,nvited watch oIficerV at other coaVtguard VtationV to move to 'over 
Coastguard.
• Taken steps to ensure that incursions by vessels into the guard zone around 
the Varne Bank, which require CNIS operator intervention, are recorded and 
submitted to the UK Safety of Navigation Committee.
Marine Information Systems AS has:
• Introduced a software upgrade to the Maris ECDIS 900 system to ensure that 
logbook data recording is always active.
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SECTION 5 - RECOMMENdATIONS
The Maritime and Coastguard Agency is recommended to:
139/2014 Forward a submission to the IMO Navigation, Communication and Search   
 and Rescue Sub-committee, promoting the concept of carrying out annual   
 perIormance checNV on all (&',6 VyVtemV fitted to VhipV and in uVe aV   
 the primary means of navigation. 
140/2014 Monitor the measures adopted to improve the quality of the VTS services   
 provided by Dover Coastguard to ensure that vessel safety is not    
 compromiVed taNing into account the importance oI VuIficient Tualified   
 operators being available.
Transport Malta, in co-operation with the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, is 
recommended to:
141/2014 Propose to the Paris Memorandum of Understanding Committee that a   
 &oncentrated ,nVpection &ampaign be conducted oI (&',6fitted    
 ships to establish the standards of system knowledge among    
 navigatorV uVing a liVt oI predefined TueVtionV.
The International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) and the Oil Companies International 
Marine Forum (OCIMF) are recommended to:
142/2014 In conjunction with ECDIS experts, develop and promulgate a set of focused  
 questions for use by surveyors and auditors when conducting audits and   
 inVpectionV on (&',6 fitted VhipV.
Ayder Tankers Ltd is recommended to:
143/2014 Take steps through audit and assessment to monitor the effectiveness of the  
 (&',6 IamiliariVation provided to itV decN oIficerV. 
Marine Information Systems AS is recommended to:
144/2014 Improve the management of safety critical information in its ECDIS 900   
 system, focusing on:
• The protection of recorded positional data in accordance with IMO 
standards.
• Highlighting the importance of safety contour data to the user.
• The activation of an alarm when the safety contour is about to be 
crossed in accordance with IMO standards.
Safety recommendations shall in no case create a presumption of blame or liability
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Grounding of
CSL THAMES 
in the Sound of Mull 
9 August 2011
At 1026 (UTC +1) on 9 August 2011, 
CSL Thames, a Maltese registered self-
discharging bulk carrier, grounded briefly 
in the Sound of Mull while on passage 
from Glensanda to Wilhelmshaven. The 
vessel sustained bottom damage to her 
hull, including a 3-metre fracture to one 
of her water ballast deep tanks, which 
flooded. There were no reported injuries 
or pollution.
The MAIB investigation found that CSL 
Thames ran aground after the third 
officer had altered the vessel’s course to 
starboard of the planned track to avoid 
another vessel. He did not notice that 
the alteration would take CSL Thames 
into shallow water, and the audio alarm 
on the electronic chart display and 
information system (ECDIS) that should 
have alerted him to the impending 
danger was inoperative.  Further, the 
master’s and other watchkeepers’ 
knowledge of the vessel’s ECDIS was 
insufficient and therefore no-one within 
the bridge team questioned the absence 
of the ECDIS audio alarm, or recognised 
that the system’s safety contour setting 
was inappropriate for the planned 
voyage. 
Alfa Ship & Crew Management GmbH 
has taken a number of actions designed 
to prevent a similar accident in the 
future. Additionally, the MAIB has issued 
a recommendation to the company 
designed to ensure the introduction 
of written instructions and guidance 
on the use of ECDIS and emergency 
preparedness, and measures to verify 
that these will be properly implemented 
throughout its fleet.
This investigation has been 
conducted with the co-operation 
and assistance of the Malta 
Marine Safety Investigation Unit.
Summary
Reproduced from Admiralty Chart BA 2390 by permission of the Controller of HMSO and the UK Hydrographic Office
Figure 1: AIS tracks of CSL Thames and sailing vessel
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FACTUAL INFORMATION
Narrative
At 0820 on 9 August 2011, CSL Thames completed 
loading a cargo of 28,962 tonnes of aggregates 
at Glensanda for discharge at Wilhelmshaven.  A 
pilot boarded and, at 0840, the vessel departed.  In 
addition to the pilot, the bridge was manned by the 
master, third officer and a helmsman. The vessel’s 
deepest draught was 10.63 metres. At 0848, the 
pilot disembarked and the master set the engine 
to full ahead. Visibility was good with a moderate 
west-north-west breeze.
At 0935, CSL Thames entered the Sound of 
Mull. To assist with navigation during the transit, 
the master used two radars and an ECDIS. 
The ECDIS was set with the following safety 
parameters: a safety contour of 10 metres;  a 
cross-track deviation limit of 0.2 mile either side of 
the planned track; and an anti-grounding warning 
zone that covered an arc 1º either side of the 
vessel’s track out to a distance equivalent to 10 
minutes steaming. The alarm on the ECDIS should 
therefore have activated if CSL Thames deviated 
more than 0.2 miles from her planned track, or 
the anti-grounding warning zone crossed a safety 
contour or other user-defined danger.
At 1006 (Figure 1), with CSL Thames on a heading 
of 290º(T) at a speed of 12 knots, the master 
instructed the helmsman to engage the autopilot 
and then handed the con to the third officer, who 
stood facing the starboard radar display, with the 
ECDIS display to his right (Figure 2). The master 
increased the volume on a portable compact 
disc player that had been playing music on the 
bridge since the pilot disembarked, and moved to 
the communication centre on the port side of the 
bridge to send routine departure messages.
At 1010, the third officer interpreted from the 
ECDIS display that CSL Thames was about 1 mile 
from the next planned waypoint; he also estimated 
that a sailing vessel he could see on the starboard 
bow would be ahead of CSL Thames when she 
was steady on her new course. Intending to leave 
the sailing vessel to port, he decided to turn early 
and, by adjusting the autopilot, initiated a slow 
alteration of course to starboard towards the next 
planned course of 314º (T).At 1014 (Figure 3), as 
CSL Thames’s heading was passing 308º(T), the 
third officer acquired on the radar an automatic 
identification system (AIS) target of the sailing 
vessel at a range of 3.6 miles and on a bearing of 
318.5º(T). At 1016, with CSL Thames approaching 
her planned course of 314º (T), he decided to 
continue the alteration to starboard to place the 
sailing vessel onto the port bow. At 1018, CSL 
Thames was on a heading of 321º (T) when the 
third officer observed another small vessel right 
ahead at about 1 mile range. With the intention 
of leaving the small vessel to port, he continued 
altering course to 324º (T). The ECDIS anti-
grounding warning zone alarm then activated on 
the display, but no audible alarm sounded.
At 1021, the third officer sounded two long blasts 
on the ship’s whistle to alert the small vessel to the 
Radar
Third Officer
ECDIS
Helmsman
Figure 2: View of ECDIS and position of bridge team
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presence of CSL Thames and, at about 1023, the 
small vessel passed clear on CSL Thames’s port 
side. The third officer then focused his attention on 
the sailing vessel ahead, which was now at about 1 
mile range.
At 1025, CSL Thames grounded in position 56º 
34.3’N, 005º57.2’W at a speed of about 12 knots 
(Figure 4). The contact with the seabed lasted 
16 seconds and caused the vessel to vibrate 
loudly. This prompted the master to return to the 
conning position and to look at the ECDIS display. 
Recognising that his vessel had run aground, 
he instructed the helmsman to switch to manual 
steering and ordered the wheel to hard-a-port. The 
sailing vessel also altered course to port and both 
vessels narrowly avoided colliding with each other.
Post-grounding events
At 1029, the master steadied CSL Thames on 
a heading to return her to the planned track. He 
instructed the third officer to check the automated 
ballast tank sounding display located on the 
bridge. The third officer reported a sounding in 
No 3(P) ballast deep tank, which had previously 
been empty, indicating an ingress of water to that 
tank.  The master then telephoned the engine 
room. He informed the chief engineer about what 
had happened, and instructed him to monitor the 
tank soundings and to check for any damage in 
the engine room. At 1047, the master informed 
the ship’s management company’s technical 
superintendent of the accident and of the ingress 
of water in No 3(P) ballast deep tank. At 1055, the 
master reduced the vessel’s speed to 9 knots and, 
at 1057, notified the company’s designated person 
ashore (DPA). 
Soon afterwards, the chief engineer reported that 
all other tank soundings were stable and that there 
were no other signs of damage. 
On instruction from the master, 
the chief officer started to pump 
out water from the damaged deep 
tank;  he reported that the ballast 
pump was able to cope with the 
rate of ingress and that the level 
of water in the tank was reducing. 
The master then instructed the 
chief officer and chief engineer 
to attempt to enter the tank to 
establish the extent of damage. 
When the sounding had reduced 
to about 50cm, the chief officer, 
chief engineer and a seaman 
entered the tank and identified a 
3-metre longitudinal fracture in 
the hull bottom plating.
At about 1315, with No 3(P) ballast deep tank 
vacated and its access re-secured, the master 
increased the vessel’s speed to full ahead. At 1400, 
he informed the DPA of his initial findings and of 
his assessment that it was safe for CSL Thames to 
continue her passage to Wilhelmshaven. At 1600, 
the vessel’s classification society agreed to the 
vessel continuing to Wilhelmshaven to discharge 
her cargo on the condition that CSL Thames 
proceeded to the nearest repair facility immediately 
afterwards.
At 1445 on 12 August, CSL Thames was berthed 
safely at Wilhelmshaven. At 0800 on 13 August, 
having discharged her cargo, the vessel left 
Wilhelmshaven and, later on the same day, entered 
Emden dry dock for repairs. She re-entered 
service on 27 August. 
ECDIS training and guidance
CSL Thames was fitted with two ECDIS units that 
were used as the primary means of navigation, 
thus removing the need for paper charts to be 
carried. All bridge officers, including the master, 
had completed a generic ECDIS training course 
in the Philippines. This course was based on IMO 
Model Course 1.271 with a duration of 40 hours. 
No training or familiarisation on the type of ECDIS 
fitted on board CSL Thames had been provided by 
the ship’s management company (Alfa Ship & Crew 
Management GmbH) or by previous employers. 
There is currently no mandatory requirement for 
bridge officers to receive such ‘equipment specific’ 
training, and reliance is placed on the vessel’s 
1  The IMO Model Course 1.27 on the Operational Use 
of Electronic Chart Display and Information Systems is 
regarded as a minimum requirement to receive an ECDIS 
certificate.
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technical management company to provide 
familiarisation training in compliance with the ISM 
Code. However, for UK registered vessels, the 
MCA, through its Marine Information Note 4052, 
has clarified what generic and ‘equipment specific’ 
training it regards as acceptable. The company 
had not provided any instructions or guidance on 
the use of the ECDIS fitted to CSL Thames.
2  Training for ECDIS as Primary Means of Navigation, 
available at www.dft.gov.uk/mca/min_405.pdf 
The third officer
The third officer, a Phillippines national, started his 
sea career as a deckhand in 1990. In November 
2008, he obtained his first watchkeeping certificate 
of competency (STCW II/I officer of a watch3),and 
was promoted to the rank of third officer in October 
2009. Since then, he had served a total of about 
3  STCW: International Convention on Standards of Training, 
Certification and Watchkeeping (as amended 1995).
515 months as officer of the watch on four different 
vessels, including CSL Thames, which he had 
joined in March 2011.
ANALYSIS
The grounding
The following events were significant leading up to 
the grounding of CSL Thames: 
• The third officer prematurely initiated a turn to 
starboard before CSL Thames’s next planned 
waypoint and then continued to alter course to 
starboard for collision avoidance purposes. 
• After initiating the course alteration, the third 
officer did not monitor CSL Thames’s position 
and projected track on the ECDIS display.
• The third officer did not see the activated anti-
grounding warning zone alarm on the ECDIS 
display.
• The ECDIS audible alarm did not function.
The safety issues arising from these events are 
considered below.
Action to avoid collision
The third officer’s decision to prematurely initiate 
a turn to starboard before CSL Thames’s next 
waypoint was based on an assumption that the 
sailing vessel would follow an approximately 
reciprocal course to CSL Thames’s next planned 
course. He perceived that the planned alteration 
of course would result in the two vessels being 
placed at risk of collision, and therefore he opted 
to alter course early to keep to the starboard side 
of the Sound. Soon afterwards, he acquired the 
sailing vessel’s AIS target on the radar display 
bearing 318.5º (T). This required him to alter 
CSL Thames’s course further to starboard than 
originally intended to bring the sailing vessel onto 
CSL Thames’s port bow. The third officer then saw 
another small vessel ahead, which he presumed to 
be crossing from starboard to port. In again opting 
to leave this vessel to port, the third officer altered 
course further to starboard and onto a track that 
would cause CSL Thames to run aground within 10 
minutes.  
A course alteration to starboard might have been 
an appropriate action in open sea conditions. 
However, the third officer had prematurely initiated 
the turn to starboard in an area of restricted sea 
room, and the vessel was already heading further 
to starboard than the planned course. This should 
have prompted him to confirm CSL Thames’s 
current position and projected track before 
deciding on an appropriate action.
The third officer was required by Rule 7 of the 
COLREGS4 to determine if a risk of collision 
existed before taking action. Analysis of CSL 
Thames’s radar recording indicates that, had 
the third officer followed the planned track in 
accordance with the passage plan, the other two 
vessels would have passed clear on her starboard 
side (Figure 3).
Position monitoring
The third officer was unaware that CSL Thames 
was heading into danger. He had last looked at 
the ECDIS display immediately before initiating 
CSL Thames’s turn to starboard at 1010. The 
ECDIS display anti-grounding warning zone alarm 
activated at about 1018. However, the focus of the 
third officer’s attention was on collision avoidance, 
and involved him looking ahead through the bridge 
windows and monitoring the radar display. 
While the third officer relied on the ECDIS as the 
primary means of navigation, he did not appreciate 
the extent to which he needed to monitor CSL 
Thames’s position and projected track in relation 
to the planned track and surrounding hazards. 
The ECDIS display was orientated so that the 
OOW had to face to starboard to look at the 
screen (Figure 2). Although this might have been 
ergonomically satisfactory for routine navigational 
watchkeeping, the third officer’s overriding priority 
during the period leading up to the accident 
was collision avoidance, which required him 
to look ahead. Had the ECDIS display been 
located in front of him, he would have been more 
likely to routinely consult it when monitoring the 
navigational situation. 
Traditional navigational techniques require an 
officer of the watch to regularly plot a series 
of historical positions on a paper chart from 
which to project the vessel’s track. The ECDIS 
display provided the third officer with an ability to 
immediately identify the vessel’s current position 
and projected track at any time without the need 
for regular plotting. Furthermore, the third officer 
was aware the ECDIS anti-grounding warning zone 
feature was designed to automatically determine 
and alarm if the vessel was running into danger. 
4  The International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at 
Sea 1972 (as amended)
6Consequently, he felt no obligation to check the 
vessel’s position and projected track during the 
15-minute period leading up to the grounding.
ECDIS
A safety contour setting of 10 metres was 
inappropriate for CSL Thames’s draught of 10.63 
metres. Taking into account the height of tide of 1.4 
metres and an estimated squat of 0.9 metre, the 
vessel would have grounded at a charted depth of 
10.13 metres, before crossing the safety contour. 
Although the ECDIS anti-grounding warning zone 
visual alarm activated, the audible alarm, which 
should have alerted the third officer to the fact that 
CSL Thames was heading into danger, did not 
function. This was because the ECDIS unit was not 
connected to a loudspeaker or buzzer capable of 
sounding an audible alarm, contrary to the IMO’s 
performance standards5. 
The ECDIS on board CSL Thames was originally 
configured to alarm through the bridge alarm 
monitoring system but this was found disconnected 
following the accident. On joining CSL Thames, 
neither the master nor the other bridge officers 
had questioned the absence of an ECDIS audible 
alarm. 
Despite having attended training courses that 
met the standards of the IMO model course 
for ECDIS, CSL Thames’s master and bridge 
watchkeepers lacked an understanding of the 
ECDIS equipment’s safety features and/or their 
value. ECDIS provides the officer of the watch 
with an efficient and effective means of navigation. 
However, its ability to continuously provide the 
vessel’s current position and projected track, 
and to warn of approaching dangers, can lead to 
over-reliance and complacency. The officer of the 
watch still needs to monitor the vessel’s position 
and projected track at regular intervals and to fully 
understand the equipment’s safety features in 
order to make best use of them.
The above shortfalls can be addressed through 
equipment-specific training and onboard 
instructions and guidance.  
Bridge team management
During the period leading up to the grounding, 
the third officer remained confident that he was 
in control of the navigational situation, and felt no 
need to defer to the master. However, at 1021, he 
5   International Maritime Organization (IMO) MSC.232(82) 
and International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 61174 
ed.3/4).
was sufficiently concerned about the intentions 
of the small vessel ahead of CSL Thames that 
he sounded the ship’s whistle. The master was 
sitting at the communications centre at the rear 
of the bridge and the activation of the ship’s 
whistle should have alerted him to the developing 
situation. Had he taken more interest in the 
navigational situation faced by the OOW, he might 
have been prompted to challenge the third officer’s 
actions, particularly as a sound signal of two long 
blasts has no meaning in the COLREGS in respect 
of collision avoidance in clear visibility. The master 
may then have identified that CSL Thames was 
running into danger and taken remedial action.The 
Sound of Mull is a regular route for coastal traffic 
and does not pose a challenge for small vessels. 
However, CSL Thames was a large vessel and 
required careful navigation in view of the restricted 
sea room and the likelihood of her encountering 
other traffic. The master was confident of the third 
officer’s abilities and, on handing him the con, was 
content for him to navigate alone. However, his 
confidence was misplaced. The third officer lacked 
experience and, given the navigational demands 
of the passage, needed the support of the master, 
who should have avoided sending the routine 
departure messages until CSL Thames was clear 
of the Sound.
Bridge environment
The master routinely encouraged music to 
be played on the bridge, and the volume was 
particularly loud during the period leading up to 
the grounding. Loud music can impair the keeping 
of a proper lookout as required by Rule 5 of the 
COLREGS. Had the ECDIS audible alarm been 
functioning, it might still not have been heard by the 
third officer due to the background noise pollution 
provided by the loud music. 
Post-accident actions
Following the accident, CSL Thames’s bridge team 
did not use the grounding checklist or record the 
times of follow-up actions taken on board, contrary 
to the company’s instructions. Although most of the 
required actions specified on the checklist were 
carried out, some important items were missed: 
sounding the general alarm, stopping the vessel 
after clearing the immediate danger to establish 
the extent of damage, and checking the vessel’s 
damage stability and strength. 
The master was keen to establish the extent of 
damage to No 3(P) ballast deep tank. Before the 
tank was entered, he reduced the vessel’s speed 
to 9 knots. However, no risk assessment was 
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undertaken, particularly with regard to the potential 
consequences of opening a breached tank. As the 
ballast pump was capable of stemming the inflow 
of water, tank entry was an unnecessary risk. An 
assessment of the rate of water ingress should 
have been sufficient for the master to decide 
whether to continue on passage or to divert to a 
nearby port for assistance and further assessment.
CONCLUSIONS 
1. The third officer’s decision to prematurely 
initiate a turn to starboard before CSL 
Thames’s next waypoint was based on an 
assumption that the sailing vessel would follow 
an approximately reciprocal course to CSL 
Thames’s next planned course. 
2. Analysis of CSL Thames’s radar recording 
indicates that, had the third officer followed the 
planned track in accordance with the passage 
plan, the other two vessels would have passed 
clear on her starboard side.
3. Had the ECDIS display been located in front 
of him, the third officer would have been more 
likely to routinely consult it when monitoring the 
navigational situation. 
4. The third officer did not detect activation of 
the anti-grounding warning zone visual alarm 
because he was not monitoring the ECDIS 
display.    
5. The ECDIS anti-grounding warning zone 
audible alarm, which should have alerted the 
third officer to the fact that CSL Thames was 
heading into danger, did not function.
6. The ECDIS safety contour setting was 
inappropriate for CSL Thames’s draught at the 
time of the accident, and neither the master 
nor the other bridge officers had questioned 
the absence of an ECDIS audible alarm. 
This indicates a lack of understanding of the 
equipment’s safety features and/or their value.
7.  The master’s confidence in the third officer’s 
abilities was misplaced. The third officer 
lacked experience and, given the navigational 
demands of the passage, needed the support 
of the master.
8. Even if the ECDIS audible alarm had been 
functioning, the third officer might not have 
heard it over the loud music being played on 
the bridge.
9. Following the accident, CSL Thames’s bridge 
team did not use the available grounding 
checklist or record the times of follow-up 
actions taken on board. This resulted in some 
important actions not being taken.
10. No risk assessment was undertaken before No 
3(P) ballast deep tank was entered to assess 
the extent of damage. As the ballast pump was 
capable of stemming the inflow of water, tank 
entry was an unnecessary risk.
ACTIONS TAKEN
Alfa Ship & Crew Management GmbH has:
• Repositioned the main ECDIS unit adjacent to 
the starboard radar to enable the officer of the 
watch to view the display while facing forward.
• Reconnected the ECDIS unit to the bridge alarm 
monitoring unit to provide a functioning audible 
alarm.
• Arranged for CSL Thames’s bridge officers, and 
the management company’s DPA and nautical 
superintendent to attend an ‘equipment specific’ 
training course on the ECDIS type fitted on 
board.
• Arranged for the fleet’s bridge officers to attend 
a bridge resource management course.
• Arranged for the nautical superintendent to 
provide onboard ECDIS training to the fleet’s 
other vessels fitted with ECDIS or electronic 
charts.
RECOMMENDATION
Alfa Ship & Crew Management GmbH is 
recommended to:
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Introduce written instructions and guidance to its 
fleet and carry out verification visits to its vessels 
as necessary to ensure that:
• Its bridge watchkeeping officers have a clear 
understanding of how ECDIS should be used 
on board the company’s vessels, and 
• its officers and crew understand the vessel’s 
emergency procedures, and the need to 
properly evaluate routine operations after 
an accident to ensure that any new risks are 
identified and mitigated as appropriate.
8SHIP PARTICULARS
Vessel’s name CSL Thames
Flag Malta
Classification society American Bureau of Shipping
IMO number 9440447
Type Bulk Carrier
Registered owner Pelican Water Investments Ltd
Manager(s) Alfa Ship & Crew Management GmbH
Construction Steel
Length overall 175m
Registered length 170.12m
Gross tonnage 19538
Minimum safe manning 16
Authorised cargo Bulk
VOYAGE PARTICULARS
Port of departure Glensanda, Scotland
Port of arrival Wilhelmshaven, Germany 
Type of voyage International 
Cargo information Aggregates
Manning 19
MARINE CASUALTY INFORMATION
Date and time 9 August 2011, 1025 (UTC +1)
Type of marine casualty or incident Serious Marine Casualty
Location of incident Sound of Mull – 56º34.3’N, 005º57.2’W
Place on board Bridge
Injuries/fatalities None
Damage/environmental impact Bottom damage including a 3-metre fracture to No3 (P)
deep ballast tank 
Ship operation Normal operation
Voyage segment Mid-water
External & internal environment Wind: WNW force 4
Visibility: Good
Tide: Low watwer at 0939 (UTC+1)
Height of tide: 1.4 m
Persons on board 19
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